臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

合作式通訊是近年來被廣泛討論的技術。合作式通訊可以有效的降低中斷機率並增加能源的使用效率，十分適合應用於下一代的綠能無線網路。然而，多數相關研究都假設所有使用者皆願意幫助其他使用者進行資料傳輸。這在現實環境中並不合理，尤其行動裝置使用者所擁有的能源有限時。為了改善此一問題，本實驗室以間接互惠的概念為基礎提出了一個名聲拍賣機制來刺激使用者參與合作傳輸。這項機制考慮協助傳輸的中繼使用者有一個或多個的情形。過去的研究中並沒有分析與多個中繼使用者進行合作傳輸的效能。因此，本文提出了一個數學模型來推導出與多個中繼使用者進行合作傳輸的中斷機率。藉由模擬結果可以證明，此數學模型可以近似地求得中斷效能。最後，本文提出了一種適應方案來決定與單一或多名中繼使用者合作。根據模擬結果，此適應方案的效能都優於固定與單一或多名中繼使用者合作的方式。

Cooperative communication is a simple but effective scheme to reduce outage probability and increase energy efficiency for next-generation green wireless networks. However, the assumption that all users of wireless networks would be willing to help transmission is not realistic. To address this issue, a previous work proposed a reputation auction scheme to stimulate users to perform cooperative transmission via the concept of indirect reciprocity. The scenarios of cooperating with single- and multiple-relay were considered. However, the performance analysis with multiple relay was not provided. Accordingly, this thesis proposes a mathematical model to derive the outage probability for the proposed reputation auction framework under the scenario of multiple relays. In this model, the reputation value and the corresponding transmission power are considered jointly, and the approximated outage probability of the system over Rayleigh fading channels is derived. The simulation and analytical model results are in a good agreement. Finally, this thesis presents an adaptive scheme to decide when to use the single-relay scheme and when to apply the multiple-relay one. According to simulation results, the outage performance of the adaptive scheme outperforms both the single-relay only and the multiple-relay only schemes.

摘要 I
Abstract II
Acknowledgements IV
Contents V
List of Figures VII
List of Tables VIII
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
1.1 Background 1
1.2 Motivation 4
1.3 Objective 5
1.4 Thesis Outline 6
Chapter 2: Related Work 7
2.1 Cooperative Transmission 7
2.2 Indirect Reciprocity 10
2.3 Outage Analysis 11
Chapter 3: System Model and Reputation Auction Game 13
3.1 System Model and Problem Statement 14
3.2 Descending Clock-Proxy Auction 17
3.3 Reputation Auction Game 19
3.3.1 Neighbor/Source Node Utility Function 21
3.3.2 Descending Clock-Proxy Auction for Single-relay (DCAS) 22
3.3.3 Descending Clock-Proxy Auction for Multiple-relay (DCAM) 30
3.3.4 Nash Equilibrium Analysis 37
Chapter 4: Numerical Results 39
4.1 Simulation parameters 40
4.2 Simulation and Analysis Results 42
4.2.1 Validation of DCAS and DCAM with Full Energy 42
4.2.2 Validation of DCAS and DCAM with different Energy Allocation 46
Chapter 5: Conclusion 52
Bibliography 54

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