臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

近年來，國人對於企業社會責任的議題日漸重視，認為企業所做之決策不應只追求本身之績效，更應考量所作決策對社會的影響，而租稅成本對企業在追求財務績效時，會被認為是一項顯著的財務成本，因此企業會有動機去從事租稅規避之活動，以降低租稅成本，然而來自企業的稅收是國家公共財的資金來源，因此若企業從事租稅規避之活動，會被認為是對社會不負責任的。
為解決經理人與股東之間的代理問題，企業通常會給予經理人股票獎酬使經理人與股東趨向利益一致，在利益一致之下經理人會考量租稅規避所帶來的非稅成本，然而當經理人持股比例過高時，代理問題將轉為大股東與小股東之間的利益侵占，在利益侵占之下經理人會基於自利動機追求租稅規避帶來的租稅利益。
本研究利用2005年到2014年之負面社會責任企業做為樣本來源，驗證租稅規避與負面企業社會責任之間的關係、租稅規避與經理人持股比例之間的關係，以及租稅規避與負面企業社會責任之間的關係是否因為經理人的持股比例而有減緩或增強的效果出現，本研究結果顯示環保與安全及勞資關係差兩項類別可以觀察到具負面企業社會責任之企業，從事租稅規避之程度越高，而經理人持股比例越高，其從事租稅規避程度越低。此外負面企業社會責任與租稅規避之間的關係會因為經理人持股比例而有減緩效果出現，只是其結果並不顯著。

In recent years, people for CSR issues growing importance. The decisions made by the enterprises should not only pursue their own performance, but also should consider the impact on the community. Tax represent a significant cost the firm and it is generally expected prefer tax aggressiveness. If a firm avoids taxes, it increases profitability, but the reduction in taxes may affect support for government infrastructure and social programs, hence the firm may be categorized as socially irresponsible.
To solve the agency between managers and stockholder, companies often give managers stock compensation to make the incentive alignment effect. So the managers would consider non-tax cost of tax aggressiveness. However, when the proportion of managers holding high, agency problem will converted to between major shareholders and minority shareholders. Under management entrenchment effect, managers will base on self-motivated to engage tax aggressive.
This study selects the sample from 2005 to 2014, which happened irresponsible event and then collected by TEJ, are used to test the relation between tax aggressive and Irresponsible CSR and the relation between management ownership and tax aggressive. Furthermore, this study test whether management ownership would affect the relationship between Irresponsible CSR and tax aggressiveness. This study find that the relation between the irresponsible CSR corporations with poor labor relations and tax aggressiveness is significantly negative. The relation between management ownership and tax aggressiveness is significantly positive. And management ownership will affect the relation between Irresponsible CSR and tax aggressiveness.

第一章、緒論 1
第一節、研究動機與背景 1
第二節、研究目的與貢獻 3
第三節、研究流程與架構 4
第二章、文獻探討 6
第一節、企業社會責任與租稅規避之探討 6
第二節、經理人持股比例與租稅規避之探討 11
第三節、企業社會責任、經理人持股比例與租稅規避之探討 14
第三章、假說發展與研究設計 18
第一節、研究假說 18
第二節、變數定義 21
第三節、實證模型 30
第四章、實證結果 33
第一節、樣本選取與資料來源 33
第二節、實證結果 38
第五章、敏感性分析 51
第一節、經理人持股比例高低 51
第二節、使用控制持股作為解釋變數之變數定義與模型 56
三、實證結果分析 57
第六章、結論與建議 62
第一節、研究結論 62
第二節、研究限制與建議 63
參考文獻 64
中文部分 64
西文部分 66

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