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研究生:阮唯林
研究生(外文):Wei-Lin Juan
論文名稱:IFRSs盈餘調節數與高階經理人薪酬績效敏感度
論文名稱(外文):IFRSs Earnings Reconciliations and Executives Pay-Performance Sensitivity
指導教授:陳昭蓉陳昭蓉引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chao-Jung Chen
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:中原大學
系所名稱:會計研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2014
畢業學年度:102
語文別:中文
論文頁數:42
中文關鍵詞:IFRSs盈餘調節數高階經理人薪酬薪酬績效敏感度
外文關鍵詞:Pay-Performance Sensitivityexecutives’ compensationIFRSs earnings reconciliations
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我國在2013年正式採用國際財務報導準則(IFRSs),金管會規定台灣上市及上櫃公司必須在2012年各季合併報表中揭露我國財務會計準則(ROC GAAP)與IFRSs之差異調節數。當適用新的會計準則而影響會計盈餘時,可能會影響薪酬與會計績效之關聯性。因此,本研究針對上市櫃公司在2012年公佈於綜合損益表中的IFRSs盈餘調節數進行研究,檢測IFRSs盈餘調節數與薪酬之關聯性,並進一步探討正向調節數與負向調節數對薪酬之影響是否不同,接著再分別探討公司獲利與虧損時,盈餘調節數對薪酬之影響是否不同。
實證結果發現,IFRSs盈餘調節數與高階經理人薪酬呈顯著正相關,表示IFRSs盈餘調節數確實對高階經理人薪酬產生正向影響,但高階經理人薪酬會隨著正向盈餘調節數提高,卻不會隨著負向盈餘調節數而調降,顯示正向及負向盈餘調節數對薪酬有不對稱之影響。最後,當公司獲利時,IFRSs盈餘調節數與高階經理人薪酬間未存在顯著關聯性,但當公司虧損時,盈餘調節數與高階經理人薪酬呈顯著正向關係,由於薪酬與會計績效間存在高度連結,將誘使經理人透過IFRSs盈餘調節數來調高薪酬。


The Financial Supervisory Commission(FSC) announced that Taiwan listed firms mandatory adoption the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) prepare financial reports from year 2013 and disclose the reconciliations of accounting change between ROC GAAP and IFRSs of year 2012 in their consolidated financial reports. This research examines whether IFRSs earnings reconciliations influences executives’ compensation in year 2012. Further, this study also distinguishes IFRSs earnings reconciliations into positive reconciliations and negative reconciliations and examines the asymmetric sensitivity of executives’ compensation to IFRSs earnings reconciliations. Finally, we divide listed firms into profit and loss firms to examine whether IFRSs earnings reconciliations have different effect on compensation.
Empirical results indicate that IFRSs earnings reconciliations have positive impact on executives’ compensation. This result shows that IFRSs earnings reconciliations positively affect executives’ compensation. Moreover, executives’ compensation will increase with positive reconciliations, but not with negative reconciliations. This result shows that positive reconciliations and negative reconciliations have asymmetric impact on compensation. Finally, there is no significant difference between IFRSs earnings reconciliations and executives’ compensation in profit firms. But there is a significant positive difference between IFRSs earnings reconciliations and executives’ compensation in loss firms. This result shows that the high relevance between compensation and accounting earnings lead executives to increase their compensation by using IFRSs earnings reconciliations.


目錄
摘要 I
Abstract II
誌謝辭 III
目錄 IV
圖表目錄 V
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第二章 文獻探討及假說發展 4
第一節 IFRSs盈餘調節數相關文獻 4
第二節 薪酬績效敏感度相關文獻 6
第三節 高階經理人薪酬與會計方法選擇相關文獻 8
第四節 假說發展 10
(一)IFRSs盈餘調節數與薪酬績效敏感度 10
(二)IFRSs會計盈餘調節數與薪酬績效敏感度:區分正負調節數 11
(三)IFRSs會計盈餘調節數與薪酬績效敏感度:區分獲利及虧損企業 12
第三章 研究設計 14
第一節 資料來源與樣本選取 14
(一) 樣本組成 14
第二節 實證模型及變數衡量 15
(一) 實證模型 15
第四章 實證結果 19
第一節 敘述性統計 19
第二節 相關係數分析 21
第三節 實證結果 23
(一) 適用IFRSs之會計盈餘調節數與經理人薪酬 23
(二) 正向調節數與負向調節數是否對薪酬存在不同之影響 25
(三) 在獲利與虧損之情況下,IFRSs盈餘調節數對薪酬之影響程度是否有所不同 28
第五章 結論與建議 32
參考文獻 34

圖表目錄
表一 樣本篩選過程 15
表二 變數定義表 17
表三 敘述性統計量 20
表四 各變數之相關係數矩陣 22
表五 IFRSs盈餘調節數與ROC GAAP績效對薪酬之影響之迴歸結果 24
表六 正向盈餘調節數對薪酬之影響之迴歸結果 26
表七 負向盈餘調節數對薪酬之影響之迴歸結果 27
表八 獲利或虧損下盈餘調節數對薪酬之影響之迴歸結果 30
表九 獲利或虧損下正向及負向盈餘調節數對薪酬之影響 31
參考文獻
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張瑞當、林國欽、沈文華、侯佩秀,2007,高階經理人薪酬績效敏感度對自願性資訊發佈之影響,會計與公司治理,第4卷第1期:57-84。
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