臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

過去研究較常以公司治理與公司績效或股東財富的影響為研究議題，然而國內針對公司治理機制與公司風險之間關係的研究較為稀少，故本研究主要在公司治理機制與公司風險之間關係加以著墨，以2005年至2009年間，臺灣上市櫃公司為實證對象，探究公司治理機制中董事會結構及股權結構，與公司總風險與公司獨特性風險間的關係。
本研究利用資產報酬率標準差、股票報酬率標準差及Tobin''s Q標準差做為衡量公司總風險變數，以及利用考慮GARCH效果後，Xu and Malkiel (2003) 所提出的直接分解法來估計公司獨特性風險。再以同時考慮了時間序列(Time-Series)與橫斷面資料(Cross-Section)之追蹤資料模型(Panel Data)形式來實證公司治理機制與公司風險之關聯性。
本研究證實發現，若公司董事會規模愈大公司較不會有極端的決策出現，使得決策品質變動較小，愈能降低公司總風險，在董事會獨立性則與公司總風險與公司獨特性風險呈現負向相關但僅與Tobin''s Q標準差呈現顯著相關，顯示董事會獨立性降低公司風險的部分在衡量公司價值波動性部分較為明顯。而在董事長兼任總經理方面呈現正向顯著相關，公司會因為董事長兼任總經理而使得權力過度的集中導致風險變大。在經理人的持股比率與公司總風險及獨特性方面呈現負向顯著相關，意味當公司經理持股比率愈高與公司投資人的利益關係趨於一致，將能降低代理問題使公司風險下降。在機構投資人持股比率部分，由於機構投資人可利用本身所持之投資組合分散單一公司風險，或因其持有動機不同而有不同的結果，故在其持股比率與公司風險之關係並沒有獲得一致性的結論。

Prior studies mostly focus on the corporate performance and pay little attention to the relationship between corporate governance and corporate risk. This study aims to examine the effect of corporate governance on the corporate risk from different perspectives. We divided corporate governance into board composition and ownership structure. The risk examined in the study includes the total risk and idiosyncratic risk. We use the standard deviations of return on assets, stock return and Tobin''s Q as proxies for total risk. We also follow the direct decomposition method provided by Xu and Malkiel (2003) to estimate the corporate idiosyncratic risk. Finally, we employed the panel data regression to examine the relationship between corporate governance and corporate risk. The result shows that board size, board independent, and CEO holding have a negative relationship with total risk and idiosyncratic risk. Board duality has positive relationship with corporate risk. However, not all corporate governance variables have a significant relationship with both risk measures variable. The institutional holding not only has impact on corporate risk behaviors, but will also affect the risk measures differently.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究流程 4
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 董事會結構與公司績效及公司風險 6
第二節 股權結構與公司績效及公司風險 11
第三章 研究方法 15
第一節 觀念性架構與假說 15
第二節 研究樣本與資料來源 19
第三節 變數定義與衡量 20
第四節 實證模型 27
第四章 實證結果及分析 33
第一節 敘述統計分析 33
第二節 實證結果與分析 38
第五章 結論與建議 50
第一節 研究結論 50
第二節 研究限制與研究建議 52
參考文獻 53

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