臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究之主旨為探討自由現金流量假說及債務假說與會計師選擇間之關聯。由於近年來一連串企業舞弊的陸續發生，使得會計師選擇之議題再次受到重視與廣泛討論。根據Jensen (1986,1989)之研究指出，低成長機會但保有高自由現金流量之公司，其經理人傾向從事有損公司價值之行為，使得公司代理成本增加；其亦提出低成長機會但擁有高自由現金流量之公司，可藉由舉債減緩經理人從事前述有損公司行為之動機，降低代理問題。本研究擬參考Gul and Tsui (1998)之研究，以自由現金流量作為代理成本之替代變數，探討其與會計師選擇間之關聯性，以及舉債程度對前述關聯性之影響。本研究以淨值市價比作為成長機會之衡量指標，研究期間為1998年至2008年，以Probit迴歸模型驗證本研究所發展出之兩項假說。實證結果發現兩項假說皆不成立，但發現不論低成長或高成長機會之公司，自由現金流量愈大者，皆傾向選擇四大會計師事務所查核。敏感性測試之結果發現，控制時間之影響後，與原先迴歸分析結果差異不大；但控制產業因素影響後，假說1成立，即低成長機會但擁有高自由現金流量之公司，相對於高成長機會且擁有高自由現金流量之公司，其經理人傾向委任四大會計師事務所作查核。

This study uses free cash flow (FCF) and debt monitoring hypotheses to analyze firms’ incentives to hire external auditing. Since more and more enterprises engaging in fraudulence, the issue of selection of auditors has been focused on and widely discussed. According to Jensen (1986, 1989), managers of low growth/high FCF firms tend to engage in non-value-maximizing activities; Jensen also argues that debt can mitigates the intention of doing such behaviors in low growth/high FCF firms, and thus mitigates the agency problems. Following Gul and Tsui (1998), we use FCF as a proxy variable for agency costs, to examine the conjecture by Jensen (1986, 1989). Research samples are collected from Taiwanese public trade companies from 1998 to 2008. We find that managers for high FCF firms tend to select Big4 auditors, no matter what the firms’ growth opportunities are. That is, we did not find empirical evidence supporting our hypotheses. However, sensitive tests showed that, as we control for industry effect, we found that managers for low growth firms with high FCF are more likely to choose Big4 auditors than managers for high growth firms with high FCF.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究架構與流程 3
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 代理環境 6
第二節 審計品質與會計師選擇 9
第三節 自由現金流量假說及債務假說 13
第三章 研究設計 22
第一節 研究假說 22
第二節 研究模型與變數衡量 23
第三節 資料來源及樣本選取 29
第四章 實證結果與分析 30
第一節 敘述性統計 30
第二節 相關性分析 32
第三節 會計師選擇Probit模型分析 38
第四節 敏感性分析 43
第五章 結論與建議 48
參考文獻 50

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