臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

在一般生活中，存在許多產品必須聯合使用才能產生價值，例如錄影機與錄影帶、電腦之硬體與軟體、自動提款機與提款卡等，此種必須聯合使用的產品稱為「系統產品」，本文主要是探討系統廠商的系統產品相容度、產品差異程度、系統技術的開放、與開放後的廠商數目及權利金等等，如何的影響廠商在市場競爭的行為。
本文與既有的文獻所不同而可視之為貢獻者有數端：第一，各廠商產品相容度不對稱，且為內生長期變數；第二，在模型上，有別於既有文獻，假設了一個兩階段次遞賽局模型，第一階段，廠商先基於自己的科技能力與策略考量選取了相容度水準，接著在第二階段，廠商進行市場數量競爭。第三，我們也探討了既有廠商開放技術給新廠的誘因程度，分析舊廠開放技術給新廠加入市場來競爭，在網路規模效益與市場競爭考慮下，這樣的決策對其自身是否有利？第四，市場競爭下的均衡相容度與社會最適相容度差異如何，也是本文探討的重點。最後，本文也綜合探討了網路效益、網路規模、生產成本、相容度、新進的廠商數、單位稅金、與差異程度，對廠商行為的影響。
首先，我們均發現，當對手廠商產品相容度相對偏小時，則廠商提高相容度，可以有效的擴大市場範圍、並增加利潤；另外，如果廠商具有相對一定水準的低成本優勢，或者自己的產品相容度不致於過大，則廠商若能讓消費者對市場產品差異度的認定愈小，對廠商的市場規模與利潤都會有增加的作用。
如果，相容度是一個短期的選擇變數，所得出的均衡相容度會因廠商的成本愈高而愈低，也會隨著產品差異程度愈大而愈小，另外，當廠商的成本相對偏大時，網路效益愈大，則廠商的均衡相容度也會愈大。
對於系統開放後，當新進廠商數增加，則會同時減少既存系統廠商的產量和利潤，但若開放廠商對新進廠商所收取的單位稅金大於某一程度時，開放系統廠商的利潤還是會增加。
在福利效果方面，我們發現，在系統未開放與開放後均得出，如果改變相容度的邊際成本呈現固定值，則社會最適的相容度剛會等於庫諾競爭下的均衡相容度，達到效率。

As we can see, many existent products have to be united together when using them in order to generate their product values, such as video and tapes, computer hardware and software, ATM machine and our ATM card, etc. Generally speaking, these united products are called “system product.” The purpose for this thesis is to investigate the effect of compatibility, network externality, and system technology disclosure and entry, to firms’ behaviors in a Cournot competition.
The differences between this thesis and the existing literature are several folds. First, we assume compatibility among products is asymmetric, and is a long-term endogenous variable for each firm. Second, a two-period model is set up. Firms choose the degree of compatibility conditional on their own technology level, and then choose quantity in a Cournot-competition market. Third, a firm, based on strategy considerations, may franchise its manufacturing technology to new firms, and hence entices more entrants. We investigate how the effect of this sort of technology disclosure works in this thesis. Forth, to see whether the competitive equilibrium achieves the social optimality, we also take into account social welfare issue. Finally, the comparative statics also explore how the network externality, network size, production cost, compatibility, the number of entrants, franchising fee, and product differentiation influence the firms’ behaviors.
The first finding coming out is that, when the product compatibility of the rival firm is decreasing, the firms will increase their own compatibility to the rival firm’s product. This enables firms to enlarge their market shares and profits. If a firm has a relatively low product cost, and a relatively low compatibility, it can increase its output level and hence profit by decreasing product differentiation.
If compatibility is a long-term endogenous variable, then the equilibrium compatibility level will be lower when the firm has a lower production cost or a lower product differentiation. On the contrary, if the firm has a relatively higher production cost or a higher network effect, then its equilibrium compatibility will get larger.
When a firm discloses its system technology, the outputs and profits of all incumbents are decreasing in the number of new entrants. However, if the firm who discloses its technology sets an enough high franchising fee, its profit may increase.
As for the social welfare, the competitive equilibrium compatibility achieves the social optimality no matter before or after technology disclosure if the marginal cost of compatibility change is constant.

頁次
第一章緒論-------------------------------------------------1
第一節研究動機與目的-------------------------------------- 1
第二節文獻探討-------------------------------------------- 2
第三節研究方法與論文結構---------------------------------- 8
第二章兩家廠商的競爭--------------------------------------11
第一節模型設定------------- ---11
第二節庫諾競爭---------------- -----------------15
第三節相容度選擇------------------------------------------26
第四節福利效果--------------------------------------------31
第五節本章小結--------------------------------------------33
第三章系統開放的競爭行為----------------------------------36
第一節模型設定--------------------------------------------36
第二節庫諾競爭--------------------------------------------39
第三節相容度選擇------------------------------------------54
第四節福利效果--------------------------------------------59
第五節本章小結--------------------------------------------60
第四章 結論與未來研究方向-----------------------------------63
參考文獻 -----------------------------------------------------65

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