臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究探討公司發行公司債與現金增資後，公司是否為了迎合債券投資人或股票投資人進而使公司異常投資行為的發生。本研究以1999年至2012年進行現金增資與發行公司債的美國上市公司資料為樣本且財報資料期間為1995年至2015年。研究方法主要依據FU(2010)對異常投資的估計方式。找出有無現金增資或發行公司債的公司進行配對來衡量投資活動與異常投資。實證結果發現，發債前後顯著為負。表示發債前的異常投資顯著高於發債後。現金增資前後顯著為正。表示增資前異常投資顯著低於增資後。因此，認為發行公司債後公司為迎合債券投資人而有投資不足的情況。現金增資後公司可能為了迎合股票投資人而有過度投資的情況。同時發行公司債與現金增資的異常投資情況並不顯著。

This study examines the issuance of corporate bonds and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), whether the company in order to meet the bond investors or stock investors to make the company abnormal investment behavior. Data of this study is a sample of the U.S. listed companies with the issuance of corporate bonds and SEOs from 1999 to 2012 and financial statements from 1995 to 2015. The research method of this study is mainly based on the estimation method of abnormal investment by FU (2010), to find out whether the issuance of corporate bonds and SEOs to match the company in order to measure investment activities and abnormal investment. Empirical evidence shows that the pre-issue investment for bonds is significantly higher than the post-issue investment for bonds, indicating that the issuance of bonds has a negative economic impact on the investment. Empirical evidence for SEOs shows that the pre-issue investment is significantly lower than the post-issue investment, indicating that the issuance of SEOs has a positive economic impact on the investment. Our results imply that companies have overinvestment behavior after SEOs in order to cater stock investors, but they may have underinvestment behavior after the issuance of corporate bonds. Abnormal investment situation is not significant when the issuance of corporate bonds and SEOs at the same time.

List of Tables IV
1. Introduction 1
2. Literature and Hypotheses development 4
2.1 Catering theory 4
2.2 Cater to Bonds Investors 4
2.3 Cater to shareholders 5
2.4 Shareholders and creditors agency problems 6
2. Research Methods 7
3.1 Research methods 7
3.2 Empirical model 8
3.3 Research variables 9
3.3.1 Dependent variable 9
3.3.2 Control variable 10
3.4 Correlation coefficient 11
4. Data and Sample Description 14
4.1 Data source 14
4.2 Sample selection 14
5. Empirical Results 14
5.1 Bond issuance and SEOs of investment behavior 14
5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 14
5.1.2 Bond issuance and SEOs of investment activities 15
5.1.3 Bond issuance and SEOs of abnormal investment 19
5.2 Regression Analysis 21
5.2.1 Investment activities between bond issuance and SEOs 21
5.2.2 Abnormal investment before and after issuance of bond issuance and SEOs 25
5.3 Robustness Checks 29
5.3.1 Robustness Analysis of Financial Tsunami 29
5.3.2 Robustness Analysis of level of investment risk 33
6. Conclusions and Implications 35
Reference 36

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