臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究探討以台灣上市公司董事會規模及內部董事、獨立董事、外資董事等項目對公司價值之影響。現有的文獻多數為探討已開發國家之公司資料，而本研究樣本具有電子產業佔半數及中小企業家族控股之台灣產業特性，二者差異頗大，所以選定2010年到2014年作為研究期間。實證結果發現獨立董事的監督功能可以有助於發揮公司治理效能也提升了公司獲利，而董事會規模大且內部董事掌握多數股權的公司其公司價值並不高，可說明政府參照歐美先進國家引進推行公司治理及獨立董監事制度有明確的成效。

This study explores whether various variables in term of director board including board size, insider dirctors, independent directors, and foreign directors would affect firm value. We use Taiwan data as our sample due to the developed counties widely explored in the relevant studies; in addition, the chareteristics of TWSE-listing firms are that almost half of listing firms are electronic firms as well as most of SMEs are family-controlled firms, which are far different from the constitution of listing firms for developed contries. The results reveal that independent dirctors would not only enhance corporate governance but also raise profits for enterprises; however, higher board size and shareholding controlled by insiders might not enhance firm value. The results imply that recruiting independent director as suggested by developed contries would matter for enterprises in Taiwan.

目 錄
頁次
中文摘要 I
英文摘要 II
目錄 III
圖目錄 V
表目錄 VI
第一章、緒論 01
第一節、研究背景 01
第二節、研究動機與目的 02
第三節、研究流程 04
第四節、研究架構 05
第二章、文獻探討 06
第一節、董事會規模與組成比率原因的相關文獻 06
第二節、關於體制環境對董事會影響的相關文獻 07
第三節、董事會組成：內部董事和外部董事比率 08
第三章、研究假說與方法 10
第一節、研究資料與變數 10
第二節、研究假說與模型 14
第三節、研究方法 15
第四章、實證結果 17
第一節、敘述統計量 17
第二節、Petersen迴歸模型一 19
第三節、Petersen迴歸模型二 21
第四節、實證結果彙整 23
第五章、結論與建議 24
第一節、研究結論 24
第二節、研究意涵 25
第三節、研究限制與建議 25
參考文獻 27


圖目錄
圖1-1、研究流程圖 04



表目錄
表4-1、敘述統計量分析 17
表4-2、共線性VIF檢驗 18
表4-3、Petersen迴歸分析一 19
表4-4、Petersen迴歸分析二 21

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