臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

公司分割為現代企業常見的企業再造手段，於公司分割(spin-off)交易中，新設公司(於公司分拆交易中，新設立的公司)通常繼承被分割公司(將部分事業或部門拆出的公司)之股權結構，然而對於其資產與負債的切割方式及比例並無特別之規定。
本論文利用公司分割之新設公司股權結構變化明顯的特性，探討影響新設公司大股東持股改變之因素。Patro (2008)曾以新設公司與被分割公司於營業層面風險的差異來解釋新設公司大股東持股之變化。本論文針對分拆交易中資產與負債的切割不定此點，提出新設公司於分拆之初的短期財務狀況將影響其財務層面之風險，進而影響新設公司之監理需求及其大股東持股變化；並且深入討論其獨立營運後三年內之大股東持股變化影響因素。
實證結果指出，除營運層面風險外，新設公司之大股東持股變動亦受其財務層面風險影響。新設公司於分割初期之Z-score變數與其大股東持股變動呈負向關係，意即於分割之初，若新設公司擁有較高的財務層面風險，其大股東持股亦將因應其受監理需求增加而提高；此外，大股東持股於分割初期將重視其短期財務風險，爾後注重於新設公司之營運層面風險變化。

A spin-off occurs when a company takes a division or part of its business and creates an entirely new entity. Spin-offs usually inherit the ownership structure of their parents and are likely to experience significant changes in the beginning of the spin-offs' independent existence. Specifically, the change from the monitoring requirements constitutes a shock to this inherited ownership structure.
This paper examines how short-term solvency affects the short-term financial risk of spin-offs and how the ownership structures change in response to changes in monitoring needs arising from differences between parent companies and spinoffs. On average, block ownership increases from an inherited level of 39.04% to 45.17% in three years.
The results suggest that block ownership changes in response to the monitoring needs of spin-offs; in addition to the operational risk, the changes of monitoring needs are also subject to short-term financial risks.

目錄 IV
表目錄 V
圖目錄 VI
第一章、 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的與貢獻 2
第三節 本文架構 2
第二章、 文獻回顧 4
第一節 公司分割相關文獻 4
第二節 股權結構改變因素相關文獻 5
第三節 大股東監理效果 6
第三章、 研究方法 7
第一節 資料來源與樣本 7
第二節 研究假說 10
第三節 研究模型 11
第四節 變數定義 12
第四章、 實證結果 17
第一節 敘述性統計結果 17
第二節 實證迴歸模型迴歸結果 20
第五章、 結論 25
參考文獻 27

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