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研究生:李珮詅
研究生(外文):LEE, PEI-LING
論文名稱:轉投資、公司治理及現金股利支付政策-台灣鋼鐵業之實證分析
論文名稱(外文):Reinvestments, Corporate Governance and Cash Dividend Payout Policy: Empirical Evidence in Taiwan’s Steel Industry
指導教授:林卓民林卓民引用關係
指導教授(外文):LIN, CHO-MIN
口試委員:邱建良陳明麗
口試委員(外文):CHIU, CHIEN-LIANGCHAN, MIN-LEE
口試日期:2015-06-19
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:靜宜大學
系所名稱:管理碩士在職專班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2015
畢業學年度:103
語文別:中文
論文頁數:35
中文關鍵詞:轉投資現金股利政策公司治理
外文關鍵詞:ReinvestmentCash dividend policyCorporate governance
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:378
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:19
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
在蓬勃發展的經濟體制下,企業為了創造更大收益,大多採用轉投資方式增加公司收入,藉以提高發放股利來吸引投資者進場投資。本文針對2005年至2013年間42家台灣鋼鐵業上市櫃公司,共計333個樣本,探討台灣上市櫃公司的轉投資行為是否會因企業的現金股利政策而受影響,並延伸探討公司治理良窳與公司轉投資行為相互影響關係。實證結果發現,公司治理指數與轉投資為負向關係,發放較高股利的公司相較於發放較少股利的公司其轉投資意願較高,而不發放現金股利的公司不參與轉投資行為。
Reinvestment is an important strategy for business expansion or transformation currently. The research subject is Taiwan’s Steel Industry between 2005 and 2013 for the relationship between reinvestment and dividend payout. To extend this study, it is about the effect of reinvestment and corporate governance quality. The empirical evidence shows opposite on reinvestment and corporate governance quality.. Overall, the empirical result indicates that a study to reinvestment should simultaneously consider both corporate governance and cash dividend payments.

摘要 I
Abstract II
目錄 III
表目錄 IV
圖目錄 V
第壹章 緒論
第一節、 研究背景與動機 1
第貳章 文獻探討
第一節、 轉投資行為 9
第二節、 轉投資與股利政策 12
第三節、 公司治理與股利政策 15
第參章 研究方法
第一節、 資料來源與選樣標準 17
第二節、 研究方法 17
第肆章 實證結果 21
第伍章 結論 31
參考文獻 32
一、中文文獻
羅會芬(1994),上市公司投資、舉債與股利政策互動關係之研究,國立政治大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文

二、英文文獻
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Miller M. H. and Modigliani,F. (1961). Dividend policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares. Journal of Business , 34, 411-433.

Palmon, O.and Wald, J.K. (2002). Are two heads better than one?The impact of changes in management structure on performance by firm size, Journal of Corporate Finance, 8, 213-226.

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