臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

國內因受制於股權集中之先天環境，普遍存在股權偏離情況，代理問題的性質由傳統代理問題演變為控制股東與小股東間之核心代理問題，致使盈餘資訊性普遍低落。本研究旨在將資訊揭露透明度與控制股東代理問題結合，試圖驗證資訊揭露評鑑系統之存在，是否可作為大股東與小股東之間的溝通橋樑，降低雙方資訊不對稱及利益衝突之程度，進而使控制股東代理問題對盈餘資訊性所造成的負向影響得以獲得減緩。實證結果顯示，隨著資訊揭露等級愈高與資訊揭露等級的提升，的確能減緩控制股東代理問題對盈餘資訊性的負向影響，且隨著不同時期評鑑制度分級程度的改良，此減緩效果亦愈趨明顯。

Due to the inherent ownership structure, there is usually divergence between control rights and cash flow rights, that is core agency problem, in Taiwan. This divergence brings negative effect to earnings informativeness. This study combines the core agency problem and information transparency which is measured by “Information Disclosure and Evaluation System” to examine whether the existence of Information Disclosure and Evaluation System could mitigate the information asymmetry derived from controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.
The empirical results indicate that the higher or improved information transparency could mitigate the negative effect of controlling shareholder agency problem on earnings informativeness. Furthermore, this effect becomes more evident when “Information Disclosure and Evaluation System” has a more detailed ranking mechanism.

目錄
第壹章 緒論 4
第一節 研究背景及動機 4
第二節 研究問題與研究目的 6
第三節 預期研究貢獻 7
第貳章 資訊揭露評鑑制度之緣起與演進 9
第一節 資訊揭露評鑑系統之介紹 9
第二節 各屆評比方式及相關內容之概述 12
第三節 資訊揭露評鑑系統與資訊透明度之相關文獻 19
第參章 文獻探討 24
第一節 控制股東代理問題 24
第二節 控制股東代理問題之相關文獻 35
第三節 與盈餘資訊性相關之文獻 38
第肆章 研究方法 41
第一節 本研究之觀念性架構 41
第二節 研究假說 41
第三節 研究期間、樣本選取與資料來源 43
第四節 變數定義 44
第五節 實證模型 48
第伍章 實證結果 51
第一節 樣本資料分析 51
第二節 敘述性統計分析 52
第三節 相關係數分析 56
第四節 回歸結果分析 59
第五節 敏感性分析 63
第陸章 結論與限制 71
第一節 實證結果之彙整 71
第二節 研究限制 72
第三節 研究建議 73
參考文獻 75
中文部分 75
英文部分 77
附錄一 歷屆完整指標彙整 85
表目錄
表2 1我國資訊揭露透明度之各屆評鑑結果家數彙整 15
表2 2我國資訊揭露透明度之各屆評鑑結果家數百分比彙整 16
表2 3歷屆新增指標彙整 17
表3 1控制權與現金流量權衡量方式之文獻彙整 29
表3 2甲家族集團控制權與現金流量權之計算釋例 33
表5 1樣本篩選過程與樣本公司之產業/年度分布情形 51
表5 2各變數之敘述性統計量 54
表5 3 Pearson相關係數表 57
表5 4資訊揭露等級對控制股東代理問題與盈餘資訊性間關係之影響效果 61
表5 5資訊揭露評鑑等級之變動對控制股東代理問題與盈餘資訊性間關係的影響效果 62
表5 6敏感性分析：分組檢測之實證結果 67
表5-7考量資訊透明度與資訊揭露等級變動之內生性問題的實證結果 69
 
圖目錄
圖3 1 甲家族集團之股權控制結構 32
圖4 1 本研究之觀念性架構圖 41

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