臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

由於以往我國有關審計公費及非審計公費之揭露並未強制規定，使得一般公司在財務報中並未充分揭露此類狀況，造成研究上有許多限制，甚至用問卷調查取得之資料正確性有所疑慮。而我國証期會在民國91年年報起，在符合一定條件下之公開發行公司必須揭露審計及非審計公費，91- 94年年報中上市公司公佈此類資訊逐年家數增加，因而引發本研究董事會獨立性，外部次大股東與審計公費與非審計公費之關連性。
　　本研究分別從審計公費及非審計公費的角度來探討，另外分別以外部次大股東股權，以及外部董監事及獨立董監事比率為自變數，來探討董事會獨立性與外部次大股東，與審計公費與非審計公費之關連性。本研究結果發現公司規模、找四大會計師事務所查核、合併子公司家數、及海外發行證劵數，均與審計公費及非審計公費成正相關，而流動比率、負債比率、存貨與應收帳款佔總資產比率則未發現有顯著關連性。查核意見為保留意見，與前三年淨利若有負數，則審計及非審計公費較高之假說，研究結果並不顯著；另外獨立及外部董監事比率及外部次大股東股權，與審計公費(非審計公費)之關連性，雖與預期方向相符，但本研究實証結果並不顯著。


關鍵字：審計公費、非審計公費、外部次大股東

Audit fees and non-audit fees have never been disclosed on Company Financial Statements in Taiwan since our government has not strongly encouraged companies to do so. This phenomenon causes a lot of inconvenience for conducting research. Therefore, the accuracy of the data gained through research is still in doubt. SFEC announced that the annual report, starting from the year of 2002, need to disclose of audit fees and non-audit fees on Company Financial Statements. From 2002 to 2005, there has been an increase in the disclosure of this information on Taiwan public Company Financial Statements. This change inspirres me to research, the independence of the Board Directors, Blockholders and Accoutants from the point of view of audit service.

This research was conducted in three dimensions:This three dimensions being the analysis of audit fees and non-audit fees,adding three experiment variables to explore the connection between the Director Board Independence and the Accoutant Independence,and the connection between audit fees and non-audits. Those three experiment variables mentioned are the ratio of Blockholders,and the ratio of people outside the board and the ratio of Independent Shareholders. There are ten control variables in this research as well. The positive findings from this research are that there is a strong associate connection between company sizes, the number of merged subsidiary companies,and the number of companies issuing overseas stocks. Moreover, there is no strong positive connection between Debt Ratio, Current Ratio, and the ratio of Inventory and Accounts Receivable. Furthermore, there is no positive finding in this research about an associated connection between high non-audit fees and audit fees, and previous three-year negative income. Evern though the connection of the ratio of Blockholders, and the ratio of people outside the board and the ratio of independent shareholders meet our exoectations, the result of the research is still not one hundred percent accurate and abvious.


Key word: audit fees, non-audit fees, Blockholders

目錄
摘要 I
英文摘要 II
誌謝 III
目錄 IV
表次 V
圖次 VI
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究架構與研究議題 3
第三節 研究方法 4
第四節 預期研究貢獻 4
第五節 論文架構 5
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 公司治理精神意涵 6
第二節 董事會獨立性、外部次大股東 10
第三節 審計服務及非審計服務 17
第四節 董事會獨立性、外部次大股東對審計公費及非審計公費關聯性 28
第三章 研究設計 31
第一節 研究假說之建立 31
第二節 研究方法 32
第三節 樣本選取與資料來源 35
第四章 實證結果與分析 40
第一節 審計公費及各變數各相關敍述統計量及分析 40
第二節 審計公費及非審計公費對外部次大股東及董事會獨立性交互作用
之一般線性迴歸模型分析 44
第五章 結論與建議 60
第一節 實證結果彙總與結論 60
第二節 研究限制與建議 62
參考文獻 64

表 次
表3-1 上市公司產業別之審計公費揭露情形 36
表3-2 上市公司產業別之非審計公費揭露情形 37
表3-3 91年至94年有揭露及未揭露公費公司之市場列分析 38
表4-1A 上市公司產業別之審計公費揭露情形 40
表4-1B 上市公司產業別之非審計公費揭露情形 41
表4-2 敍述統計量(N=387) 42
表4-3 相關係數矩陣 43
表4-4 審計公費模型之迴歸結果(N=387)(外部次大股東、外部董監事比率) 44
表4-5 審計公費模型之迴歸結果(N=387)(外部次大股東、獨立董監事比率)46
表4-6 非審計公費模型之迴歸結果(N=386)(外部次大股東、外部董監事比率)
48
表4-7 非審計公費迴歸結果分析(N=386)(外部次大股東、獨立董監事比率) 50
表4-8 審計公費模型之迴歸結果(N=387)(外部次大股東、外部董監事比率 52
表4-9 審計公費模型之迴歸結果(N=387)(外部次大股東、獨立董監事比率) 54
表4-10 非審計公費迴歸結果(N=386)(外部次大股東、外部董監事比率) 56
表4-11 非審計公費迴歸結果(N=386)(外部次大股東、獨立董監事比率) 58

圖 次
圖 1-1 觀念性架構圖 2
圖 1-2 論文架構圖 4
圖 2-1 公司治理架構圖 9

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