臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

Schipper (1989) 認為盈餘管理是公司管理當局在符合一般公認會計原則(GAAP) 的前提下，有目的之介入財務報表編製的過程，以達到預期的盈餘目標。Wild et al. (2004)認為盈餘管理：「為滿足個人目的，管理階層蓄意干預盈餘決定的過程」。
本研究在代理變數由1.公司規模2.經理人持股3.十大股東持股4.獨立董事5.槓桿，並加入以公司的未來股價報酬高低來驗證：本研究準備進行探討著實執行盈餘管理的廠商，其短期和長期的未來績效是否與其盈餘管理之目的，損益波動或平穩有關，是否呈現異常正報酬或異常負報酬的關係。
我們假設進行盈餘管理之廠商的目標在於獲取公司未來報酬提高，以及降低公司的損益波動，讓公司損益趨近平穩化。然而，進行盈餘管理之廠商可分為兩種，一種是廠商進行盈餘管理卻未致力於損益平穩化，造成損益發生波動，我們認為此種廠商未來異常報酬在短期會呈現正報酬，故我們假設：假說一:進行盈餘管理卻未損益平穩之廠商其未來報酬短期呈現異常正報酬。廠商在進行盈餘管理後，短期未來報酬雖呈現異常正報酬，但是長期下來，未來報酬將會呈現異常負報酬，故我們建立假說二: 進行盈餘管理卻未損益平穩之廠商其未來報酬長期呈現異常負報酬。
另外一種是廠商進行盈餘管理致力於讓公司損益平穩化，我們認為此種廠商的未來報酬短期會呈現異常正報酬，故我們建立假說三: 進行損益平穩廠商其未來報酬短期呈現異常正報酬。廠商在進行損益平穩後，短期未來報酬呈現異常正報酬，長期下來，未來報酬仍然會呈現異常正報酬，故我們建立假說四: 進行損益平穩廠商其未來報酬長期呈現異常正報酬。
本研究結果發現，進行盈餘管理卻未損益平穩之廠商其未來報酬短期呈現異常負報酬。廠商在進行盈餘管理後，短期未來報酬呈現異常負報酬，長期下來，未來報酬仍然會呈現異常負報酬。然而致力於讓公司損益平穩化之盈餘管理廠商，未來報酬短期會呈現異常正報酬。廠商在進行損益平穩後，短期未來報酬呈現異常正報酬，長期下來，未來報酬仍然會呈現異常正報酬。
顯示從事盈餘管理卻未進行損益平穩之公司，未來一年，即短期下具有異常負報酬，長期而言，資料顯示在未來三年仍然具有異常負報酬，且異常負報酬之程度加劇，代表自由經濟市場非常具有效率性，若存在隱含負面動機下之盈餘管理操弄之廠商，通常會面臨異常負報酬的結果。
然而，從事盈餘管理且同時進行損益平穩之公司，未來一年，及短期下具有異常正報酬，長期而言，資料顯示在未來三年仍然具有異常正報酬，且異常正報酬之程度提高，亦代表存在效率性自由經濟市場，提供睿智投資人理性且透明的選擇。
關鍵詞：盈餘管理、損益平穩、公司治理變數

Schipper, (1989) argued that earning management, which means that the corporate authorities are involved in the process of preparation of financial statements in order to achieve the desired surplus target, according with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) .
Wild, et al (2004) argued that earnings management, which is to meet personal purposes, management authorities intentionally interfere with earnings.
In this study, we use some proxy variables indeed to our model: 1.Size. 2. Managers holding. 3. Top ten shareholders holding. 4. Independent directors. 5. Leverage.
We joined the company's future stock returns into our model, to see if the result were support our hypothesis. Our study is to explore the corporate earnings management between short-term and long-term performance of their earnings management purpose.
Fluctuations or steady may affect our result. Showing that the results which lead to positive abnormal returns or negative abnormal return depend on the corporate purpose.
We assume that the goal of the corporate of earnings management is that to access to company remuneration to improve and reduce the volatility of the company's profit and loss, and the purpose is to make the company’s profit and loss approach smooth.
However, the corporate of earnings management can be divided into two, one is a corporate which execute earning management, but they did not carry out income smoothing. The earnings have not committed to smoothing, resulting in gains and losses fluctuation, and we believe that such corporate shows positive abnormal returns in the short term, and we build the hypothesis1 : corporate of earnings management, which did not carry out income smoothing, shows positive abnormal returns in the short term.
Although the corporate shows positive abnormal returns in the short term, it may shows negative abnormal returns in the long term, so we establish hypotheses2: corporate of earnings management, which did not carry out income smoothing, shows negative abnormal returns in the long term.
The other is a corporate which execute earning management, and they did carry out income smoothing, and we believe that such corporate shows positive abnormal returns in the short term, and we build the hypothesis3 : corporate of earnings management, which did carry out income smoothing, shows positive abnormal returns in the short term.
The corporate shows positive abnormal returns in the short term, and it may still shows positive abnormal returns in the long term, so we establish hypotheses4: corporate of earnings management, which did carry out income smoothing, shows positive abnormal returns in the long term.
The results of this study display a significant message. We found that corporate which execute earning management, did not carry out income smoothing, resulting in gains and losses fluctuation, and such corporate shows negative abnormal returns in the short term.
In the long term, corporate which execute earning management, did not carry out income smoothing, still resulting negative abnormal returns in the long term.
However, corporate which execute earning management, and they did carry out income smoothing, shows positive abnormal returns in the short term. The corporate shows positive abnormal returns in the short term, and it still shows positive abnormal returns in the long term, in other words, corporate of earnings management, which did carry out income smoothing, shows positive abnormal returns in the long term.
According to our data, we found that corporate which execute earning management, did not carry out income smoothing, resulting in gains and losses fluctuation, and such corporate shows negative abnormal returns in the short term, namely, after executing earning management a year. In the long term, corporate which execute earning management, did not carry out income smoothing, still resulting negative abnormal returns in the long term, namely, after executing earning management three years, and the level was raising up, and the effect was severer.
Represent that there is an efficiency, free, and fair free market economy. If corporate which execute earning management, did not carry out income smoothing, existing an unfathomable or bad reason to engage earning management, then they will lead to resulting in negative abnormal returns in the future.
On the contrary, corporate which execute earning management, did carry out income smoothing, resulting in gains and losses steady, and such corporate shows positive abnormal returns in the short term, namely, after executing earning management a year. In the long term, corporate which execute earning management, did carry out income smoothing, still resulting positive abnormal returns in the long term, namely, after executing earning management three years, and the level was raising up, and the effect was splendid.
Represent that there is an efficiency, free, and fair free market economy. If corporate which execute earning management, did carry out income smoothing, existing a positive or good reason to engage earning management, then they will lead to resulting in positive abnormal returns in the future. It also provide rational and transparent choices for wise investors.
Keywords: Earnings management, Income smoothing, Corporate governance variables.

目錄
頁
摘要 i
誌謝辭 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 vi
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第二章 文獻探討 7
第一節 盈餘管理相關假說…. 8
第二節 應計項目模型演進 12
第三節 盈餘管理之實證文獻相關研究 18
第三章 研究方法 25
第一節 研究假說 25
第二節 研究模型 26
第四章 實證結果分析 29
第一節 樣本特性 29
第二節 實證結果 32
第五章 結論與建議 38
第一節 研究結論 38
第二節 研究限制 40
第三節 未來研究建議 40
參考文獻 41

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