臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

In today’s turbulent financial markets, fraud and corporate scandals have become increasing common. New technologies have made it much more difficult for individual investors to detect and safeguard themselves from these increasingly complex scams. Over the past ten years corporate governance principles have been tested, and the weaknesses found in ethical values have made it even more important to be exceedingly aware of the inner workings of corporations. Much research has been done analyzing these companies and their leadership to find the reasons behind the perpetrated fraud. With the help of archival data we can find ways to alert the individual investor, making him more aware of the possibility that accounting figures that seem ‘too good to be true’ – may actually be false. In this paper we examine the internal and external causes of fraud in order to discover methods of early detection and prevention.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I
ABSTRACT II
TABLE OF CONTENTS III
LIST OF TABLES V
LIST OF FIGURES VI
CHAPTER ONE 1
1.1 Research Background and Motivation. 1
1.2 Research Project. 2
1.3 Research Structure. 3
CHAPTER TWO 4
2.1 Corporate Governance and the Sarbanes - Oxley Act 2002. 4
2.2 Statement in Accounting Standards No. 99. 7
2.3 Stakeholders. 8
2.4 Gatekeepers. 8
2.5 Role of the CEO and Upper Management. 9
CHAPTER THREE 12
3.1 The Research Framework. 12
3.2 Earnings Manipulation. 13
3.3 Fraud Occurrences. 14
3.4 Propositions to be analyzed. 23
CHAPTER FOUR 24
4.1 Enron. 24
4.1.1 Background and History. 24
4.1.2 Lessons from Enron. 25
4.2 Worldcom. 27
4.2.1 Background and History. 27
4.2.2 Lessons from Worldcom. 29
4.3 Business organizational culture. 31
4.3.1 WorldCom Culture. 31
4.3.2 Enron Culture. 32
4.4 Investing in Enron and WorldCom. 37
4.4.1 Technical analysis of Enron and WorldCom. 39
CHAPTER FIVE 43
5.1 Current implications. 43
5.1.1 Analyzing the Financials. 44
REFERENCES 46


LIST OF TABLES

Table 3-1 Fraud Occurrences (Cash)……………………………………………………...15
Table 3-2 Fraud Occurrences (Accounts Receivables)…....................................................16
Table 3-3 Fraud Occurrences (Inventory)……………………………………….…..…….17
Table 3-4 Fraud Occurrences (Investments/Securities)………………..……….….…..….17
Table 3-5 Fraud Occurrences (Goodwill and Intangibles)..………………………..…......18
Table 3-6 Fraud Occurrences (Goodwill and Intangibles).…………………………….…..19
Table 3-7 Fraud Occurrences (Liabilities)………………………………….…….……......19
Table 3-8 Fraud Occurrences
(Equity, Cost of Goods Sold - Property, Plan, Equipment)..20
Table 3-9 Fraud Occurrences (Revenues/Gains)……………………………………..…....21
Table 3-10 Fraud Occurrences (Expenses)………………………………………….……..22
Table 4-1 Enron and WorldCom Fraud Occurrences (Cash)…………………….….…….35
Table 4-2 Enron and WorldCom Fraud Occurrences (Expenses)…………………………35
Table 4-3 Enron and WorldCom Fraud Occurrences (Revenue/Gains)………….…….….36
Table 4-4 Enron and WorldCom Fraud Occurrences (Liabilities)………….………….….36
Table 4-5 Enron and WorldCom Fraud Occurrences
(CGS/Plant, Property, Equipment)..37
Table 4-6 Enron and WorldCom Fraud Occurrences (Goodwill/Intangibles)…………….37


LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1-1. Fraud triangle…………….……...……………………………………………...8
Figure 4-1. WorldCom chart……….……...…………………………………………….…39
Figure 4-2. Enron chart …………….……...………………………………………………40

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