臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究旨在探討證交所公布公司治理評鑑指標後，上市櫃公司是否因更加重視公司治理機制，使得公司財務報表品質提升。證交所在2014年第一次開始實施公司治理評鑑，首次結果揭露三個級距；隨後，第二屆增加至四個級距，第三屆更增加為七個，據此，本研究檢視在揭露級距逐次增加下（資訊揭露增加），公司更加重視其結果，公司是否會因此改善治理品質（裁決性應計數之絕對值變小）。
實結果顯示，在第一屆僅揭露三個級距下，公司治理評鑑級距與裁決性應計數絕對值呈正相關，第二、三屆則呈現負相關情形，即隨著揭露級距增加，公司治理品質有較為改善現象，表示，增加公司治理評鑑結果的揭露，公司會對其結果更加重視，故而改善其公司治理品質，與研究預期相符。不過，僅第二屆之分析結果，在三種估計模式下一致地達到一般統計顯著水準。

This study aims to explore whether the publicly traded company has increased the quality of its financial statements by paying more attention to corporate governance mechanisms after the corporate governance evaluation system implemented by Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) and Taipei Stock Exchange (TPEx). In 2015, the first round, TWSE and TPEx announced the first corporate governance evaluation results for the companies ranked in the top 20% of TWSE/TPEx listed companies. In 2016, they announced the second corporate governance evaluation results for the companies ranked in the top 50% of TWSE/TPEx listed companies. Starting from 2017, the rankings results for all TWSE/TPEx listed companies were announced. Accordingly, this study examined weather the gradually improve the ranking content of the evaluation system, the company would pay more attention to the results, then improve its quality of governance (to restrain the use of the absolute value of discretionary accruals).
The empirical results show that based on the first round evaluation results, the function of corporate governance is positively correlated with the absolute value of the discretionary accruals. Whereas based on the results in the second and third rounds, there are negative correlated between the function of corporate governance and the proxy of earnings quality. To sum up, it indicates that increasing the disclosure of corporate governance assessment results, the company gradually improve their implementation of corporate governance system. . However, the coefficients of corporate governance are negative and significantly in all three models only in the second round.

第壹章 緒論
第一節 研究動機
第二節 研究目的
第三節 研究架構
第貳章 文獻探討
第一節 公司治理評鑑機制的效果
第二節 公司治理評鑑揭露程度
第三節 公司治理評鑑結果的影響
第參章 研究方法
第一節 研究假說
第二節 研究樣本及資料來源
第三節 變數定義與衡量
第四節 實證模型
第肆章 實證結果分析
第一節 敘述性統計
第二節 相關分析
第三節 多變量迴歸分析
第伍章 結論與建議
參考文獻

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