臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

企業在競爭激烈的環境中，創新能力為提升競爭優勢、創造利潤的關鍵因素。當所有權與管理權分離，股東和高階管理者的利益不一致導致兩者對於創新的偏好不同，進而產生代理問題，而公司董事會主要功能為代理股東監督管理階層，並透過有效監督以降低代理成本。然而以往研究多視外部董事為同質性，但事實上每位外部董事擁有不同背景應視為異質的，當外部董事在同一時間擔任多間公司的董事席位時，不僅能建立人脈關係且擁有豐富資源。
本研究目的為檢視外部董事連結對於創新績效的影響，並探討外部董事持股和CEO權力對外部董事連結與創新績效關聯性是否具有調節效果。過去研究多採用研發支出、研發強度與專利權等因素來衡量公司創新的能力，然而新產品的品質和市場接受程度與公司創新能力更加息息相關。因此，本研究以新產品宣告效果來衡量公司創新，研究樣本為新產品宣告之美國公開上市公司，樣本期間為2000年初至2011年底。實證結果顯示外部董事連結對於公司新產品宣告績效呈現正顯著影響；且外部董事持股對外部董事連結與新產品宣告績效之關係具有正向調節效果。
根據本研究結果就董事而言，在能力範圍內勝任多席外部董事，並善盡其應付之職責，在累積自身董事資本和聲譽的同時，將有助於公司創新。此外，公司在聘任外部董事時，應注意到外部董事連結所帶來豐富資源，將對公司創新活動甚至是競爭力產生影響。

In the competitive environment, firms’ ability of innovation is a key to enhancing the competitive advantages and creating profits. Due to the separation of ownership and management, the interests of shareholders and managers are inconsistent on innovation. The role of the Director is to monitor management for shareholders and reduce agency costs. Rather than being viewed as homogeneity by previous studies, outside directors with different backgrounds are in fact heterogeneous. And having multiple directorships also helps outside directors establish connections and accumulate abundant resources.
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of multiple directorships on firm’s innovation, and the moderating effect of incentive mechanism and CEO power on multiple directorships-firm innovation relationship. Chen, Ho, Kueh, and Lee (2002) assert that the changes, resulting from new product introduction (NPI) announcements, of a firm’s market value have direct and efficient effects upon its innovative abilities. Hence, this study takes NPI announcements as the proxy of innovation.
The samples of this study are from NPI announcements of America public firms during 2000-2011.The empirical results show that multiple directorships do have positive and significant effects upon the market reaction to firms’ NPI announcements. Moreover, incentive mechanism moderates the relationship between multiple directorships and firm's NPI announcements. According to the findings, outside director who holds multiple directorships and fulfills their responsibility will accumulate their own resources and reputation and it benefits firms’ innovation in the same time.

第一章 緒論
第一節 研究背景與動機
第二節 研究目的
第三節 研究流程
第二章 文獻探討與假設建構
第一節 創新績效
第二節 外部董事連結與創新績效
第三節 董事誘因機制的調節效果
第四節 CEO權力的調節效果
第三章 研究方法
第一節 樣本選取與資料來源
第二節 研究方法
第四章 實證結果
第一節 樣本資料敘述說明
第二節 相關係數矩陣和迴歸分析
第五章 結論與建議
第一節 研究結論與貢獻
第二節 研究限制與建議
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