臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

受到國內外爆發許多企業資產掏空及不實財務報導事件之影響，使得全球投資人對於企業所揭露之資訊失去信心，嚴重影響到資本市場運作。為強化公司治理，提升資訊透明度，財團法人證劵暨期貨發展基金會在2003年開始實施「資訊揭露評鑑系統」，期望以外部機制來促使企業在法規要求之外，加強企業自願性資訊揭露，俾藉此強化企業透明度，降低企業內部人與外部人的資訊不對稱，促進資本市場健全發展。此外，近年來法人說明會亦逐漸成為公司對外公布相關訊息的重要媒介，藉由法人說明會的召開，管理當局與投資人間的溝通互動較為直接，資訊的揭露亦較為及時。
本研究利用2005年至2007年的上市公司為樣本，探討法人說明會、自願性資訊揭露與資訊不對稱的關聯，其中自願性資訊揭露是利用「資訊揭露評鑑系統」中關於年報之資訊揭露評鑑指標為依據，判斷其自願性資訊揭露水準。研究結果顯示，當召開法人說明會次數愈多或年報中自願性資訊揭露水準愈高，則資訊不對稱程度愈低。代表召開法人說明會和提升自願性資訊揭露水準，愈能有效緩和資訊不對稱之情況。

After a considerable number of impacts resulted from misappropriation of assets and fraudulent financial reporting occurred in domestic and overseas companies, global investors have lost confidence in the information disclosed by companies. That has seriously affected the activities of the capital market. In order to strengthen corporate governance and promote information transparency, Taiwan Securities and Futures Institute launched the Information Disclosure and Evaluation System from 2003 with an expectation that the outside mechanism can urge companies to disclose their information more voluntarily than that the regulations required, and hereby to intensify company transparency, reduce the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, and enhance the healthy development of the capital market. Besides, conference calls in recent years have gradually become an important medium for companies announcing related message to the public. By holding conference calls, the communication and interaction between management and investors can be more direct and the disclosure of information can also become more timely.
This research uses listed companies from 2005 to 2007 as samples to explore the relationship between conference calls, voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry; among which the level of voluntary disclosure is ranked in accordance to the annual report ranking index of the Information Disclosure and Evaluation System. The results show that as the frequency of conference calls or the level of voluntary disclosure becomes higher, the degree of information asymmetry becomes lower. That means that holding conference calls and promoting voluntary disclosure can indeed mitigate the condition of information asymmetry.

目錄
中文摘要 Ⅰ
英文摘要 Ⅱ
謝辭 Ⅲ
目錄 Ⅳ
圖表目錄 Ⅴ
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 5
第三節 研究架構與流程 6
第二章 文獻探討與假說發展 8
第一節 法人說明會與資訊不對稱程度之關聯 8
第二節 資訊揭露與資訊不對稱程度之關聯 13
第三章 研究方法 18
第一節 實證模型與變數衡量 18
第二節 研究期間、資料來源與選樣標準 26
第肆章 實證結果分析 30
第一節 實證分析 30
第二節 額外分析 37
第伍章 結論與建議 39
第一節 研究結論 39
第二節 研究建議 41
參考文獻 42
附錄一：揭露項目評分釋例 47


圖表目錄
圖1.1研究流程圖 7
圖3.1 衡量PIN之賽局樹 20
表3.1 評分方式說明 23
表3.2 樣本篩選過程 27
表3.3 樣本公司是否召開法人說明會之產業分配表 28
表3.4 法人說明會召開次數年度分配表配表 29
表4.1 敘述性統計量表 31
表4.2 相關係數表 33
表4.3 資訊不對稱與資訊揭露和召開法人說明會次數之分析結果 36
表4.4 資訊不對稱與強制性、自願性資訊揭露和召開法人說明會次數之分析結果 37

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