臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

先前對於社會連結之研究指出，獨立董事與總經理之社會連結可能影響獨立董事在企業內之職權有效性。本篇研究蒐集2006年至2010年間238家台灣上市及上櫃公司獨立董事與總經理之三種社會連結（同校、同事以及同社），並檢視該社會連結對總經理薪酬之影響。本研究發現當上述三種獨立董事與總經理之社會連結同時存在時，該總經理將獲得較高薪酬，惟本篇研究也發現同時考量上述三種社會連結時才會影響獨立董事之決策過程，三種社會連結個別效果並不顯著。此外，相對於傳統產業，由於高科技產業之總經理職業及領域知識的限制，他們傾向與獨立董事建立更多的社會連結，而高科技產業之總經理亦獲得較高之薪酬。

Prior research suggests that independent director’s social ties with the CEO could undermine the efficacy of a formally independent director in the firm. In this study, I examine the relation between social ties and CEO compensation over the time period of 2006 to 2010 using hand-collecting data from Taiwanese TSE and GTSM companies. My results suggest that CEO compensation is higher when social ties exist between CEO and independent directors. In addition, this study also finds that the impacts of social ties are wholly integrated to affect decisions of independent directors rather than individually affecting them. Moreover, CEO of technology industries might have more social connections with their independent board members and they tend to share social relationships with them through social networks because of limitations of professional knowledge. Consequently, CEO of technology industries would receive higher compensation than other industries. Thus, my findings would be useful in better informing regulators and investors faced with questions related to the possible consequences of CEO-board social ties for business decisions and other concerning economic outcomes.

Index
1. Introduction 1
2. Literature and Hypothesis Development 6
2.1. Literature Review 6
2.1.1. Board Independence and Social Ties 6
2.1.2. Social Ties and CEO Compensation 16
2.2. Hypothesis Development 21
3. Research Design 23
3.1. Sources and Sample 23
3.2. Identification/Measurement of Social Ties 25
3.3. Research Design and Empirical Model 28
3.4. Variables Measurement 29
3.4.1. CEO Compensation 29
3.4.2. Independent Director-CEO Social Ties 30
3.4.3. Control Variables 30
4. Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Results 34
4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analyses 34
4.2. Empirical Results 38
5. Additional Analysis 41
6. Conclusions, Contribution, and Limitations 43
6.1. Conclusions 43
6.2. Contribution 44
6.3. Limitations 46
References 48

References
鄒秀明，2006，「科技業高階經理人，年薪千萬起」，聯合報，4月30日。
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. 2007. A theory of friendly boards. Journal of Finance,
62(1): 217-250.
Baker, G.P., Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. 1988, Compensation and incentives:
Practice vs. theory. Journal of Finance, 43: 593-616.
Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. 2003. Executive compensation as an agency problem.
Journal of Economic Perspective, 17: 71-92.
Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. 2004. Pay without performance: The unfulfilled
promise of executive compensation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Belliveau, M. A., O’Reilly, C. A., & Wade, J. B. 1996. Social capital at the top:
Effects of social similarity and status on CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 39(6): 1568-1593.
Berscheid, E., Snyder, M., & Omoto, A. M. 1989. Issues in studying close
relationships: Conceptualizing and measuring closeness. In C. Hendrick (Ed.), Review of personality and social psychology, 10: 63-91. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. 2002. The non-correlation between board independence and
long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law, 27(2): 231-273.
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. 2001. Financial accounting information and
corporate governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32: 237-334.
Chatman, J., & Jehn, K. 1994. Assessing the relationship between industry
characteristics and organizational culture: How different can you be? The academy of Management Journal, 37(3): 522-553.
Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., & Malloy, C. J. 2008. The small world of investing: Board
connection and mutual fund returns. Journal of Political Economy, 116(5):
951-979.
________. 2010. Sell side school ties. Journal of Finance, 65(4): 1409-1437.
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. 2008. Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal
of Financial Economics, 87: 329-356.
Core, J. E., Holthausen R. W., & Larcker, D. F. 1999. Corporate governance, chief
executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51: 371-406.
Davis, G. F., Yoo, M., & Baker, W. E. 2003. The small world of the American
corporate elite, 1982-2001. Strategic Organization, 3: 301-326.
Dey, A., & Liu, X. 2010. Social connections, stock based compensation, and
director oversight. Unpublished working paper.
Dooley, P. C. 1969. The interlocking directorate. American Economic Review, 59:
314-323.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of
Law and Economics, 26: 301-325.
Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. C. 1989. Chief executive compensation: A study of
the intersection of markets and political processes. Strategic Management Journal, 10: 121-134.
Fredrickson, J. W., Hambrick, D. C., & Baumrin, S. 1988. A model of CEO
dismissal. Academy of Management Review, 13: 255-270.
Gaver, J. J., & Gaver, K. M. 1993. Additional evidence on the association between
the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16: 125-160.
Gordon, G. 1991. Industry determinants of organizational culture. The Academy of
Management Review, 16(2): 396-415.
Hermalin, B. E. & Weisbach, M. S. 1998. Endogenously chosen boards of directors
and their monitoring of the CEO. American Economic Review, 88: 96-118.
Hwang, B. H., & Kim, S. 2009. It pays to have friends. Journal of Financial
Economics, 93: 138-158.
____________________. 2010. Earning management and social ties. Unpublished
Working Paper, Purdue University, IN.
Ingram, P., & Robert, P. W. 2000. Friendships among competitors in the Sydney hotel
industry. American Journal of Sociology, 106: 387-423.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360.
Kimberly, J., & Zajac, E. J. 1988. The dynamics of CEO-board relationships. In D. C.
Hambrick (Ed.), The executive effect: Concepts and methods for studying top managers: 179-204. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Klein, A. 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earning
management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33: 375-400.
Krishnan, G. V., Raman, K. K., Yang, K., & Yu, W. 2011. CFO/CEO-board social
ties, Sarbanes-Oxley, and earning management. Accounting Horizons, 25(3): 537-557.
Larcker, D. F., Richardson, S. A., Seary, A. J., & Tuna, I. 2005. Back door links
between directors and executive compensation. Unpublished working paper. Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. 1992. A modest proposal for improved corporate
governance. Business Lawyer, 48: 59-77.
Li, Y., & Weintrop, J. 2005. The effectiveness of NYSE guidelines to regulate CEO
compensation through independent compensation committees. Working paper. New York, NY: Baruch College.
Main, B., O’Reilly, C., &Wade, J. 1995. The CEO, the board of directors and
executive compensation: Economic and psychological perspectives. Industrial and Corporate Change, 4: 1-34.
March, J. 1984. Notes on ambiguity and executive compensation. Scandinavian
Journal of Management Studies, 1: 53-64.
Marsden, P. V. 1987. Core discussion networks of Americans. American Sociological
Review, 52: 122-131.
Matsumura, E. M., & Shin, J. Y. 2005. Corporate governance reform and CEO
compensation: Intended and unintended consequences. Journal of Business Ethics, 62: 101-113.
McDonald, M. L., & Westphal, J. D. 2003. Getting by with the advice of their friends:
CEOs’ advice networks and firms’ strategic responses to poor performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 48: 1-32.
McPherson, M., Smith-lovin, L., & Cook, J. M. 2001. Birds of a feather: Homophily
in social networks. Annual Review of Sociology, 27: 415-444.
Morck, R. 2007. Behavioral finance in corporate governance-independent directors
and non-executive chairs. Working paper. Alberta, Canada: University of Alberta.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1988. Management ownership and market
valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20: 293-315.
Moreno, J. L. 1934. Who shall survive? Foundations of sociometry, group
psychotherapy, and sociodrama. Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co (Beacon House), Washington D.C.
Murphy, K. J. 1999. Executive compensation. North Holland, Amsterdam.
Nowak, M. J., & McCabe, M. 2003. Information costs and the role of the independent
corporate director. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(4): 300-307.
O’Reilly, C. A., & Main, B. G. M. 2007. Setting the CEO’s pay: It’s more than simple
economics. Organizational Dynamics, 36: 1-12.
Palmer, D., Friedland, R., & Singh, J. 1986. The ties that bind: Organizational and
class bases of stability in a corporate interlock network. American Sociological Review, 51: 781-796.
Porac, J., Thomas, H., & Baden-Fuller, C. 1989. Competitive groups as cognitive
communities: The case of Scottish knitwear manufacturers. Journal of Management Studies, 26(4): 397-416.
Porac, J., Wade, J., & Pollock, T. 1999. Industry categories and the politics of the
comparable firm in CEO compensation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(1): 112-144.
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. 1978. The external control of organizations. Harper &
Row, New York.
Rodgers, W., and Gago, S. 2003. A model capturing ethics and executive
compensation. Journal of Business Ethics, 48: 189-202.
Rosen, S. 1982. Authority, control, and the distribution of earnings. Bell Journal of
Economics, 13: 311-323.
Schmidt, B. 2009. Costs and benefits of friendly boards during mergers and
acquisitions. Unpublished Working Paper, Emory University, Atlanta, GA.
Scott, J. 2000. Social network analysis: A handbook. Sage Publication, London.
Shlefier, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of
Finance, 52(2): 737-783.
Smith, C. W., & Watts, R. 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate
financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 32: 263-292.
Udi, H. 2011. Should independent board members with social ties to management
disqualify themselves from serving on the board? Journal of Business Ethics, 99: 299-423.
Uzzi, B. 1996. The sources and consequences of embeddedness for the economic
performance of organizations: The network effect. American Sociological Review, 61: 674-698.
______ .1999. Embeddedness in the making of financial capital: How social
relations and networks benefit firms seeking financing. American Sociological Review, 64: 481-505.
Westphal, J. D. 1999. Collaboration in the boardroom: Behavioral and performance
consequences of CEO-board social ties. Academy of Management Journal, 42: 7-24.
Westphal, J. D., Boivie, S., & Chng, D. H. M. 2006. The strategic impetus for social
network ties: How strategic dependencies affect the likelihood of reconstituting broken CEO friendship ties to executives of other firms. Strategic Management Journal, 27: 425-445.
Westphal, J. D., & Milton, L. 2000. How experience and network ties affect the
influence of demographic minorities on corporate boards. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(2): 366-398.
Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of
directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2): 185-211.
Young, C. S., & Tsai, L. C. 2008. The sensitivity of compensation to social capital:
Family CEOs vs. nonfamily CEOs in the family business groups. Journal of Business Research, 61: 363-374.