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研究生:施欣汝
研究生(外文):SHIH, SHIN-RU
論文名稱:資訊揭露水準與機構投資人持股關聯性之實證研究
論文名稱(外文):Information Disclosure and Institutional Ownership
指導教授:賴靖宜賴靖宜引用關係劉鋼劉鋼引用關係
指導教授(外文):Lai, Jing-yiLiu, Kang
口試委員:郭良瑋周淑卿
口試委員(外文):Liang-wei KuoChou,Shu-Ching
口試日期:2016-06-27
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:財務金融系研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2016
畢業學年度:104
語文別:中文
論文頁數:56
中文關鍵詞:資訊揭露機構投資人Ordered Probit ModelInterval Regression
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:3
  • 點閱點閱:369
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:48
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
在公司治理中扮演重要角色的資訊揭露,近年來備受重視,而機構投資人其持股規模較大,擁有較充分且專業之金融知識,可視為外部監理機制。本研究以台灣上市公司為樣本,以證基會資訊揭露評鑑系統之評鑑結果來衡量公司資訊揭露水準,先討論內生性問題,並以Ordered Probit Model及Interval Regression探討機構投資人持股比率是否存在監理力量,能對公司資訊揭露水準有顯著影響。實證結果並無發現模型中存在內生性問題,而在控制公司治理及公司特性相關變數與每年強制性揭露指標占總指標數比例後,發現在2012年至2014年間,機構投資人持股比率對公司資訊揭露有顯著正向影響,亦即機構投資人發揮外部監理力量。
謝辭 i
摘要 ii
目錄 iii
表目錄 iv
壹、緒論 1
一、研究動機 1
二、研究目的 3
三、研究架構 4
貳、文獻回顧 5
一、資訊揭露相關文獻 5
二、機構投資人相關文獻 6
參、研究方法 8
一、變數定義與衡量 8
三、Ordered Probit Model 10
四、Interval Regression 13
五、實證模型 14
肆、資料來源及其分析 16
一、資料來源 16
二、資訊揭露水準之敘述統計 16
三、解釋變數之敘述統計 19
伍、實證結果與分析 25
一、內生性檢定 25
二、2012年至2014年之估計結果 27
三、2006年至2014年之估計結果 36
陸、結論與建議 39
附錄一、評鑑等級與分數標準 46
附錄二、估計結果 47

一、中文部分
丁秀儀(2009)。公司治理是否受到機構投資人的青睞,《證券市場發展季刊》,26,233-253。
丁秀儀與黃勇達(2010)。資訊揭露程度與內涵對機構投資人持股的影響,《證券市場發展季刊》,22,39-74。
財團法人中華民國證券暨期貨市場發展基金會(2006)。歷屆評鑑資料(第4屆)問答集。取自:http://www.sfi.org.tw/finance/finance1/finance1_2
陳冠宙、陳育成與陳雪如(2005)。影響上市公司網站資訊透明度因子之實證,《會計與公司治理》,2,33-59。
臺灣證券交易所股份有限公司外國股票買賣辦法(2012年6月7日)。
證券交易法第25條第1項(2002年6月12日)。

二、外文部分
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