臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文在品質提升的R&D內生成長模型的基礎下，建構了具有阻礙式專利(blocking patents)的及利潤分配(profit-division rule)特性的模型，
並引進一般化Nash談判(generalized Nash bargain)的函數形式，讓研發廠商擁有各自的談判力量，來解決研發廠商之間的利益衝突。政府有兩種政策工具，專利權的保護及研發勞動成本的補貼，在此架構下探討以上的參數對經濟成長及社會福利的影響。

我們發現隨著新一代研發廠商的談判力量、專利權的保護程度及政府提供的補貼比例愈大時，愈能夠帶動經濟成長; 反之，隨著新一代研發廠商的談判力量、專利權的保護程度及政府提供的補貼比例愈小時，經濟成長會隨之下降。在社會福利方面，我們列出經濟體所有存在的外部性，並分析如何透過專利權的保護及研發勞動的補貼來矯正外部性;其中，發現次佳政策下的最適專利權保護政策及勞動補貼政策為兩個非獨立的政府政策工具。最後，也發現最佳政策與次佳政策求解出的最適補貼相同，經濟成長率等內生變數的均衡值也皆相同，因此次佳政策求解出的補貼足以矯正經濟體存在的外部性，將經濟體帶回到Pareto最適的狀態。

This thesis develops a quality-ladder growth model with blocking patents and the profit-division rule. Our model introduces generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine the distribution of profits between current and former inventors. In our model, each of these two innovators owns its bargaining power. Also, the government has two policy instruments to improve social welfare: patents breadth and R&D subsidies. The main focus of this thesis is to study whether the relative bargaining power between current and former inventors, patents breadth, and R&D subsidies are powerful to affect economic growth and social welfare.

Some main findings emerge from the analysis. First, in association with increases in the bargaining power, the extent of patents protection, and the subsidy rate on R&D production, the economy's growth rate will rise in response, and vice versa. This study also deals with the welfare analysis, and our analysis focuses on whether the government's R&D subsidy policy is effective to correct the externalities associated with R&D production. Second, both policy instruments of patent protection and R&D subsidies are mutually dependent when the government seeks for the second-best optimum. Finally, we find that the optimal subsidy rate on R&D production at the second-best optimum are equal to that at the first-best optimum, and all relevant endogenous variables are the same under both the second-best regime and the first-best regime. Accordingly, the optimum subsidy polity on R&D production in second best optimum can eliminate all distortions within the model, and bring the economy back to the Pareto optimum equilibrium.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 文獻回顧 3
第三節 本文架構 4
第二章 理論模型 5
第一節 各部門之決策行為 5
第二節 競爭均衡 18
第三章 福利分析 26
第一節 次佳政策(Second-best optimum) 26
第二節 最佳政策(First-best optimum) 33
第四章 結論 37
本文附錄 39
附錄A 39
附錄B 39
附錄C 41
附錄D 42
參考文獻 45

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賴景昌(2018)，內生成長理論，政大經研所上課講義。
賴景昌(2015)，內生成長理論：品質提升模型，逢甲經研所上課講義 。
賴景昌(2013)，R&D 內生成長理論，逢甲經研所上課講義。
賴景昌(2005)，工資談判理論(Union Bargaining Theory)，輔大經研所上課講義。
賴景昌(1993)，國際金融理論：基礎篇，台北：茂昌。

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