臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文藉由在Cournot寡佔市場內，採用Martin(1999)之異質產品需求假設模型為架構，以三階段賽局過程討論廠商A在搭售與不搭售的情況下，與競爭對手廠商B利潤利潤之變化，在第一階段中，由製造產品1與產品2之廠商A來決定搭售與否。第二階段為廠商A及廠商B研發投入與否。第三階段即為市場競爭(數量競爭)，利用三階段完全資訊下之有限賽局，找出各種情況下之子賽局完全均衡，並藉由均衡結果來探討分析在研發與搭售的情況下，廠商A與廠商B需要採用何種策略才能達到利潤的提升。
另對於Whinton支持之「搭售亦可提高競爭對手利潤」及「透過搭售行為可封閉被搭售市場，並將競爭對手趕出市場」之觀念，在本研究中將試圖解釋，倘若廠商研發費用假定為已知常數，且無固定成本存在之情況下，搭售廠商採取搭售策略時，不一定會不利被搭售市場之競爭對手，相反的，在一定範圍內，廠商A選擇搭售與不搭售，均可能提升競爭對手之利潤，故打破所謂獨占廠商透過搭售行為，將被搭售市場之競爭對手趕出市場之概念。而研發創新部分，當獨占廠商進行研發創新時，競爭對手並不會停止參進，因為唯有在同時間進行研發，獨占廠商與競爭對手的利潤，才會一起提升。因此，透過彼此雙方良性競爭下，必將促使產品市場更加公平及效率增加，而對於消費者而言，必然有其嘉惠作用，故藉由本文中探討搭售及研發創新的行為及策略，勢必會創造出搭售廠商、競爭者及消費者三贏之局面。

By Cournot’s oligopoly , the present study applies Martin’s (1999) heterogeneous product demand supposition as a model to discuss three-stage game in which the situation of firm A tying with or without firm B. The first stage is that the firm A decides whether to combine the selling of product A and B or not. The second stage is the firm A and B decide whether join the research and development or not. The third stage is the market competition in which all the information of the three stages was used to find out every possible subgame perfection equilibrium. And by analyzing the result to discover what kinds of tying products from firm A and B can greatly increase the profit.
Moreover, Whinton states that tying can increase the profit of the competitor. Through the tying, the tied-in market can be closed and the other firms can be excluded. The present study tries to explain that if the research and development expenditure is supposed as a parameter and without fixed cost, then the tying firm may not be affected by the other competitors. On the contrary, with certain range, whether the firm A chooses to tie-in or not may increase the profit of the competitors. For this reason, it should be avoid the idea of monopolizing tying of a firm and excluding the competitor from the market. On the part of research and development, when a monopolized firm is trying to do research and innovate some new products, the competitors will not cease to making their process. It is because the profit of both could be increased when the monopolized firm and the competitors innovate at the same time. Therefore, through the fair competition can greatly enhance the equity and effectiveness of product market. It also brings beneficial effect to the consumers. Through the use of the finding of present study, it is surely that the three-way win for the tying firms, competitors, and the consumers can be made

中文摘要 …………………………………………………………………………Ⅰ英文摘要 …………………………………………………………………………Ⅱ
目錄 ……………………………………………………………………………Ⅲ 第一章 緒論 …………………………………………………………………1
第一節 前言 …………………………………………………………………1
第二節 研究動機與目的 ……………………………………………………3
第三節 研究方法與架構 ……………………………………………………4
第二章 文獻回顧………………………………………………………………6
第三章 模型設定………………………………………………………………12第一節 廠商選擇搭售情況下，與競爭對手利潤之變化……………………14
第二節 廠商選擇不搭售情況下，與競爭對手利潤之變化…………………21
第四章 均衡結果 ………………………………………………………26第一節 研發 ………………………………………………………………26 第二節 搭售 …………………………………………………………………28
第五章 結論與建議……………………………………………………………31
參考文獻 …………………………………………………………………………33

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