臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究旨在探討企業所有權結構如何引導其現金持有政策、並進而對營運績效產生深遠的影響。基於過去代理理論(agency problem)對控制股東及少數股東的探究，本文以所有權結構和交叉持股行為做為出發點，試圖解釋公司持有大量現金的行為，並據此延伸至管理者自我裁量(managerial discretion)議題，觀察是否這些超額現金的保留的確被運用到企業的未來投資機會，亦或可能成為掌權者移轉資源自利的目標。
本研究樣本涵蓋2001-2009年，台灣地區508間不含金融業之公開上市公司，並運用計量方法的追蹤資料(panel data)，混和橫斷面(cross sectional)和時間序列(time-series)資料，並以固定效果模型(fixed-effect model)做迴歸分析。
實證研究結果發現經理人持股行為較為符合「利益收斂假說」(Convergence of Interest Hypothesis)，而董監事持股行為則較為符合「利益掠奪假說」(Entrenchment Hypothesis)，尤其董監事持股越多將使企業對當前財務指標的重視程度高於未來成長機會的發展，進而衍生管理短視行為(managerial myopic behavior)，另一方面機構法人的持股則是對企業發揮正面的監督效果。
交叉持股結構有可能會使企業在超額現金的運用上無效率，儘管交叉持股結構的確能提供穩定公司經營權、減少資訊不對稱，降低代理成本及財務危機成本等益處，但其也造成董監事無法充分發揮功能，並誘使這些董監事以其控制權影響企業的資源分配，進而衍生公司治理的議題，此現象尤其表現在高度的董監事質押比上。透過交叉持股，董監事極可能利用其控制權剝奪公司資產及操縱盈餘，進而犧牲小股東利益以取得個人利益，使得兩者間代理問題越發嚴重，且公司未來的經營績效受到董監事行為影響也就越深，因此本研究也間接證實獨立董事的設立有其發揮監督力量的必要性。

This research aims at investigate the correlations that how a firm’s ownership structures conduct its cash holding policy and then produce the performances. By means of specific speculation of the agency problem between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, the perspectives of ownership structure can be an effective denominator to examine the situation why firms hold so much excess cash, and extend the managerial discretion issue that the possibility for controlling shareholders to transfer the liquidity resource without fully used in investing opportunity. We observe 508 independent Taiwan listed firms during the period 2001-2009 and use econometric analysis of cross sectional panel data which is verified by Redundant FE test and Hausman test to prove the fixed effect model.
The empirical estimates report that cross-holdings structure may be one of the reasons that results in inefficient management of excess cash. Manager shareholdings provide the motivation to improve the future expectation of performance while board directors and supervisors will value more on current value that may imply the managerial myopic behavior. Our observations can be interpreted that cross-holdings structure can be a strategy for a firm to enhance its efficiency of management but it also enable the dominant shareholders in corporate with greater power to conduct the resource allocation where corporate governance should provide the mechanism to prevent the inappropriate resource transferring through cross-holdings structure and enhance the benefit of maintaining competitive advantage.　

Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Research Motivation 1
1.2 Research Objectives 4

Chapter 2 Literature Review 6
2.1 Ownership Structure and Agency Problem 6
2.2 Agency Problem and Excess Cash Holdings 9
2.3 Excess Cash Holdings and Ownership Structure 12

Chapter 3 Data and Methodology 14
3.1 Data Resource and Sample Selection 14
3.2 Methodology 14

Chapter 4 Variables and Hypotheses 17
4.1 Measure of Cash Holdings 17
4.2 Measure of Ownership Structure 19
4.3 Measure of Cross-Holdings 24
4.4 Measure of Firm’s Performance 25
4.5 Hypotheses 27

Chapter 5 Cash Holdings and Ownership Structure in Taiwan 29
5.1 The Increase in Cash Holdings 29
5.2 Diverse Industrial Cash Holdings 30
5.3 Why Firms Hold Cash 31
5.4 Growing Ownership Concentration in Taiwan 32
5.5 Growing Cross-Holdings Ownership in Taiwan 33

Chapter 6 Empirical Results 35
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 35
6.2 Regression Evidence 36
6.3 Different Types of Cross-Holdings and Excess Cash Holdings 44

Chapter 7 Conclusion 47
7.1 Conclusion 47
7.2 Research Restriction and Further Study Suggestion 51

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