臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究主要探討財務預測制度規範改變之際，自願性財務預測、公司治理及權益資金成本間之關係。先前的研究指出，當公司愈依賴外部融資時，愈可能試圖揭露更多的資訊，以獲取較低的外部融資成本。另外，根據OECD原則與說明，認為健全的公司治理應具有降低資金成本的功能，國內學者則認為透過公司治理設計與執行，可確保資金提供者的投資能夠獲得應有的報酬，並兼顧其他利害關係人的利益。
研究發現，公司治理中獨立董監的設立與權益資金成本呈顯著的負相關；股東質押比率則可能使權益資金成本上升;而自願性財務預測則與權益資金成本呈負相關但未達顯著水準。藉由實證結果，本研究建議相關主管機關應建立完整地自願性盈餘揭露措施，鼓勵公司揭露財務盈餘資訊，降低資訊不對稱。除了提昇資訊透明度可以降低投資人所要求的報酬率外，健全公司治理亦有助於公司取得的權益資金成本。

This research tries to detect the association between the voluntary earning forecast, corporate governance and equity of capital cost under the earning forecast law changed. Prior study predicts if firms reliant on external financing are more likely to disclose more information; in turn, lead to a lower cost of external financing. Moreover, according to the OECD principle and the explanation, thought the perfect corporate governance should have the function that can reduce the cost of equity capital. The domestic scholars found the design and implement of corporate governance mechanism, may provide the deserved reward and benefits that belong to the investors and stakeholders.
The following results are observed: this study finds that the more independence and professionalism on the board of directors lead to the lower cost of equity capital. The significant negative relationship between the shareholders’ pledges and cost of equity capital. In addition, the voluntary earning forecast policy is insignificant and negatively correlated with cost of equity capital. Due to the result, the study suggests government should establish completely the voluntary earnings disclosure policy, encourages the company to expose the information, and reduces the asymmetric information. The promotion information transparency which can reduce the return that investor requests, the right corporate governance can also let firms get reasonable cost of equity capital.

摘要 i
目錄 . ii
圖表目錄 iv
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 前言 .. 1
第二節 本文架構 3
第二章 文獻探討與假說發展 5
第一節 資訊不對稱與代理問題 5
第二節 代理成本與權益資金成本 7
第三節 研究假說發展 8
第三章 研究設計 8
第一節 樣本選取與變數衡量 15
第四章 實證結果與分析 16
第一節 樣本選取 17
第二節 敘述性統計分析 18
第三節 相關分析 19
第四節 實證分析 23
第五章 研究結論與建議 29
第一節 研究結論 29
第二節 研究限制 30
第三節 研究建議 31

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