臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

台灣金融監督管理委員會於2013年將辦理公司治理評鑑列為2014年的重點工作項目，顯示公司治理重要性，且台灣的企業家族色彩濃厚，家族對於公司之影響值得探究。本研究以2009~2014年台灣上市(櫃)公司為研究對象，探討公司治理及家族企業對公司績效之影響。實證結果顯示，不管是單一的構面指標或整合的公司治理綜合指標，在公司治理越好的情況下，皆能使得公司績效提升。然而，家族企業對公司會計績效有顯著負向影響，對市場績效卻為正向影響，顯示其對會計績效與市場反映有差異。 此外，本研究進一步探討公司治理綜合指標優良之公司是否有較好的股價表現，結果顯示公司治理優良之公司的確比大盤指數擁有更好的投資報酬率。再將公司治理優良之公司劃分為家族及非家族企業，得到公司治理良好之非家族企業會有較好的股價表現。

The 2013 Corporate Governance Roadmap of the Taiwan Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) considered corporate governance evaluation as one of the key tasks and started the evaluation for all Taiwan-listed companies from 2014, it shows how important the measures of effectiveness of a corporate governance system is. Since family firm is a typical structure in Taiwan, the impact of family firms on company performance is worth exploring.
For a sample of 5,174 observations over the period of 2009〜2014, this study investigated the impact of corporate governance and family firms on corporate performance. The empirical results appear that when firms from either single facet or comprehensive index of corporate governance which demonstrated good corporate governance are able to make corporate performance get improved. However, the family firms have a significant negative impact on a firm’s accounting performance, but inversely positive effect on the market performance, which it reflected the differences between the accounting performance and market. In addition, this study further examines whether firms with good comprehensive index of corporate governance have a better share price, the results show a firm with good corporate governance has a better return on investment (ROI) than TAIEX. Finally, the sample firms are separated into two groups: family and non-family and the results indicate that non-family businesses with good corporate governance have a better share price.

摘 要 I
ABSTRACT II
誌 謝 III
目錄 IV
表目錄 VI
圖目錄 VII
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究動機與目的 2
第三節 研究架構 4
第二章 文獻探討與假說建構 6
第一節 公司治理與績效 6
第二節 家族企業 10
第三節 公司治理與市場報酬 12
第三章 研究方法 13
第一節 研究樣本 13
第二節 實證模型與變數定義 14
第三節 敘述性統計 18
第四節 研究設計 23
第四章 實證結果與分析 24
第一節 公司治理與家族企業對公司績效之影響 24
第二節 公司治理良好之企業與股價表現之關聯性分析 31
第三節 公司治理評鑑 32
第五章 結論與建議 33
第一節 研究結論 33
第二節 研究限制與後續研究建議 34
參考文獻 35
附錄 38

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