臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

隨著時間的演進和現實世界的轉變，使得每種理論秉持的觀點和觀察的現況不盡相同。導致各理論對「廠商」這課題論述的方式和著重的重心也有所差異。因此，本文主要是論述各廠商理論發展的核心，進而說明探討的方式和衍伸出的內容為何。
首先，是對新古典廠商理論、由交易成本發展出的廠商理論和代理理論這三者的理論內容做介紹。
除此之外，並比較彼此間的異同。分為兩部分，第一、對新古典廠商理論和交易成本廠商理論提出六點論點上的差異。第二、由代理理論和交易成本廠商理論則歸納出有三個相同點和四個不同點。
最後，於結論裡也簡要的談及台灣企業的所有權結構。

This thesis reviews and compares three different views of the theory of the firm: neoclassical theory, transaction cost theory, and agency theory of the firm. The first part of the thesis interprets the causes and consequences of the firm in each theory. I focus on the rationale of the existence of the firm and how the firm interacts with other parties of the market. I also make an extensive discussion on the issue of corporate governance, which is a research area developed from the agency firm theory. In the second part of the thesis, I compare the similarity and difference of the theories. It includes six different views between neoclassical firm theory and transaction cost theory, and three common and four different views between agency theory and transaction cost theory. There is also a short description about the corporate control in Taiwan.

目 錄
第一章 緒論 ……………………………………..………………………1
第一節 廠商理論簡介 …………………………………………………1
第二節 研究動機與全文架構 …………………………………………1
第二章 新古典廠商理論 …………………………………………………3
第一節 基本前提 ………………………………………………………3
第二節 廠商理論 ………………………………………………………6
第三節 價格機制的效率 ………………………………………………8
第三章 交易成本廠商理論………………………………………………16
第一節 廠商理論………………………………………………………16
第二節 交易成本觀點之衍伸 ……………………………………..24
第四章 代理理論 ……………………………………………………….28
第一節 現代組織理論…………………………………………………28
第二節 世界企業所有權現況…………………………………………38
第五章 新古典、交易成本與代理理論之比較…………………………43
第一節 新古典與交易成本廠商理論比較……………………………43
第二節 代理理論與交易成本廠商理論比較 ……………………….48
第六章 結論………………………………………………………………55
參考文獻 …………………………………………………………………57

中文部分
１．羅台雄（1997），〔現代管理經濟學－組織管理的經濟觀〕，羅台雄出版。
２． 葉銀華（2001），〔董事會組成之決定因素－公司管理觀點〕，　　　　研討會論文。
３． 謝登隆 （1995），〔個體經濟理論及應用〕，華泰書局。
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