臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

借殼上市這樣的市場潛規則，在現今的股票市場運作中屢見不顯。若是借殼公司能好好經營，為公司所有利害關係人（股東、員工、投資人、供應商‧‧等等）帶來經營成果，利潤回饋給大家也不乏是件好事。但是若公司有意利用股民們的預期心理作用藉機炒作股價，就有失企業正派經營、公司正常治理之原理原則，亦有失股票投資之公正公開性（難免有內線交易之嫌）。

2013年基因國際(為借殼公司)因子公司胖達人麵包使用人工香精廣告不實，造成基因國際股價大跌，投資人損失慘重。事後OTC做了借殼法規修正，明確規定若上市櫃公司經營權與經營項目同時異動，則該上市櫃公司股票需停止買賣，主管機關的目的是希望能扼止有心人士利用借殼立即注入完全不相關的營業項目而進行炒股。

本研究將以借殼上市櫃公司之公司治理相關議題為研究主軸，從主管單位的法規制定與公司內部之經營管理等不同構面來進行深入探討，希望可以提供實務上運作之建議。研究方法以質性研究之個案研究方式進行，分析基因事件前後之借殼案例的差異性及共通性。另外，也會分析OTC在基因事件後的修法對扼止借殼市場的炒作之影響，並提出本研究建議的修法方向及做法。

為了使研究更加聚焦，將以以下幾個議題為本研究之核心

1. OTC因為基因事件後之修法對公司運作之實務影響，是否能對投資人提供相對較好之保障（相對於修法前）？若不是，建議作法為何？怎樣的作為才可以有效的保障投資人？
2. 借殼公司的公司治理問題探討，借殼公司與一般公司在公司治理的要點上有和不同？公司應該有哪些制衡機制來造就股東利益最大化，防止經營者與所有者利益之背離？

3. 借殼公司如何協調所有利害關係人的利益關係？如何透過公司治理來達成？

依據此研究的發現，建議借殼公司每月除了公告營收，還要公告獲利，且針對新增營業項目之獲利金額需要在財務報表中被清楚標示出來，投資大眾可以清楚知道該公司獲利來源，並就該公司獲利項目比重進行投資參考。落實防止人頭戶交易將會是重要的配套措施，可以避免大股東運用人頭戶交易，對投資人的權益可以獲得更好的保障。內線交易須確實杜絕，以確保投資大眾的投資公平性。集團交叉持股之管理，子公司持有母公司股票之資訊到達一定比例時，此資訊必須在股市觀測站充分揭露。此外，在公司治理方面，建議借殼公司內部人持股申報擴大至三親等，以及借殼公司的獨立董事，由主管機關提名人選，以落實超然獨立。另外，透過代理人有效管理公司，建議借殼公司的總經理及協理級以上主管需與大股東無三等親以內關係。最後，加強關係人交易之監督，避免借殼公司透過關係人交易五鬼搬運、上下其手。

Backdoor listing has become an unspoken rule of the market and takes place frequently in today's stock market operation. It is not really a bad thing if the backdoor company can run well and feed the profit back to all stakeholders (shareholders, employees, investors, suppliers, etc.). However, if the company intends to take advantage of the anticipation of the stockholders to hype the stock price, this would violate the governing criteria of honest business and normally operated company and is in conflict with the fairness and openness of stock investment (and is suspicious of insider trading).

In 2013 the stock price of Gene International (a backdoor company) plummeted as a result of the use of artificial flavor (against its advertising) in the bread made by its subsidiary Top Pot Bakery, causing heavy loss to its investors. After this incidence, OTC made a correction to the backdoor regulations, clearly stipulating that if the operating rights of a listed or cabinet company and its business content change at the same time, the trading of its stock should be suspended. The purpose of this amendment is to prevent the use of the backdoor to immediately inject irrelevant business items to hype the stock price.

This research targets the corporate governance issues of a backdoor lcompany. Through in-depth investigations in various aspects including the government regulations and the internal management of the company, I hope to provide some useful advices on the practical operation of backdoor companies. The research is conducted through qualitative case study to analyze the differences and commonalities of the backdoor cases before and after the incidence of Gene International. In addition, the influence of OTC's amendment on stopping the hype of stock price through backdoor listing is studied, and suggestions for future revision are given.

In order to make the research more focused, the following topics are selected as the core of this research.

1. How does OTC’s amendment after the incidence of Gene International affect the operation of backdoor companies? Does it provide better protection for investors than before? If not, what better ways are recommended? What kinds of action can protect investors more effectively?

2. What are the key points in the administration of a backdoor company? What is different between the management of a backdoor company and that of an ordinary company? What countering mechanisms should the company have to keep the company operators in line with the maximal interest of the shareholders?

3. How does the backdoor company balance the interest of all stakeholders? How can this be achieved through corporate governance?

Based on this study, it is suggested that the backdoor company must announce its profit besides its revenue in the monthly report. In addition, the profit resulting from the new business items should be marked clearly in the financial statements. This allows the investors to clearly know the source of the profit and use this information for reference in making investment decision. The enforcement of preventing dummy account transactions is an important supporting measure to avoid the use of dummy account transactions by major shareholders, providing better protection for the rights and interests of the general investors. Eradication of insider trading is a requisite to ensuring the investment fairness of the general investors. Regarding the management of the cross-shareholdings in a group company, when the shares of the parent company owned by its subsidiary exceeds a certain level, this information must be fully disclosed at the stock market observatory. In addition, in the aspect of corporate governance, it is suggested that the declaration of insider shareholding should be extended to relatives of the third degree of kinship, and the independent directors should be nominated by the governing authority in order to attain true independence. Furthermore, the company should be effectively managed through the agent. The general manager and the manager of the associate level or above need to have no third-degree or closer relationship with the major shareholders. Finally, the supervision of the transactions through related parties should be strengthened to avoid hollowing out the backdoor company by the insiders.

目　次
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究問題與目的 3
第三節 章節架構 4
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 公司治理 6
第二節 代理理論 10
第三章 研究方法 13
第一節 研究設計 13
第二節 個案選擇 15
第三節 資料蒐集 16
第四節 資料分析 17
第四章 上市櫃程序、借殼上市 18
第一節 上市櫃程序 18
第二節 借殼上市 22
第五章 個案分析 26
第一節 個案公司 26
第二節 研究發現 39
第六章 結論 50
第一節 研究結論 50
參考文獻 57

壹、 中文參考文獻

（一） 書籍
潘淑滿（2003）。質性研究：理論與應用（第初版）。台北：心理出版社股份有限公司。
蕭瑞麟（2007）。不用數字的研究：鍛鍊深度思考力的質性研究（第二版）。台北：台灣培生教育出版股份有限公司。
尚榮安, & Yin, R. K. (2001)。個案研究. 台北: 弘智文化。
李華驎, & 鄭佳綾( 2014)。公司的品格. 臺灣: 先覺.
陳志龍（2017）。集團化公司治理與財經犯罪預防: 國立臺灣大學出版中心.

（二） 期刊與論文
林嘉娜＆陳脩文＆李宥瑩及謝欣蕙（2011）, 私募有價證券之經營效益分析暨監理制度之探討,證交資料文章, 589 ,14~29。
吳克昌（1999）, 集中交易市場「借殼上市」之探討,證交資料文章,452, 9~17。
鍾怡如（2014）, 有關強化借殼上市（櫃）及股權流通性偏低之監理機制相關措施 ， 證券暨期貨月刊, 32(9) , 17~29。
陳瑞斌, & 許. J.（ 2007）. 公司治理結構與資訊揭露之關聯性研究. 交大管理學報, 2: 55-109.
黃. J.（2013）. 2012 年公司法與證券交易法發展回顧. 臺大法學論叢, 42(S): 1109-1145.
朱國光（1995）,台灣地區上市公司資本結構影響因素之研究 ,政治大學國際貿易研究所碩士論文。
呂季蓉（2005）,台灣上市上櫃公司私募之研究—論私募對象之影響,中山大學財務管理學系碩士論文。
倪偉倫（2002）,借殼上市公司的代理問題與經營績效之關係,政治大學財務管理研究所碩士論文。
吳雅妮（2008）,影響我國上市櫃公司選擇現金增資或私募的原因,政治大學會計學系碩士論文。

（三） 網際網路
金融監督管理委員會 新版公司治理藍圖(2018-2020) http://cgc.twse.com.tw/img/%E6%96%B0%E7%89%88%E5%85%AC%E5%8F%B8%E6%B2%BB%E7%90%86%E8%97%8D%E5%9C%96(2018-2020).pdf

台灣證券交易所 公司治理中心網頁http://cgc.twse.com.tw/front/aboutCorpgov

證券櫃檯買賣中心
http://www.tpex.org.tw/web/regular_emerging/apply_way/standard/standard.php?l=zh-tw

證券櫃檯買賣中心 www.tpex.org.tw/storage/eb_data/10310/103002662311-1.doc
 




貳、 英文參考文獻

（一） 書籍
Anthony Cox Jr, L. 2017. Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics by Richard Thaler. Risk Analysis, 37(9): 1796-1798.

（二） Journals
Beaver William H., 1966, “Financial Rations as Predictors of Failure,” Journal of Accounting Research, 4, 71-111. 
Bruderl Josef, Preisendorfer Peter and Ziegler Rolf, 1992, “Survival Chances of Newly Founded Business Organizations,” American Sociological Review, 57, 227-242. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4): 305-360.

Sheppard Jerry Paul, 1995, “A Resource Dependence Approach to Organizational Failure,” Social Science Research, 24, 28-62. 
Zmijewski Mark E., 1984, “Methodological Issues Related to the Estimation of Financial Distress Prediction Models,” Journal of Accounting Research, 22, 59-81.