臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

過去的學者在討論通路問題時，多是以通路成員的組織結構作為討論的方向。而賽局理論在行銷通路結構的分析上有一獨特的看法，並且對於一些組織的現象提出合理的解釋。因此本文主要目的是在試著應用賽局理論中均衡的觀念，探討廠商在選擇行銷通路亦或自行面對終端客戶之決策上的問題並比較優缺點。
在資訊產業中，原廠多半是以經銷的方式面對終端客戶，原因不外乎考量其自身人力上的成本問題，但經銷商人員素質良莠不齊，公司穩定性亦是一大考量。且在全球大環境中，無論是軟體或是硬體，單純產品的獲利已經不如預期。如何藉行銷通路創造更高的附加價值與利潤，同時亦可提高市佔率，一直是原廠所思考的問題。本文藉著國外資訊整合大廠IBM公司與Oracle公司其軟體產品與其經銷商的合作中，去探討原廠最適之通路策略。在通路結構的不同或針對策略性客戶與其自身加值服務的考量下，所形成廠商領導或通路領導的情況，運用賽局理論，探討當原廠及經銷商在通路中的地位不同時，實體產品與服務行銷通路和原廠的經銷合作機制是否能增加雙方利潤。並在多個通路中考慮競爭關係，以通路中含有單一經銷商的情形來進行分析比較。亦可提供未來有關服務通路研究領域之參考。

Traditional research identified the marketing channel topic almost focus channel member and composition, institutional. And there is a unique attitude about marketing channel composition analysis use the game theory, and propose a reasonable explanation for some channel organizations composition phenomenon.
The research is trying to use game theory and proportion concept, probe into the question that the manufacturer is choosing the decision on sale throughout the channel or direct customer by oneself to have and comparative pluses and minuses.
In the IT service industry, the factory almost direct sell to customer, because them must consider the cost question on manpower, but the distributor personnel has very different quality, company''s stability is also greatly considered. And in the global environment, no matter software or hardware, the profit is not enough form products. How to creating higher additional value and profit and improve the taking rate of market throughout the marketing channel, it has been the question that the factory has thought deeply all the time. This research through IBM and Oracle company’s distributor''s cooperation, to find out the rightest distribution strategic decision. In the different channel strategic decision and consider add value, situations of the manufacturer leader or the channel leader, use and is comparable to the game theory, probing into it when factory and distributor''s position in the channel are different, entity products and service selling the cooperative mechanism and can increase the profits of both sides. And consider the competition relation in the nullity channel, analyses to compare with situation with single distributor in the channel. At the end of our research, some results are surprising, which set up the benchmark comparisons for future work in this area.

目錄
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究流程與步驟 3
第二章 文獻探討 5
第一節 服務利潤鏈 5
第二節 行銷通路與競合理論 6
第三節 建立夥伴關係 9
第四節 資訊產品的通路結構 14
第三章 產業特性分析 21
第一節 資訊系統服務廠 21
第二節 IBM公司簡介與經銷通路說明 22
第三節 Oracle公司簡介與經銷通路說明 26
第四章 個案分析 29
第一節 通路結構賽局理論模型 29
4.1.1. 單一零售商的基本模型 35
4.1.1.1. 原廠領導(MS) 38
4.1.1.2. 單零售商領導(RS) 39
4.1.1.3. 垂直Nash均衡(VN) 41
第二節 數值分析討論 46
第三節 兩案例公司經銷體制比較 48
第五章 結論與建議 53
參考文獻 54


表目錄
表4-1各種不同配銷通路力量下之均衡解 43
表4-2各種不同配銷通路力量下均衡解之比較 44


圖目錄
圖1-1 價值網 3
圖1-2 研究流程圖 4
圖2-1 關係行銷的中介變數模型 11
圖2-2 國內資訊產品通路結構常見稱呼與概念圖 15
圖2-3 北美地區軟體行銷通路 20
圖2-4 日本軟體市場通路 21
圖3-1 IBM整合性經銷服務 24
圖3-2 IBM BP主要類型與說明 25
圖4-1 通路結構圖 30

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