臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

亞洲金融風暴的發生，突顯亞洲企業公司治理機制的不完善，大規模公司的財務危機事件，不僅使投資者權益受損，嚴重影響著社會大眾的信心和國際金融市場的穩定性。良好的公司治理對企業本身幫助許多，還可以提升投資者對於公司的信心，也使得公司治理機制日趨重要。公司為了在市場上具有較高的競爭力，會引進專業經理人，以所有權與經營權分離的型態，讓公司經營得更加有效率，甚至提高公司價值，最後達到股東利益極大化。由於現在企業經營權與所有權分離的結果，因此產生代理的問題，要在利益與代理成本中取決，選出對公司價值最好的情形。
本研究的目的在探討如何運用股權結構來改善代理問題，並了解不同的股權結構會如何影響公司的資本結構。本篇研究主旨在於探討台灣上市公司的股權結構和資本結構之間的關係。我們以相關文獻為基礎，使用1990年至2011年間台灣上市公司22年共計6612筆樣本數。本研究從公司治理的角度來研究股權結構及資本結構的關連，股權結構的部分主要以大股東持股比例及管理者持股比例來探討是否會影響資本結構對公司負債的影響。

The happening of Asian Financial Crisis has highlighted incomplete corporate governance system of Asian companies, the financial crisis incidents of large-scale companies have not only damaged the benefits of investors but also seriously affected confidence of the public and stability of international financial markets. Healthy corporate governance would benefit business a lot and enhance confidence of investors in company, which is getting imperative.In order to be more competitive in the market, the company will introduce professional managers to enable more efficient business operation upon separation of right of ownership and right ofmanagement, allowing business operation to be more efficient, enhanced company value and lastly, maximization of shareholders’ benefits. The outcome of separation of right of ownership and management of today has led to agency issue. To choose between benefits and agent cost and make decision best for the company value. The purpose of this study is to explore how to use shareholding structure to improve agency issue, and to understand how different shareholding structures affect company’s capitastructure. The study aims to explore the shareholding structure and capital structure of listed companies inTaiwan. Following related literatures with 6612 samples of listed companies between1990and2011 introduced, the research is to study the correlation between shareholding structure and capital structure from corporate governance perspective, in which the shareholding structure will be discussed in terms of blockholdershareholding ratio and manager shareholding ratio to see whether corporate structure affects corporate debt.

摘要 i
致謝詞 i i i
目錄 i v
表目錄v i
圖目錄 v i i
第一章 緒論1
第一節 背景與動機1
第二節 研究目的 3
第二章 文獻探討 5
第一節 資本結構理論 5
第二節 資本結構國內外相關實證 10
第三節 股權結構理論 16
第四節 股權結構國內外相關實證18
第三章 研究方法 24
第一節 假說與模型 24
第二節 控制變數26
第三節 資料說明29
第四章 實證結果分析31
第一節 樣本特性31
第二節 實證結果34
第伍章 結論與建議39
第一節結論39
第二節建議40
參考文獻41

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