臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究旨在探討薪酬委員會之設置及其品質是否有效提升總經理現金薪酬與會計績效間的連結程度（即薪酬績效敏感性）。以2009-2012年之台灣上市公司為研究樣本，實證結果支持薪酬委員會的設置能有效增進前述兩者間之正向關係，後續進一步以2012年設置薪酬委員會後之的公司來檢驗薪酬委員會品質對薪酬績效敏感性之影響後發現，薪酬委員會品質愈佳，愈能提升總經理薪酬績效敏感性。整體而言，本研究發現一些薪酬委員會的特性（如出席狀況、忙碌程度及任期等）對治理品質的提升具有實質助益，故委員會成員的特質屬性，將主導該委員會品質之優劣。換言之，薪酬委員會是否能帶來提升薪酬績效敏感性的預期效果，除觀察設置的後果外，亦應端視其組成成員的特性。

This study examine whether establishment of compensation committee (hereafter, CC) and its quality can improve the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting performance (i.e., the pay-performance sensitivity, PPS). Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms over the period spanning 2009-2012, the empirical results can support our argument that CC establishment have a positive effect on PPS. However, we do find that the higher CC quality, the positive association between CEO compensation and accounting earnings is more pronounced while we focus on the period of CC establishment. Overall, our findings indicate several compensation committee characteristics (e.g., meetings attendance, members’ directorship and tenure) have significant benefits in improving corporate governance mechanism of monitoring CEO compensation. Therefore, CC quality is dominated by its members’ attributes, that is, whether CC play a role of improving PPS depends on the characteristics of its committee members.

目 錄
第一章 前言 1
第二章 文獻探討與假說發展 7
第一節 我國薪酬委員會之設置規範 7
第二節 總經理現金薪酬與會計績效之關連性(Pay-performance sensitivity, PPS) 9
第三節 薪酬委員會及其組成品質對總經理薪酬及公司績效之影響 10
第三章 研究方法 15
第一節 研究期間、樣本選取與資料來源 15
第二節 變數之操作性定義 17
第三節 實證模型 25
第四章 實證結果 28
第一節 敘述性統計量 28
第二節 相關分析 29
第三節 薪酬委員會之設置對薪酬績效敏感性之影響效果 30
第四節 薪酬委員會組成品質對薪酬績效敏感性之影響 32
第五章 增額測試 38
第一節 薪酬委員會之設置及其品質對董監薪酬績效敏感性之影響 38
第二節 薪酬委員會之設置對總經理或董監薪酬組成之影響效果 44
第六章 結論與建議 48
第一節 研究結論 48
第二節 研究貢獻 49
第三節 研究限制與建議 50
參考文獻 52
中文部分 52
英文部分 53
附錄 60
變數定義 60
表 目 錄
表3-1 樣本篩選過程 16
表3-2 本研究樣本之產業/年度分佈狀況 17
表3-3 上市公司薪酬委員會設立情形 21
表4-1 敘述性統計量 29
表4-2 Pearson相關係數表 30
表4-3 薪酬委員會之設置對總經理薪酬績效敏感性之影響效果 31
表4-4 薪酬委員會單一品質特性對總經理薪酬績效敏感性之影響效果 35
表4-5 薪酬委員會綜合品質對總經理薪酬績效敏感性之影響效果 36
表5-1 薪酬委員會之設置對董監現金薪酬績效敏感性之影響效果 40
表5-2 薪酬委員會之單一品質特性對董監薪酬績效敏感性之影響效果 41
表5-3 薪酬委員會綜合品質對董監薪酬績效敏感性之影響效果 43
表5-4 薪酬委員會的設置對總經理及董監薪酬組成成份之影響效果 46

中文部分
朱珊慧，2010，薪酬委員會相關法律問題之研究，東吳大學法律研究所學位論文。
邱茜，2010，董事會監督效力與高管薪酬-基於中國上市公司的實證研究，學術論壇，第三十三卷，第八期，頁112-116。
李怡瑩，2011，高階經理人薪酬與公司績效關係─薪酬委員會及專門委員會之調節效果，國立高雄應用科技大學學位論文。
林穎芬與劉維琪，2003，從高階主管薪酬的研究探討代理理論在台灣的適用程度，管理學報，第20卷，第2期，頁365-395。
陳盈翔，2006，公司治理機制與高階管理者薪酬關係之研究，東海大學會計研究所學位論文。
婁天威、洪瑞成、黃啟瑞與駱武昌，2012，淺析美國證管會對上市公司薪酬委員會新規範，證交資料，607期，頁32-41。
楊朝旭與吳幸蓁，2003，總經理薪酬績效敏感性、績效門檻與盈餘管理關聯性之研究，會計評論，第36期，頁56-87。
楊朝旭與吳幸蓁，2009，資產減損之決定因素與盈餘資訊性後果：論公司治理之角色，會計評論，第 48 期：67-114頁。
鄧穎懋與李秀玲，2012，薪酬委員會之功能及運作模式：評析證券交易法第14之6，朝陽商管評論，第11卷，第1期，頁69-85。
謝佳蓉，2011，董事會結構與高階經理人變動薪酬關聯性之研究，臺北大學會計學系學位論文。
戴銘昇，2010，薪資報酬委員會之組織與職權─兼評我國證券交易法2010年增訂之第 14 條之6，證交資料，585 期，頁31-55。
蘇裕惠，吳幸蓁與李靜芬，2012，獨立董事平均任期對盈餘品質之影響，會計理論暨實務研討會。

英文部分
Abowd, J. M. (1990), "Does performance-based managerial compensation affect corporate performance?," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43 (3), pp.52-73.
Anderson, R. C., and J. M. Bizjak. (2003), "An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay." Journal of Banking and Finance, 27 (7), pp.1323-1348.
Antle, R., and A. Smith. (1986), "An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives," Journal of Accounting Research, 24 (1), pp.1-39.
Balsam, S. (1998), "Discretionary accounting choices and CEO compensation," Contemporary Accounting Research, 15 (3), pp.229-252.
Bathala, C. T., and R. P. Rao. (1995), "The determinants of board composition: An agency theory perspective," Managerial and Decision Economics, 16 (1), pp.59-69.
Beasley, M. S. (1996), "An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud," The Accounting Review, 71 (4), pp.443-465.
Boyle, G., and H. Roberts. (2013), "CEO presence on the compensation committee: a puzzle," Journal of Economics and Business, 70, pp.16-26.
Bushman, R., Q. Chen, E. Engel, and A. Smith. (2004), "Financial accounting information, organizational complexity and corporate governance systems," Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37 (2), pp.167-201.
Chaganti, R. S., V. Mahajan, and S. Sharma. (1985), "Corporate board size, composition and corporate failures in retailing industry," Journal of Management Studies, 22 (4), pp.400-417.
Cheng, P., F. Gul, W. Tong, and J. Tsui. (2008), "Does corporate governance affect firm value? Evidence with corporate governance indices," 2008 AAA Conference Paper.
Chhaochharia, V., and Y. Grinstein. (2009), "CEO compensation and board structure," The Journal of Finance, 64 (1), pp.231-261.
Chou, H.-I., H. Chung, and X. Yin. (2012), "Attendance of board meetings and company performance: Evidence from Taiwan," Working paper, La Trobe University, Australia.
Chtourou, S. M., J. Bedard, and L. Courteau. (2001), "Corporate governance and earnings management," University of Laval, Quebec, Canada.
Coles, J. W., and W. S. Hesterly. (2000), "Independence of the chairman and board composition: Firm choices and shareholder value," Journal of Management 26 (2), pp.195-214.
Conyon, M. J., and S. I. Peck. (1998), "Board control, remuneration committees, and top management compensation," Academy of Management Journal, 41 (2), pp.146-157.
Conyon, M. J., and L. He. (2004), "Compensation committees and CEO compensation incentives in US entrepreneurial firms," Journal of Management Accounting Research, 16 (1), pp.35-56.
Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen, and D. F. Larcker. (1999), "Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, 51 (3), pp.371-406.
Cosh, A. (1975), "The remuneration of chief executives in the United Kingdom," The Economic Journal, 85 (337), pp.75-94.
Daily, C. M., J. L. Johnson, A. E. Ellstrand, and D. R. Dalton. (1998), "Compensation committee composition as a determinant of CEO compensation," Academy of Management Journal, 41 (2), 209-220.
Dechow, P. M., M. R. Huson, and R. G. Sloan. (1994), "The effect of restructuring charges on executives' cash compensation," The Accounting Review, 69 (1), pp.138-156.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. (1995), "Detecting earnings management," The Accounting Review, 70 (2), pp.193-225.
Defeo, V. J., R. A. Lambert, and D. F. Larcker. (1989), "The executive compensation effects of equity-for-debt swaps," The Accounting Review, 64 (2), pp.201-227.
DeFond, M. L., and J. Jiambalvo. (1994), "Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals," Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17 (1), pp.145-176.
Eisenberg, T., S. Sundgren, and M. T. Wells. (1998), "Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms," Journal of Financial Economics, 48 (1), pp.35-54.
Fahlenbrach, R., A. Low, and R. M. Stulz. (2010), "Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors?," Journal of Financial Economics, 97 (1), pp.12-32.
Faleye, O. (2011), "CEO Directors, Executive incentives, and corporate strategic initiatives," Journal of Financial Research, 34 (2), pp.241-277.
Fama, E. F. (1980), "Agency problems and the theory of the firm," The Journal of Political Economy, 88 (2), pp.288-307.
Fama, E. F., and M. C. Jensen. (1983), "Separation of ownership and control," Journal of Law and Economics, 26 (2), pp.301-325.
Ferris, S. P., M. Jagannathan, and A. C. Pritchard. (2003), "Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments," Journal of Finance, 58 (3), pp.1087-1111.
Fich, E. M., and A. Shivdasani. (2006), "Are busy boards effective monitors?," Journal of Finance, 61 (2), pp.689-724.
Finkelstein, S., and D. C. Hambrick. (1996), "Strategic leadership: Top executives and their effects on organizations: West Pub. Co.(Minneapolis/St. Paul)."
Firth, M., P. M. Y. Fung, and O. M. Rui. (2007), "Ownership, two-tier board structure, and the informativeness of earnings – Evidence from China," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 26 (4), pp.463-496.
Fisher, J. W. (1986), "Crafting policy for performance and rewards," Compensation and Benefits Review, 18 (1), pp.44-49.
Gaver, J. J., and K. M. Gaver. (1998), "The relation between nonrecurring accounting transactions and CEO cash compensation," The Accounting Review, 73 (2), pp.235-253.
Gibbons, R., and K. J. Murphy. (1990), "Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43 (3), pp.30-51.
Hermalin, B., and M. Weisbach. (2003), "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, 9 (1), pp.7-26.
Jensen, M. C. (1993), "The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems," Journal of Finance, 48 (3), pp.831-880.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. (1976), "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4), pp. 305-360.
Jiraporn, P., W. N. Davidson Iii, P. DaDalt, and Y. Ning. (2009), "Too busy to show up? An analysis of directors’ absences," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 49 (3): 1159-1171.
Kaplan, S. N., and D. Reishus. (1990), "Outside directorships and corporate performance," Journal of Financial Economics, 27 (2), pp.389-410.
Kerr, J., and R. A. Bettis. (1987), "Boards of directors, top management compensation, and shareholder returns," Academy of Management Journal, 30 (4), pp.645-664.
Kerr, J. L., and L. Kren. (1992), "Effect of relative decision monitoring on chief executive compensation," Academy of Management Journal, 35 (2), pp.370-397.
Kesner, I. F. (1988), "Directors' characteristics and committee membership: An investigation of type, occupation, tenure, and gender," Academy of Management Journal, 31 (1), 66-84.
Kosnik, R. D. (1987), "Greenmail: A study of board performance in corporate governance," Administrative Science Quarterly, 32 (2), 163-185.
Lambert, R. A., and D. F. Larcker. (1987), "An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts," Journal of Accounting Research, 25, pp.85-125.
Lewellen, W. G., and B. Huntsman. (1970), "Managerial pay and corporate performance," The American Economic Review, 60 (4), pp.710-720.
Lipton, M., and J. W. Lorsch. (1992), "A modest proposal for improved corporate governance," The Business Lawyer, 48 (1), pp.59-77.
Lorsch, J. W., and E. MacIver. (1989), "Pawns or potentates: The reality of America's corporate boards," Harvard Business School Press. Boston, MA.
Mangel, R., and H. Singh. (1993), "Ownership structure, board relationships and CEO compensation in large US corporations," Accounting and Business Research, 23 (Supplement), pp.339-350.
Masson, R. T. (1971), "Executive motivations, earnings, and consequent equity performance," The Journal of Political Economy, 79 (6), pp.1278-1292.
Murphy, K. J. (1985), "Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7 (1), pp.11-42.
Murphy, K. J. (1999), "Executive compensation," Handbook of labor economics, 3, pp.2485-2563.
Newman, H. A., and H. A. Mozes. (1999), "Does the composition of the compensation committee influence CEO compensation practices?," Financial Management, 28 (3), pp.41-53.
O'Reilly III, C. A., B. G. Main, and G. S. Crystal. (1988), "CEO compensation as tournament and social comparison: A tale of two theories," Administrative Science Quarterly, 33 (2), pp.257-274.
Peasnell, K. V., P. F. Pope, and S. Young. (2005), "Board monitoring and earnings management: Do outside directors influence abnormal accruals?," Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 32 (7‐8), pp.1311-1346.
Perry, T., and M. Zenner. (2001), "Pay for performance? Government regulation and the structure of compensation contracts," Journal of Financial Economics, 62 (3), pp.453-488.
Shivdasani, A. (1993), "Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers," Journal of accounting and economics, 16 (1–3), pp.167-198.
Singh, H., and F. Harianto. (1989), "Top management tenure, corporate ownership structure and the magnitude of golden parachutes," Strategic Management Journal, 10 (Supplement), 143-156.
Sloan, R. G. (1993), "Accounting earnings and top executive compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16 (1), pp.55-100.
Sun, J., and S. Cahan. (2009), "The effect of compensation committee quality on the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting performance," Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17 (2), pp.193-207.
Sun, J., S. F. Cahan, and D. Emanuel. (2009), "Compensation committee governance quality, chief executive officer stock option grants, and future firm performance," Journal of Banking and Finance, 33 (8), pp.1507-1519.
Vafeas, N. (2003a), "Further evidence on compensation committee composition as a determinant of CEO compensation," Financial Management, 32 (2), pp.53-70.
Vafeas, N. (2003b), "Length of board tenure and outside director independence," Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 30 (7-8), pp.1043-1064.
Watts, R., and J. Zimmerman. (1986), Positive accounting theory.
Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. (1978), "Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards," The Accounting Review, 53 (1), pp.112-134.
Weisbach, M. S. (1988), "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp.431-460.
Xie, B., W. N. Davidson Iii, and P. J. DaDalt. (2003), "Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee," Journal of Corporate Finance, 9 (3), pp.295-316.
Yermack, D. (1996), "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, 40 (2), pp.185-211.
Zhu, Y., G. Tian, and S. Ma. (2009), "Executive compensation, board characteristics and firm performance in China: the impact of compensation committee," Paper read at 22nd Australasian Finance and Banking Conference.