臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究探討借款公司的財務報表揭露品質與貸款合約條款間的關聯性。本研究採用Chen, Miao, and Shevlin (2015) 所構建用以衡量財務報表揭露品質指標(DQ)，發現銀行提供較高的借款利差以及較為嚴苛的非價格條款予DQ較低的借款公司。此外，在比較DQ在大陸法系以及普通法系國家的效果差異後，本研究發現在採用大陸法系的國家中，財務報表分解程度較低的借款公司承受較高的借款利差。在額外測試中，本研究發現當有外國銀行參貸時，財務報表分解程度較低的公司承受較高的借款利差、較小的借款金額、更短的到期日。此外，當借款予財務報表分解程度較低的公司時，聯貸結構中的參貸者數量會增加以減低自身風險。總結而言，本研究認為財務報表分解程度在銀行決定債務條款時能提供有價值的增額資訊。

In this paper, I examine whether and how a firm’s disclosure quality of financial statements is associated with the terms of loan contracts. Following the parsimonious disclosure quality measure (DQ) constructed by Chen, Miao, and Shevlin (2015) which captures the disaggregation level of accounting line items, I find that banks provide higher spreads and more stringent non-price terms to firms with lower DQ. Moreover, I examine the effect of DQ on legal traditions of common law and civil law, I find that firms providing less disaggregated financial statements receive unfavorable loan spreads in countries of civil law origins. Additional analyses reveal that borrowers with low DQ receive unfavorable loan spreads, smaller loan amounts, and shorter maturities when foreign banks are involved in lending. Besides, I find that the size of syndicate becomes larger when lending to borrowers with lower DQ. To conclude, my findings suggest that the incremental information in DQ is valuable to banks in determining loan contract terms.

1. Introduction 1
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 5
2.1. Measure of disclosure quality 5
2.2. Disclosure and loan contracting 6
2.3. Hypothesis development 7
2.3.1. The effect of DQ on the terms of loan contracts 7
2.3.2. The effect of DQ on loan contracts in East Asia 8
3. Research design 9
3.1. Regression Analyses 9
3.2. Sample 13
4. Empirical findings 16
4.1. Summary statistics and correlation analysis 16
4.2. Main analysis 20
4.2.1. The effect of DQ on loan spreads 20
4.2.2. The effect of DQ on non-price terms of loan contracts 21
4.2.3. Test of countries legal origins 24
4.3. Additional analyses 26
4.3.1. Subsample analyses based on foreign lender participation 26
4.3.2. Test of syndicated loan structure 30
5. Conclusion 34
References 36
Appendix A: Variable definition 39
Appendix B: An Example for Constructing Balance Sheet Disclosure Score 40

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