臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文參考Chen and Liu (2013a) 的架構，分析當兩家碼頭營運商進行Bertrand 價格競爭時，一個追求費用收入極大化的港務局應該如何制訂最適的港埠業務契約。我們建立了一個兩階段賽局來描述港務局及兩家碼頭營運商之間的利益互動。首先，在賽局的第一階段，港務局先宣告契約的內容。兩家碼頭營運商在得知契約內容後，則在賽局的第二階段同時且獨立地決定均衡價格。本模型考慮三種不同的收費方式：兩部收費法（two-part tariff scheme）、從量收費法（unit-fee scheme）及定額收費法（fixed-fee scheme）。我們發現，當效率較差的營運商，其邊際成本較小時，兩部收費法為港務局的最適契約；而在其他情況下，港務局則會以兩部收費法或從量收費法作為最適契約。

Based on the framework of Chen and Liu (2013a), this thesis analyzes the optimal concession contracts of a fee-revenue maximizing landlord port authority under the price (Bertrand) competition of two terminal operators. We construct a two-stage game to describe the interactions between the port authority and terminal operators. In the first stage, the port authority announces a contract. Given the contract, two operators choose equilibrium prices independently and simultaneously in the second stage. Three types of contracts, two-part tariff scheme, unit-fee scheme and fixed-fee scheme, are considered in our model. We discover that the two-part tariff scheme is the best contract when the marginal costs of the less-efficient operator are small. In the remaining cases, the two-part tariff and the unit-fee schemes are equally preferred by the port authority.

目 次
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻回顧 5
第三章 模型設定 9
第四章 碼頭營運商在不同契約之下的最適行為 13
第一節 營運商在兩部收費法下的最適行為 13
第二節 營運商在從量收費法下的最適行為 15
第三節 營運商在定額收費法下的最適行為 16
第五章 最適的港埠業務契約 18
第一節 港務局採取兩部收費法時的契約訂定 18
第二節 港務局採取從量收費法時的契約訂定 20
第三節 港務局採取定額收費法時的契約訂定 22
第四節 最適契約 24
第六章 比較靜態分析 29
第一節 當 c_2 < c_2_hat 的情形 29
第二節 當 c_2_hat ≤ c_2 < c_2_bar 的情形 31
第七章 結論與建議 33
附錄 35
附錄1：高雄港務分公司招標案號102051401 部分公開資訊 35
附錄2：Proposition 1 的相關證明 36
附錄3：Proposition 2 的相關證明 39
附錄4：Lemma 4（iii）的相關證明 41
參考文獻 42

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