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研究生:王郁雯
研究生(外文):WANG, YU-WEN
論文名稱:CEO持股與盈餘管理之關係-論CEO權力之角色
論文名稱(外文):CEO Ownership and Earnings Management: The Moderating Effect of CEO Power
指導教授:盧正壽盧正壽引用關係
指導教授(外文):LU,CHENG-SHOU
口試委員:陳安琳高蘭芬盧正壽
口試委員(外文):CHEN, AN-LINKAO, LAN-FENGLU, CHENG-SHOU
口試日期:2017-05-27
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄應用科技大學
系所名稱:財富與稅務管理系碩士在職專班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2017
畢業學年度:105
語文別:中文
論文頁數:45
中文關鍵詞:CEO雙重性CEO持股CEO權力盈餘管理
外文關鍵詞:CEO DualityCEO OwnershipCEO PowerEarnings Management
相關次數:
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本研究以1996年至2015年國內上市櫃公司為研究對象,主要探討CEO持股與盈餘管理間的關係,並檢驗CEO權力是否影響上述兩者之間的關係。研究發現CEO持股與盈餘管理為非單調線性關係,當CEO持股較低時,CEO持股與盈餘管理為正向關係,但當CEO持股至一定水準後,兩者則為負向關係。說明當CEO持股較低時,為鞏固地位,會藉由盈餘管理以美化公司的財務績效,隨著持股達特定水準,在公司地位獲得穩固後,CEO深怕操弄盈餘管理被外界發現,而不願意承擔盈餘管理衍生的風險,進而降低盈餘的操弄行為。此外,本文也發現,CEO權力對於CEO持股與盈餘管理兩者關係具有調節效果。根據管家理論,認為董事長身兼CEO對公司會存在加分效果,而降低操弄盈餘管理的意願。另外,董事長身兼CEO,表示CEO在公司地位穩固,也會減緩透過盈餘管理美化公司績效以鞏固個人地位的動機。
This thesis contains listed firms in Taiwan from 1996 to 2015 to investigate the relationship between CEO ownership and earnings management, and explore whether the CEO power has effect on the relationship between them. The results indicate the non-linear relationship between CEO ownership and earnings management, earnings management increases with a low CEO ownership level, but earnings management increases with CEO ownership at a higher ownership level. When the CEO ownership is low, the earnings management is used to enhance the financial performance and help CEO entrenchment. However CEO take downside risk where earnings manipulation is detected, thus CEO with a particular ownership level will reduce the earnings manipulation behavior. The result also finds that CEO power has positive effect on the relationship between CEO ownership and earnings management. According to stewardship theory, the chairman of the board serves as CEO will have a positive effect on firm operating, and reduce the earnings manipulation. In addition, the chairman of the board serves as CEO means the CEO entrenchment thus reduce the incentive of CEO to enhance performance through earnings manipulation.
中文摘要 i
英文摘要 ii
致謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
一、 緒論 1
二、 文獻探討 4
2.1 CEO持股與盈餘管理 4
2.2 CEO權力和對風險的認知 6
2.3 CEO雙重性的調節效果 7
三、 研究設計 10
3.1 樣本選取與資料來源 10
3.2 變數定義與衡量 13
四、 實證分析 17
4.1 敘述性統計分析 17
4.1.1 敘述性統計量 17
4.1.2 Pearson相關分析 19
4.1.3 根據CEO持股分組之樣本敘述統計量 23
4.1.4 根據CEO雙重性分組之樣本敘述統計量 25
4.2 CEO持股與盈餘管理程度之影響 27
4.3 CEO雙重性對CEO持股與盈餘管理程度之調節效果 30
4.4 根據CEO雙重性分組下,CEO持股與盈餘管理程度之關係 33
五、 結論與建議 36
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