臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本論文研製之公司資訊揭露與公司經營績效，是以台灣證券暨期貨市場發展基金會於2003年至2005年公佈的資訊揭露評鑑指標為主，輔以台灣上市櫃公司之年度財報，探討影響公司揭露程度的相關因素以及揭露程度是否會影響公司的經營績效。探討變數之間的相關性分析，本研究採用最小平方法以及二階段最小平方法，解決內生性問題。實證結果指出，公司之信用風險與資訊揭露行為呈現負向的顯著關係、國外法人持股比例越高，資訊揭露程度亦越高，以及大股東持股比例越多，資訊揭露程度越低。對於公司資訊揭露程度與公司經營績效，亦有顯著的正向線性關係，符合本研究的研究假設。此外，本研究透過該實證分析，另有其他研究發現: 公司之研發(R&D)利用率對於公司經營績效有正向的影響關係，政府持股比例越高之公司，營運的彈性較小，效率較低，對經營績效有負面影響。在股權結構部份，經理人持股比例越高，因互利效果(Mutual Back Scratching Effect)的存在，使得公司治理的程度降低，進而影響公司的經營績效表現。對於公司董監之酬勞，董監酬勞比例越高之公司，經營績效越好，印證台灣企業的董監特徵因素中，酬勞的投入會讓董監更能增加對公司投入決策、監督、與建議的意願，進而提升公司的經營績效。此外，獨立董事比例越高之公司，經營績效越好。然而美國資本市場常見之親信效果(Cronyism Effect)，在台灣的實證結果中並不存在。

In this thesis, we undertake a study on the relationship between corporation’s disclosure quality and their financial performance. Main sources of data include the public disclosure evaluation conducted by the Securities and Futures Institute during 2003~2005, as well as annual reports published by publicly listed Taiwanese companies. The quantitative methods, OLS (Ordinary Least Square Approach) and 2SLS (Two Stage Least Square Approach), were adopted to uncover the correlations and to reduce Homoskedasticity problems. The empirical results show that there is a consequential positive correlation between credit risk and disclosure quality. The quality of disclosure is also positively correlated with size of foreign institutional shareholding, and negatively correlated with the presence of large domestic shareholders. Further, there is indeed a positive correlation between disclosure quality and financial performance, inline with our research hypothesis. Other ancillary findings show that R&D expenditure is positively correlated with financial performance, whilst sizable government holding is a negative factor for performance. Size of holding by the senior management team also turns out to be a negative performance factor, we believe, due to the Mutual Back Scratching Effect that impairs management effectiveness. Board of Directors compensation showed a positive factor for performance. This indicates that higher compensation has encouraged board members to get more involved in monitoring and guiding the company’s developments. The presence of Independent Directors proved a further positive factor for performance. This result also shows that the Cronyism Effect commonly witnessed in the U.S. capital markets is not currently demonstrated in Taiwan.

中文摘要 ……………………………………………………………………………………… i
英文摘要 ……………………………………………………………………………………… ii
目錄 ……………………………………………………………………………………… iii
表目錄 ……………………………………………………………………………………… iv
一、 緒論…………………………………………………………………………… 1
二、 文獻回顧與假設議題………………………………………………………… 3
2.1 文獻回顧………………………………………………………………………. 3
2.2 研究假設………………………………………………………………………. 6
三、 研究方法與資料……………………………………………………………… 9
3.1 二階段最小平方法回歸模型…………………………………………………. 9
3.2 資料與變數選取………………………………………………………………. 10
四、 實證分析……………………………………………………………………… 15
4.1 資訊揭露與公司績效相關性分析……………………………………………. 15
4.2 實證結果論述…………………………………………………………………. 26
五、 結論與建議…………………………………………………………………… 29
參考文獻 ………………………………………………………………… 30

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