臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

近年來亞洲地區股東行動主義之興起，臺灣的股東行動意識也逐漸提高，當股東的行動越積極，越會給公司帶來龐大的壓力，因此公司管理階層可能會藉由一些方法來減低股東參與股東會的機會，例如管理階層可以藉由選擇股東常會地點來影響股東行動。因此本研究將探討公司治理對股東常會地點的影響，並進一步分析股東常會地點與公司未來績效之關聯。其中，衡量股東常會地點影響股東參與的程度，以計算股東常會地點到公司總部間距離的公里數為主。。研究對象則為2011~2015年間有開股東常會之臺灣上市櫃公司，共計7,094筆樣本。
研究結果發現，在公司治理變數與股東常會距離之關聯中，機構法人持股比例愈高或董監持股比例愈高，股東常會距離愈遠；外部董事比例愈高，股東常會距離愈近。而在股東常會距離與公司未來績效之關聯中，股東常會距離與市場績效指標-Tobin’s Q值之間沒有顯著關係；股東常會距離與會計績效指標-資產報酬率(ROA)呈現顯著負相關，表示股東常會距離愈遠，資產報酬率愈低。

In recent years, with the rise of shareholder activism in the Asia region, the consciousness of shareholder activism in Taiwan has also gradually increased. The more aggressive shareholder activism, the more pressure on the company. So, the managers will want to reduce chances that shareholders attend the annual shareholder meeting aby some methods, such as choosing the location of annual shareholder meeting. Therefore, this study will focus on the two issues, the first is the relation between the corporate governance and the location of annual shareholder meeting, and the second is the relation between the location of annual shareholder meeting and the future firm performance. In this study, the variable used to measure the impact of location on shareholders' participation is the distance (kilometers) between the location of annual shareholder meeting and the headquarters. The sample period is from 2011 to 2015 including all listed companies that has held the annual shareholder meeting in Taiwan, and the total observations are 7094.
The empirical results of the first issue shows that institutional ownership and directors ownership has significant positive effect to the distance of annual shareholder meeting. The percentage of outside director has significant negative effect to the distance of annual shareholder meeting. Moreover, the results of the second issue show that there is no significant relationship between the distance of annual shareholder meeting and Tobin’s Q. But, the distance of annual shareholder meeting has significant negative effect to ROA. It means that the farther the distance of annual shareholder meeting, the lower the ROA

目錄 iv
圖目錄 vi
表目錄 vii
第一章 緒論 1
1.1研究背景與動機 1
1.2研究目的與問題 2
1.3研究流程 3
1.4論文架構 4
第二章 文獻回顧與假說發展 5
2.1股東行動主義 5
2.1.1股東行動主義之定義 5
2.1.2股東行動主義之起源與發展 6
2.1.3我國股東行動主義相關法律條文 8
2.1.4 股東行動主義與股東常會地點 13
2.1.5股東行動主義之相關發現 14
2.2公司治理 15
2.2.1公司治理之起源與定義 15
2.2.2國際經濟合作暨發展組織(OECD)之新公司治理原則 16
2.2.3我國公司治理之原則 16
2.2.4公司治理結構之相關發現 18
2.3公司治理結構與股東常會地點 20
2.4股東常會地點與公司未來績效 23
第三章 研究方法 25
3.1資料來源與研究樣本 25
3.2變數衡量 27
3.3實證方法與模型 32
第四章 實證結果與分析 34
4.1敘述性統計分析 34
4.2相關性分析 37
4.3迴歸分析 40
4.4敏感性分析 44
第五章 結論與建議 50
5.1研究結論 50
5.2研究限制及建議 52
參考文獻 54

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三、網站
1.中華公司治理協會，http://www.cga.org.tw/f_1_01_company_govern.aspx
2.交通部臺灣鐵路管理局，http://www.railway.gov.tw/tw/cp.aspx?sn=3611
3.交通部臺灣鐵路管理局列車查詢系統，http://twtraffic.tra.gov.tw/twrail/
4.臺灣集中保管結算所股份有限公司(民國96年12月)，各國股務相關制度之研究，http://smart.tdcc.com.tw/pdf/others/a104.pdf(最後存取日期：2016年5月10日)
5.Google地圖，https://www.google.com.tw/maps?hl=zh-TW