臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究主要是探討金融控股公司風險影響之成因，研究期間從民國90年至96年間，以國內14家金融控股公司做為研究對象。實證結果發現，退休政府官員任職非但不會抑制金融控股公司之風險，反而會提高風險，進而，本研究加入公司特徵要素(規模與呆帳費用)，並且進行敏感度分析，實證結果發現在公司治理方面，無退休官員任職、法人持股較低的情況下，資本適足率最佳(風險最小)，而在公司特徵方面，規模較高、呆帳費用較低的情況下，資本適足率最高(風險最低)。另外，再以金融控股公司中非存放利差業務不同的角度，持續探討是否對金融控股公司風險有影響，實證結果發現當金融控股公司側重在以非存放款利差收入為主要收入來源時，會擴大金融控股風險，且以佣金與手續費收入之業務最為明顯。最後，因為績效與風險之間互為替代函數，故本研究納入了金融控股公司之績效，檢視金融控股公司之公司治理各構面不同是否對金融控股公司績效(會計績效與市場績效)有影響，研究結果發現，退休政府官員任職非但不會提升金融控股公司之績效，反而會降低其績效，相對導致金融控股公司風險的增加。

This study mainly investigated the determinants of financial holding company risk, taking 14 domestic financial holding companies from 2001 to 2007. First, we found that the retired official would increase financial holding company risk. Furthermore, we used the retired official, institutional holding, size, and bad debt had influence on BIS, exhibiting sensitivity analysis, we still found financial holding company risk lowest by no retired official working, less institutional holding in the financial holding company, larger asset and lower bad debt. Second, we studied the aspects of financial holding company non-operation impact on financial holding company risk, finding that non-operation spread of financial holding company would enhance financial holding company risk, especially return of fee and commission. Finally, we examined corporate governance influence on financial holding company performance, including ROA, EPS and Tobin’s Q. The result as same as prior findings lowering the financial holding company performance and related increased financial holding company risk.

中文摘要 ……………………………………………………………… i
英文摘要 ……………………………………………………………… ii
誌謝 ……………………………………………………………… iii
目錄 ……………………………………………………………… vi
表目錄 ……………………………………………………………… vii
第壹章 緒論………………………………………………………… 1
第一節 研究背景與動機…………………………………………… 1
第二節 研究目的…………………………………………………… 4
第三節 研究架構…………………………………………………… 5
第貳章 文獻探討…………………………………………………… 6
第一節 退休政府官員對金融控股公司風險之相關文獻………… 6
第二節 公司治理對金融控股公司風險之相關文獻……………… 8
第三節 金融控股公司非存放利差業務對金融控股公司風險之相關文獻……………………………………………………… 11
第四節 公司治理對金融控股公司會計績效之相關文獻………… 12
第五節 公司治理對金融控股公司市場績效之相關文獻………… 15
第參章 研究方法…………………………………………………… 18
第一節 研究期間、樣本選取及資料來源………………………… 18
第二節 變數定義與衡量…………………………………………… 21
第三節 研究假說建立……………………………………………… 29
第四節 實證模型…………………………………………………… 32
第肆章 實證結果…………………………………………………… 38
第一節 敘述性統計分析…………………………………………… 38
第二節 多元廻歸分析……………………………………………… 41
第三節 敏感度分析………………………………………………… 52
第伍章 結論與建議………………………………………………… 58
第一節 研究結論…………………………………………………… 58
第二節 研究建議…………………………………………………… 61
參考文獻 ……………………………………………………………… 62

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