臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

交易理論經常被用來探討廠商與客戶間的交易行為如何被保護，但為了因應快速變化的環境以及市場需求，廠商是否永遠依照交易理論與客戶進行交易，本論文以台灣專業液晶顯示器和工業電腦代工廠商為例進行探討。

This paper discusses the features of transaction cost economics (TCE): asset specificity, governance mechanism, prior ties; and to consider resource-based view theory together, how OEM suppliers in LCD monitor and Industrial PC (IPC) industries deal with their customers in accordance with transaction cost theory. OEM suppliers have some key activities in the product or project development schedule. The features of TCE will impact the managers to make decisions on the necessity of unilateral investments without the commitments from the customers; and how much to invest in these key activities to secure current business and to expand the business scale.

The findings state OEM suppliers in IPC industry implicitly follow TCE on investments in accordance with customers’ requests. In LCD monitor assembly industry, due to limited supplier selection and less product design deviation, OEM suppliers could be willing to offer unilateral investments upon the business consideration.

Table of Contents
Acknowledgement....................................i
Abstract............................ii
Table of contents...................................... iii
List of tables..........................................v
List of figures.......................vi
Chapter 1、Introduction...................................1
1. Research Background..................1
2. Research Objectives......................8
3. Scope of Research...................10
Chapter 2、Literature Review.............................12
1. Transaction cost theory ..............................12
2. Governance mechanism ..............................17
3. Resource-Based View ..............................20
4. Interdependency ..............................22
Chapter 3、 Methodology..................................23
1. Research framework ..............................23
2. Research approach ..............................27
3. Procedure .......................................28
Chapter 4、Research Findings.............................30
1. LCD monitor industry ..............................30
2. IPC industry .......................................35
3. Comparison between LCD monitor and IPC industries ...40
Chapter 5、Conclusions and Management Implications........46
1. Conclusions........................................46
2. Implications......................................49
Reference..............................................51
English ................................................51
Chinese ................................................54
Appendix .................................................56

Ahmadjian C and Oxley J. 2006. Using hostages to support exchange: dependence balancing and partial equity stakes in Japanese automotive supply relationships. Journal of Law Economics & Organization 22(1): 213-223.

Argyres NS and Zenger T. 2007. Capabilities, Transaction cost, and firm boundaries: a dynamic perspective and integration working paper, Boston University: Boston, MA.

Arrunada B and Vazquez XH. 2006. When your contract manufacturer becomes your competitor Harvard Bustness Review 84(9):135-159.

Bensaou M and Anderson E. 1999. Buyer-supplier relations in industrial markets: when do buyers risk making idiosyncratic investments? Organization Science volume 10, no.4, pp.460-481

Carter R and Hodgson GM. 2006. The impact of empirical tests of transaction cost economics on the debate on the nature of the firm. Strategic management journal 27, pp.461-476.

Gulati R and Sytch M. 2007. Dependence asymmetry and joint dependence in interorganizational relationships: effects of embeddedness on a manufacturer’s performance in procurement relationships. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52(3), pp.32-69.

Kang MP, Mahoney J.T. and Tan D. 2009. Why firms make unilateral investments specific to other firms. Strategic Management Journal 30: 117-135.

Kim SM and Mahoney JT. 2006. Mutual commitment to support exchange: relation –specific IT system as a substitute for managerial hierarchy. Strategic Management Journal 27(5):401-423.

Leiblein MJ, Reuer JJ, and Frederic D. 2002. Do make or buy decisions matter? The influence of organizational governance on technological performance. Strategic Management Journal 23: 817-833.

Macher JT and Richman BD. 2008 Transaction cost economics: an assessment of empirical research in the social sciences. Business and Politics 10(1):1-63.

Madhok A. 2000. Inter-firm collaboration: contractual and capabilities-based perspectives. In Competence, Governance, and Entrepreneurship: Advances in Economic Strategy Research, Foss N, Mahnke V (eds).Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK:276-303.

Mayer KJ and Argyres NS. 2004. Learning to contract: evidence from the personal computer industry. Organization Science 15(4):394-410.

Mayer KJ, Nickerson JA and Owan H. 2004. Are supply and plant inspections complements or substitutes? A strategic and operational assessment of inspection practices in biotechnology. Management Science 50(8):1064-1081.

Mayer KJ and Salomon RM. 2006. Capability, contractual hazards, and governance: integrating resource-based and transaction cost perspectives. Academy of Management Journal 49(5):942-959.

Parmigiani A. 2007. Why do firms both make and buy? An investigation of concurrent sourcing Strategic Management Journal 28(3):285-311.

Porter M. 1980. Competitive Strategy Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors. Free Press: New York.

Rokkan AI, Heide JB and Wathne KH. 2003. Relation-specific investments in marketing relationships, expropriation and bonding effects. Journal of Marketing Research 40(2):210-224.

Saussier S. 2000. Transaction costs and contractual incompleteness: the case of Electricite de France Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 42(2):189-206.

Shervani TA, Frazier G and Challagalla G. 2007. The moderating influence of firm market power on the transaction cost economics model: an empirical test. In a forward channel integration context Strategic Management Journal 28(6):635-652.

Srinivasan R and Brush TH. 2006. Supplier performance in vertical alliances: the effects of self-enforcing agreements and enforceable contracts. Organization Science 17(4):436-452.

Stuart TE. 2000. Interorganizational alliances and the performance of firms: a study of growth and innovation rates in a high-technology industry. Strategic Management Journal 21(8):791-811.

Subramani MR and Venkatrarnan N. 2003. Safeguarding investments in asymmetric interorganizational relationships: theory and evidence. Academy of Management Journal 46(1):46-62.

Werneifelt B.1984. A resource-based view of the firm Strategic Management Journal 5(2):171-180.

Williamson OE. 1983. Credible commitments: using hostages to support exchange American Economic Review 73(4):519-540.

Williamson OE. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free Press: New York.

Williamson OE 1991. Strategizing, economizing, and economic organization. Strategic Management Journal Winter Special Issue 12:75-94.

Williamson OE. 1996. The Mechanisms of Governance. Oxford University Press: New York.

Williamson OE. 1999 Strategy research: governance and competence perspective. Strategic Management Journal 20(12):1087-1108.

王慧美，2001，國際代工夥伴關係下之資產專屬性與能力建構 – 供應商觀點分析，國立台灣大學國際企業學研究所博士論文。

司徒達賢，2005，初版，管理學的新世界，台北市，遠見下天。

佘日新、梁家隆、陳厚銘，2000，「廠商如何由國外夥伴之技術合作提升企業技術能力—以台灣資訊電子廠商為例」，管理學報，17卷2期：頁297-319。

佘日新、梁家隆、陳厚銘，2003，「國際化資源連結特性、能力提昇與廠商產業網絡地位之關係」，3 卷2 期，頁85-102。

林志斌，2004，「生產代工策略聯盟績效的整合架構：基本邏輯、管理挑戰、與鑲嵌」，產業論壇，第6卷第4期，頁1-46

陳盛旺，2005，台灣數位電視製造商國際市場進入模式之研究─交易成本理論觀點探討，國立台灣大學管理學院國際企業管理組碩士論文