臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

隨著產品市場發展最終趨於飽和，廠商間競爭不僅在於價格，如何使消費者持續購買亦為維持廠商利潤之關鍵因素。面對如此競爭的環境，廠商除了以價格吸引消費者，同時會利用簽約金等形式之轉換成本留住欲進行轉換的消費者。因此欲進行轉換的消費者將可能因為高額的轉換成本而被迫留在原有廠商。然而競爭廠商為了避免此情況發生，將提供誘因吸引欲進行轉換的消費者。故本研究在兩製造商的競爭供應鏈中，探討轉換成本和補貼誘因對於廠商利潤之影響。研究中將建構出兩期模型，製造商在第一期銷售具有轉換成本的產品給消費者。當消費者第二期進行產品更換時，轉換成本將隨之發生。因此，對手製造商可於第二期提供補貼誘因，以彌補因更換產品付出轉換成本的消費者。在此情況中，製造商會在第一期進行價格競爭和第二期進行誘因補貼競爭。此外本研究依照轉換成本之特性，將轉換成本分別考量為外生變數、內生變數與同時考量的三種情境，並藉由模型推導出製造商的最適價格、補貼誘因與利潤之均衡解，且對決策變數與利潤進行解析分析與敏感度分析，並進一步提供供應鏈管理者相關管理意涵。

Because of the saturation on the sales market, firms not only attract consumers with lower prices, but also induce switching costs for the consumers who desire to transfer to other products. However, the rival firms may provide incentives for the consumers for encouraging their transfer. This study investigates the effect of switching costs and incentives in a competitive supply chain consisting of two manufacturers. The paper develop the competition in a two-period model, where the manufacturers sell the products with switch cost to the consumers, and the manufacturers may provide the incentives to the consumers of the other product for subsidizing their switching costs. In such a situation, the manufacturers engage in pricing competition in the first period as well as incentive competition in the second period for stimulating the customers to switch from the other manufacturers. Moreover, depending on the characteristics of switching cost, there are three scenarios are examined, namely, the switching cost can be considered as exogenously, endogenously and both. We further derive the equilibrium decisions of the manufacturers'' unit sales prices and incentives and then obtain their equilibrium profits. Through the analytical and numerical analyses, we characterize the manufacturers'' behavior at equilibrium and provide the managerial insights for managers.

中文摘要 i
英文摘要 ii
目錄 iii
表目錄 v
圖目錄 vi
一、緒論 1
1.1 研究背景與動機 1
1.2 研究目的 2
1.3 研究流程 3
二、文獻探討 4
2.1 賽局理論 4
2.2 轉換成本 5
2.3 補貼誘因 9
三、模型建立 10
3.1 問題描述 10
3.2 研究假設 11
3.3 符號說明 12
3.4 建立數學模型 13
3.4.1 轉換成本為外生變數 13
3.4.2 轉換成本為決策變數 18
3.4.3 轉換成本為決策變數與外生變數 21
四、解析分析 24
4.1 價格 24
4.2 補貼金額 27
4.3 違約金 30
4.4 小結 32
五、敏感度分析 33
5.1 各參數對決策變數與利潤之敏感度分析 34
5.2 各期市場規模對決策變數與利潤之敏感度分析 41
六、結論與未來研究 45
6.1 結論 45
6.2 未來研究 45
參考文獻 46
附錄 48
附錄一 48
附錄二 49
附錄三 50
附錄四 51

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