臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本論文由兩篇關於私募股權市場的文章所構成，分別探討私募股權發行定價與市場的宣告反應。過去文獻指出，外部人參與私募股權可享有較大的折價幅度，但對於內部人參與認購時的定價卻有分歧的看法。本研究以民國91年1月至96年3月間，台灣上市上櫃公司進行私募股權宣告為樣本。第一篇文章旨在探討內部人參與私募認購時的定價決定因素，亦即找出內部人認購私募股權時，何種情況下其願付較高價格，何種情況下易產生自我圖利的現象？異於過去文獻，本文採權力指數衡量大股東對公司的控制力。實證結果顯示，發行公司最大股東的控制權是影響內部人購買私募股權折價幅度的關鍵因素。當最大股東於私募後仍維持原有的控制力量時，若主要認購者為公司內部人，則其享有較大的折價，有明顯自我圖利的現象，若主要認購者為外部人，則其需付較高的價格。相反地，當最大股東於私募後喪失原有的控制地位時，或對公司的控制權下降時，則外部人參與私募可享有較高的折價，若主要認購者為公司內部人，則需付較高的價格。顯示內部人在私募後仍握有對公司的控制權時，較容易有自我圖利的現象。本文亦顯示，上市櫃公司進行私募後，股權集中度明顯上升，且公司會產生重大控制權異動。
第二篇文章旨在探討以下議題：(1)企業採行公開發行與私募之宣告效果是否不同;(2)私募動機以及參與認購之投資人類型是否會造成私募宣告效果之差異;(3)私募股權的價格能否作為公司品質的訊號;(4)若內部人透過私募進行自我圖利，或控制股東將集團內的私募交易作為利益輸送的一種工具，則私募宣告是否會產生負向的市場反應？結果顯示，國內私募股權宣告確實會產生正向的異常報酬，反之，公開發行宣告後短期雖無顯著異常報酬，但長期卻有顯著負向異常報酬。本文也發現，私募動機與投資人類型具有很重要的資訊內涵，當公司為了與交易廠商進行策略聯盟或進一步進行併購為其主要私募動機，或是當投資人參與認購之後，積極參與公司經營管理或加入董事會，上述類型的私募宣告有顯著正向的異常報酬，顯示市場對於私募引進積極的策略性投資人保持正面的看法。本文實證也發現，當內部人以低價買進私募股票，或私募股權以低價賣給同集團內的企業，此類私募會產生顯著的負向市場反應。顯示國內私募確實潛藏內部人自我圖利以及集團內公司利益輸送的隱憂，主因在於國內私募市場較少受到投資人關注，以致於交易過程的重要資訊未能即時揭露，加上主管機關對於私募的相關規範仍未盡周詳。本論文能夠協助投資人加以瞭解國內私募市場的運作，亦提供主管機關在未來私募制度與規範上實務性的參考價值。

This dissertation investigates the pricing and the market reaction to the announcement of private placements. A sample of 181 private placement announcements during January 2002 and March 2007 in Taiwan was obtained. This dissertation consists of two essays on the private placements. The first essay identifies the conditions determining insiders will pay more (or less) in private placement. We explore the argument of private placement pricing sold to insiders by considering the changes in the control power of the largest shareholders in private placement, using the Banzhaf power index to better reflect the largest shareholder’s relative power of influence. Our results indicate that, if the existing insiders maintain their leading control status, in cases where insiders are the main investors, private placements are issued at deep discounts that benefit themselves; however, in cases where outsiders/new insiders are the main investors, outsiders and new insiders will pay relatively more when existing insiders dominate. Contrarily, if existing insiders fail to retain their leading position and become less powerful after private placement, outsiders and new insiders buy at lower prices. In more than 65% of the sample, the largest shareholders lost their leading control status, and the issuer’s ownership structure becomes more concentrated following private placements.
In the second essay, we examine whether the announcement of private placement and public offering share the same announcement effects. In particular, we investigate whether the market reactions to private placement announcements vary with different placement motivations and investor types. In addition, we focus on the dark side of private placement by studying how the stock price reaction to private offerings when insiders intentionally lower the offer price to self-dealing, or when within-group private placements are motivated by the controlling shareholders’ tunneling. The results indicate that private placements generally result in a positive wealth effects, however, public offerings associated with negative announcement effects. The market reacts more favorably to private placements in which a strategic alliance or merger are involved, or to private placements where investors actively participate in the management or even procures the controlling rights of the company. It suggests that the motivation and investor type of private placement convey important information to market investors regarding the issuing firm’s performance. Moreover, we have evidence to support the dark side of private placements. For issuing firms with stronger tendency towards self-dealings by insiders or tunneling in transactions between firms within a business group, they are more likely to have poor performance after private placement. However, we have no evidences to support the firm quality hypothesis.

Chapter 1 Introduction………………………………………………............................................................1
Chapter 2 Essay1: Why Do Insiders Sometimes Pay More and Sometimes Pay Less in Private Placements? ……………………………………………………………...….………8
2.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………...……8
2.2 Literature Review……………………………………………………………………..........11
2.3 Data and Methodology………………………………………….........................................14
2.3.1 Data and summary statistics …………………………………………………....14
2.3.2 The measurement of power index …………………………………………..…16
2.3.3 Investor type and private placement discounts …………………………..…19
2.3.4 Placement motivation and private placement discounts ………………….22
2.4 Empirical Results and Discussion…………………………………..…………………..25
2.4.1 Ownership structure and control power around private placement ….....25
2.4.2 The control power of the largest existing shareholder around private
placement ………………….......................................................................................27
2.4.3 Determinant of private placement discount ………………………………....29
2.4.4 Investor type, changes in control of the largest existing shareholder
and pricing ……………………………………………………………………….....32
2.4.5 Robustness test …………………………………………………………………….34
2.5 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………...34
Chapter 3 Essay2: The Announcement Effects of Private Equity Placements: Evidence from Taiwanese Market……………………………………………………………………39
3.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….39
3.2 Samples and Methodology…………………………………………………………….…46
3.2.1 Data description ……………………………………….……………………..……46
3.2.2 Event study methodology ……………………………………………………… 50
3.3 Analysis of Announcement Effects……………………………………….………….…52
3.3.1 The announcement effects of public offering and private placement...52
3.3.2 Placement motivation and the announcement effects………….................55
3.3.3 Investor types and the announcement effects…………................................56
3.3.4 A signal of firm quality and the announcement effects………………….59
3.3.5 Insiders’ self-dealing and the announcement of private placements….62
3.3.6 Tunneling and the announcement of private placements……………..66
3.4 Cross-sectional analysis of private placement announcement returns…………..69
3.4.1 Testing hypotheses and variables …………....................................................69
3.4.2 Findings of multivariate regressions …………...............................................71
3.5 Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………….…77
Chapter 4 Conclusion and Suggestions……………………………………………………………....79
References………………………………………………………………………………………………........83

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