臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

根據過去的研究，台灣的上市櫃公司不僅屬於具有控制股東的股權集中型態，這些控制股東在公司管理及營運上亦存在影響力，2010年時為強化我國公司治理，避免公司虧損董監事仍領有高薪之不合理情況發生，立法機關增訂反肥貓條款，強制上市櫃和興櫃公司於2011年底前設立薪酬委員會。因此，本研究結合控制股東與薪酬委員會，欲瞭解薪酬委員會是否也會因控制股東而對其設置效果產生影響，本研究分別探討控制股東現金流量權、掌控董監事席次比例，及其席次控制權與現金流量權偏離程度對設置薪酬委員會後董監事、高階經理人薪酬績效敏感性的調節作用。研究對象為2009年至2014年之上市櫃公司。實證結果顯示，控制股東掌控董監事席次比例在負的侵占效果下會對薪酬委員會設置後的董監事薪酬與會計績效敏感性產生負向的調節作用，即控制股東愈有能力控制董事會的運作時，會在自利動機的驅使下，做出不利於小股東的薪酬決策，降低董監事薪酬與會計績效的連動性；然而，控制股東現金流量權及席次控制權與現金流量權偏離程度，雖預期具有正的誘因效果及負的侵占效果，但該等效果並未對設置薪酬委員會後的薪酬績效敏感性產生相應的調節作用。

Previous researches indicated that companies in Taiwan have controlling owners generally, and these controlling owners have effect on management and operation of companies. In 2010, the Financial Supervisory Commission required that TWSE-listed, GTSM-listed and emerging-stock Companies must establish compensation committee after 2011. Therefore, this study is to explore whether ultimate owners’ cash flow rights, the directors affiliated with controlling owners, and the divergence between ultimate owners’ board seat and cash flow rights affect the establishing effect of compensation committee. The empirical results indicate that the increasing of the directors affiliated with controlling owners would weaken pay-performance sensitivity in director compensation and accounting performance after compensation committee establishing. However, there is no evidence found that the higher ratio of cash flow rights and the greater divergence between the ultimate owners’ board seat and cash flow rights have positive and negative moderating effect upon pay-performance sensitivity.

致謝 I
摘要 II
Abstract III
目錄 IV

第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究架構 5

第貳章 文獻回顧與研究假說 6
第一節 控制股東 6
第二節 薪酬委員會 9
第三節 研究假說 15

第參章 研究設計 18
第一節 研究樣本與資料來源 18
第二節 研究模型 19
第三節 變數定義與衡量 22

第肆章 實證結果與分析 27
第一節 樣本選擇、敘述性統計與差異數檢定 27
第二節 相關係數分析 32
第三節 多元迴歸分析 35
第四節 敏感性分析 49
第五節 額外測試 54

第伍章 研究結論與建議 56
第一節 研究結論 56
第二節 研究限制與建議 58

參考文獻 59
一、中文文獻 59
二、英文文獻 62

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