臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

金融控股公司之經營至少包含銀行、保險、證券其中的兩項業務，因此如何適當地監理跨業經營的金融控股公司，是對主管機關的一大挑戰，尤其是資本監理的問題更是整個金融控股公司監理之主軸。再者，近來金融控股公司間吹起的整併風潮，使得資本適足率之管制更為重要。本研究分別探討美國及歐盟對於金融控股公司之定義及現行監理架構，與台灣目前之監理實務相較，找出不一致之處，並進而分析其差異是否合理。
本研究發現在以銀行為母公司及銀行為子公司的不同金融控股公司架構下，銀行所發行之次順位債券，在計算集團合格資本時處理並不相同，台灣並未考量資本溢額自由移轉之特性，造成在不同控股架構下，相同的融資活動卻對資本適足率有著不同的影響。故本研究建議監理者應參酌國際監理實務，讓台灣之金融控股公司能更有效及彈性地運用資本，以增加其國際競爭力。
另外根據本研究所搜集之資料顯示，金融控股公司之雙重槓桿比率與負債佔權益比率具有高度相關性，將兩項指標重複納入規範，實無實益。此外本研究認為異質金融控股公司其事業風險性質並不相同，主管機關以其資本適足率之高低來作為評判其財務狀況良窳並不見得合理，本研究認為異質金融控股公司之資本適足率之比較宜於以相同業務為主體之金融集團間，方為適當。

The study focuses on the capital regulation of heterogeneous financial holding companies. First, the thesis introduces the definition and capital regulation of financial holding companies in the United States and the European Union. Financial conglomerates which provide diversified services have dominated the financial service industry in the past decades. Since each financial sector has each regulator, a question has arising that whether it is necessary to impose further capital regulation on the consolidated group level. To study the issue, the thesis introduces the international practice including the United States and the European Union. They both have very deep and complete financial markets. It is believed that their experience is valuable and inspirable to Taiwan.
Since the group’s capital adequacy is the central issue of regulation on FHCs, the thesis introduces the calculation methods of the United States, the European Union and Taiwan respectively. Because the amount of capital surplus would cause great influence on the level of group’s capital adequacy ratio, the idea of the transferability of capital surplus has to be studied carefully. The thesis suggests that Taiwan should adjust current practice in some respects that FHCs can manage their higher-cost capital more flexibly and effectively.
Finally, the thesis introduces the regulations on capital structures of FHCs in Taiwan. The study finds that there is high correlation between debt to equity ratio and double leverage ratio. It is redundant that regulator include both ratios as indicators to monitor the capital structure of FHCs. Further, different businesses has different natures, comparison between CARs from heterogeneous FHCs is distortive. The higher a FHC’s CAR doesn’t necessarily mean that it has a better capital structure or is more competitive.

I. Introduction 1
1. Motives and Purposes 1
2. Framework of The Thesis 3

II. The Definition of a Financial Holding Company and Regulatory Framework 4
1. The United States 4
2. The European Union 9
3. Taiwan 11

III. The Regulation on Capital Adequacy of Financial Holding Companies 13
1. The United States 13
2. The European Union 16
3. Taiwan 19

IV. Necessity for Regulation on Capital Adequacy Ratio of Financial Holding Companies 24
1. No Regulation on Consolidated CAR of Financial Holding Companies 24
2. Regulation on Consolidated CAR of Financial Holding Companies 26

V. Transferability of capital surplus 37
1. The upstream and downstream of group capital 37
2. The effect on capital adequacy ratio by issuing subordinated debt under different holding architecture 44

VI. Regulation on Capital Structure 46
1. The relationship between CAR, Debt to Equity Ratio, Double Leverage Ratio 46
2. Comparisons between heterogeneous financial group’s CAR 49

VII. Conclusions 53

References 56

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