臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　管理者為了達到分析師預期與投資人的期待而在法令准許之範圍內做盈餘管理，但若超出此合理範圍之盈餘管理則被認為是扭曲財報，甚至與作假帳有所掛勾，資本市場對此消息將有劇烈反應，過去文獻也指出，盈餘管理的程度與股票報酬呈現負向關係，故盈餘管理的議題深受各界關心。
　　本文旨在建立一般化盈餘管理偵測模型，使用公開可得之財務指數及公司治理資訊預測盈餘操縱機率。從誘因面出發並延續Beneish (1999) 所發展之財務指數以辨認財務報表數字扭曲程度，加入考量台灣公司治理環境之監督面因素，建構捕捉重編公司之盈餘管理偵測模型。
　　利用本模型10%的迴歸樣本可以捕捉到44%的重編公司，50%可以捕捉到近九成的重編公司；利用10%的測試樣本可以捕捉到25%的重編公司，50%則能捕捉到六成，此盈餘管理機率預測值可顯著區別重編公司與非重編公司，供投資人辨認重編公司、評估投資風險。

Our study aims to build a statistical model that provides the probability of earnings manipulation. The probability is estimated by several financial indexes and corporate governance variables from publicly available information of firms. To verify the validity of this model, we rank the estimated probability to see if the former probability really captures the more restatement firms (manipulators) in estimation sample and holdout sample separately. In estimation sample tests, 10% of the estimation samples identify 44% of the manipulators while 50% identify about 90%. In holdout sample tests, 10% of the holdout samples identify 25% of the manipulators while 50% identify about 64%. The probability of earnings management calculated by this model has the ability to distinguish the manipulators from non-manipulators. Investors may evaluate the investment risk by referring to the detection of earnings management.

第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究架構 1
第三節 研究流程 3
一、 第壹章 緒論 3
二、 第貳章 文獻探討 3
三、 第參章 研究設計 3
四、 第肆章 實證結果與分析 3
五、 第伍章 結論與建議 3
第貳章 文獻探討 5
第一節 盈餘操縱的誘因 5
一、 資金需求 5
二、 經理人自利動機 9
第二節 盈餘操縱的監督機制 10
一、 內部機制 10
二、 外部機制 12
第三節 盈餘操縱公司的特性 13
一、 前景不佳 13
二、 高成長性 13
三、 董事會特性與結構 14
四、 股權結構 14
第參章 研究設計 16
第一節 研究方法 16
一、 實證模型 16
二、 準確度估計 19
第二節 變數定義與衡量 19
一、 應變數 19
二、 自變數 20
三、 控制變數 25
第三節 資料蒐集 25
一、 樣本選取 25
二、 資料來源 27
第四節 樣本公司特性 27
第肆章 實證結果與分析 29
第一節 敘述性統計 29
第二節 迴歸結果 32
第三節 機率預測結果 34
一、 平均數與中位數檢定 34
二、 實際捕捉能力測試 35
第伍章 結論與建議 36
參考文獻 37
一、 中文部份 37
二、 英文部分 38

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