臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

多數跨國企業(MNE)運用移轉訂價達到利潤移轉與節稅這兩個目的，因此本文探討兩簿帳移轉訂價，將移轉價格分為內部移轉價格與報稅用移轉價格。在兩簿帳之下，探討跨國企業於地主國投資的廠商(廠商1)與對手廠商(廠商2)進行空間競爭，並討論跨國企業決定的兩個移轉價格如何影響廠商的區位選擇。
我們發現，由於假設MNE可以使用兩簿帳，造成下游廠商之間的成本不對稱，故廠商區位選擇為非對稱的結果。若地主國為相對高稅率國家，當(1) MNE之內部移轉價格下降或報稅用移轉價格上升，(2)地主國的稅率上升或罰金降低，或(3)兩簿帳移轉訂價的使用，以上三種情況會讓廠商1之區位選擇靠近市場中心，而讓廠商2之區位選擇遠離市場中心。

Most multinational enterprises (hereafter, MNEs) use transfer pricing for two purposes, profit shifting and tax avoidance. Thus, we study two sets of books in transfer pricing, that is, the transfer price includes two parts, incentive transfer price and tax transfer price. Considering two sets of books, we study the impact of transfer pricing on location choices under spatial competition.
We find that since firm 1 has the support from a MNE and firm 2 doesn't so, firms' location choices are asymmetric due to cost asymmetry caused by the support from the MNE.
We assume that the tax rate of the host country is relatively high. If (1) incentive transfer price falls or tax transfer price goes up, (2) the tax rate goes up or the fine falls, or (3) the MNE adopts two sets of books, then firm 1 will move towards the market center, and firm 2 will move far away from the center.

1 第一章：緒論...6
1.1 研究動機與目的...6
1.2 研究方法...7
1.3 論文架構...7
2 第二章：文獻回顧...8
3 第三章：理論模型...12
3.1 模型假設...12
3.2 模型求解...16
3.2.1 Stage 3 (價格競爭階段)...16
3.2.2 Stage 2 (區位選擇階段)...18
3.2.3 Stage 1 (移轉價格決定階段)...24
4 第四章：結論...31
參考文獻...33
Maple數學推導...36

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