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研究生:莊苡欣
論文名稱:公司庫藏股購回與CEO權力關聯性之實證研究─以台灣上市公司為例
論文名稱(外文):The study on the relationship between share repurchase and CEO power- evidence from TSE-listed companies in Taiwan
指導教授:林淑惠林淑惠引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立彰化師範大學
系所名稱:商業教育學系
學門:教育學門
學類:專業科目教育學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2012
畢業學年度:100
語文別:中文
論文頁數:78
中文關鍵詞:CEO權力庫藏股股票購回事件研究法
外文關鍵詞:CEO powertreasury stockstock repurchaseevent study
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:461
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:107
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
本論文的研究目的在於探討CEO權力對於公司實施庫藏股制度之影響,並以CEO之雙元性、社會網絡以及持股率來作為CEO權力之代理變數。本研究以2006年至2010年為研究期間,探討台灣上市公司在決定宣告購回庫藏股之決策與否、宣告購回庫藏股之後,市場對於股價之反應、購回庫藏股之情況,是否將會受到CEO權力所影響。
本研究之實證結果發現,當CEO之網絡關係越好以及其持有股份比率較高時,公司較傾向宣告購回庫藏股。而在公司宣告購回庫藏股之後,市場對於股價反應方面,當CEO同時兼任董事會主席和持有較高的股份時,市場對於公司宣告購回庫藏股之股價會有正向反應。最後在購回庫藏股情況,發現整體而言,CEO權力對於預計購回庫藏股之股數以及購回之執行率並無顯著之影響;而另外發現,當CEO權力越高時,宣告購回庫藏股的次數會越多次。

The purpose of is about that how the power of CEO influences the treasury stock system.Moreover,it uses the CEO duality,social network and ownership as the proxy variable of CEO power.The period of this study is from2006 to 2010.The study is focus on the situation about the stock repurchase announcement,about the reaction of the market toward the stock proce and the condition of stock repurchase.
Empirical results shows that the company intended to make stock repurchase announcement when the CEO's social network and ownership is higher.The study shows that the reaction of the market stock price after the announced the stock repurchase.When the CEO's structural and ownership power is higher,the market will have a positive reaction about the stock price.Generally,CEO power had no great impact on the repurchase the number of shares of treasury stock and implemantation rate;moreover,when the CEO has more power,the frequency of announcing repurchase of treasury stock will get higher.
目錄
第壹章 緒論
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 論文架構 5
第貳章 文獻探討
第一節 庫藏股購回制度與相關法令規範 7
第二節 庫藏股購回之相關文獻 11
第三節 CEO權力相關文獻探討 18
第參章 研究方法
第一節 研究架構 23
第二節 研究假說 24
第三節 事件研究法 29
第四節 模型建立與變數定義 31
第五節 研究樣本與資料來源 33
第肆章 實證結果與分析
第一節 敘述性統計與變數相關分析 38
第二節 迴歸模型之實證結果分析 42
第伍章 結論與建議 57
參考文獻 60
附錄 70

圖次
圖1 研究流程圖 6
圖3-1研究架構 23
圖3-2庫藏股購回之時間參數關係 29

表次
表1 各年度庫藏股購回事件之筆數分佈 35
表2 上市公司及購回庫藏股之產業類別統計 37
表3 相關變數敘述統計量 39
表4 Pearson 相關係數矩陣 41
表5 CEO權力對庫藏股購回決策之影響 44
表6 CEO結構權權力對購回後市場反應之影響 49
表7 CEO聲望權權力對購回後市場反應之影響 50
表8 CEO所有權權力對購回後市場反應之影響 51
表9 CEO權力對平均宣告購回股數佔流通在外股數比率之影響 54
表10 CEO權力對平均購回執行率之影響 55
表11 CEO權力對平均購回次數之影響 56
中文部分:
林文凱(民97)。公司買回庫藏股對股價之影響-以台灣上市櫃公司為例。國立
彰化師範大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
林穎芬(民78)。民營企業最高主管報酬與公司績效之研究。國立中山大學企業
管理研究所未出版士論文。
洪麗芳(民93)。股權結構、財務決策與公司績效關聯性之研究。中原大學會計
研究所未出版碩士論文。
張金條(民98)。我國上櫃公司庫藏股買回宣告對股票報酬之影響。國立雲林科
技大學財務金融研究所未出版碩士論文。
陳振遠與吳香蘭(民91)。台灣上市公司庫藏股購回宣告資訊內涵之研究。中山
管理評論,第十卷第一期,頁127-154。
陳嘉惠、劉玉珍與林炯垚(民92)。公開市場股票購回影響因素分析。證券市場
發展期刊,第十五卷第三期,頁27-62。
劉韻僖與林玟廷(民99)。CEO權力與薪酬關係之實證研究-代理和資源依賴觀
點。中原企管評論,第八卷第一期,頁35-60。
蔡柳卿(民89)。子公司購回母公司股票與盈餘資訊。二00二海峽兩岸財經與
商學研討會論文集,頁437-460。
蔡柳卿與郭法雲(民93)。我國庫藏股制度之實證研究:資訊效果與資訊傳遞動
機。會計評論,第三十八期,頁81-112。


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