臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

現實交易過程中，買賣雙方為了使交易順利達成進而議價（Bargaining）與談判（Negotiation），在議價過程中，議價雙方有外在的成本壓力，因此雙方協調失敗時，必須負擔議價失敗時的成本。當理性決策者在面對訊息不對稱以及議價成本差異化下，將如何制定議價策略，是本文探討的重心。
本文將以議價賽局中的終止議價賽局模型為基礎，探討議價雙方在面對雙方訊息不對稱，且存在議價失敗成本的情況下，議價雙方制定決策的過程以及均衡結果的產生，並藉由兩種理論行為預測（子賽局完全均衡及均等分法），驗證驗證參賽者的行為是否符合理論的預期，再經由實驗法驗證結果。實驗證據顯示：（1）兩種理論預測，只有均等分法在雙方訊息對稱下預測結果較為準確；（2）存在議價失敗成本對參賽者的行為的確產生顯著的影響，特別是雙方成本存在差異時；（3）訊息不對稱增加議價的不確定性；（4）議價失敗成本的存在抵銷了部分先行者的優勢；（5）學習效果在實驗結果中均不顯著；（6）存在議價失敗成本的威脅下，有助於提高雙方議價協調的成功率。

The aim of this research is to discuss how rational players make bargaining strategies while facing the situations of asymmetric information and cost differentiation. In order to reach agreement, both traders bargain or negotiate during transaction. As a result, both sides of traders who have the outside pressure of cost about bargaining process should undertake bargaining cost while they fail to reach agreement.
On the basis of ultimatum bargaining model, this research tries to discuss the process of traders making strategies and outcome of equilibrium under the situations of asymmetric information and bargaining cost, and identify the expectation of behaviors of all players by two predicted models (Subgame perfect equilibrium and equal-split equilibrium) and experimental method. The experimental evidence shows: (1) Only equal-split model predicted well under the situation of complete information of both sides of players. (2) Bargaining cost affects the bargaining behavior of all players significantly, especially the bargaining cost of both traders were different. (3) Asymmetric information between traders increases the uncertainty of bargaining. (4) Partial first-mover advantage was offset by bargaining cost. (5) Learning effect is not significant in the experimental results. (6) The pressure of bargaining cost indeed increases the success rate of bargaining.

目錄
中文摘要 I
英文摘要 II
目錄 III
表目錄 IV
圖目錄 V
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究架構 2
第二章 相關理論背景及文獻探討 3
第一節 實驗室實驗法 3
第二節 議價理論與賽局理論 8
第三章 研究方法 19
第一節 理論架構 20
第二節 實驗設計 25
第四章 實驗結果分析 29
第一節 實驗結果 29
第二節 參賽者行為分析 45
第五章 結論與建議 49
第一節 研究結語 49
第二節 後續研究建議與研究限制 51
參考文獻 52
附錄 56
附錄一：實驗說明 56

參考文獻
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