臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

金融海嘯與經濟不景氣下，造成公司獲利不佳，但許多績效不彰甚至虧損之公司，其高階經理人卻仍坐領高薪，讓其股東承擔損失，為遏止代理成本日益擴大，主關機關企圖從改善公司治理來監督高階經理人自利行為。本研究以2005年至2010年2,016家國內上市公司為研究對象，分別從董事會結構、股權結構、資訊揭露水準三大構面來探討公司治理品質與高階經理人溢領薪酬之因果關係。研究結果發現：當董事會忙碌程度愈高、機構法人持股比率愈高，高階經理人溢領薪酬可能性越高，董監事持股比率越高，高階經理人溢領薪酬可能性越低。在控制產業特性後發現，無論是傳統製造業、化學生技醫療產業、電子產業或其他產業，董監事持股比率之高低是造成高階經理人可能溢領薪酬的重要因素；對化學生技醫療產業及電子產業的公司而言，雙重性結構是另一個會導致高階經理人可能會溢領薪酬的重要因素。

In a decade year, public companies have suffered from operating loss due to financial crisis and economic recession. However, some executives of those companies have been overpaid compensation regardless of shareholders’ sufferings. To hinder a growing agency cost, authorities acclaim to mitigate executives’ self-interests with mechanism of corporate governance. This study examines the cause-effect relationship between corporate governance and overpaid executives’ compensation from perspectives of board structure, ownership structure and disclosure transparency, respectively. After investigating into 2,016 public companies during the period from 2005 to 2010, the study find that the busier the independent directors and/or the higher institutional shareholdings, the higher likelihood executives are overpaid. Controlling for industry characteristics, the study finds that the shareholdings of directors and supervisors is a significant factor resulting in overpaid executive compensation in the traditional manufacturing, chemical and biotech, and electronic industries. For public companies in the chemical and biotech and electronic industries, duality is another significant factor contributing to overpaid executive compensation.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與背景 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構及流程圖 4
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 代理理論 6
第二節 公司治理 8
第三節 公司治理機制與高階經理人薪酬 11
第四節 小結 23
第三章 研究方法 24
第一節 研究假說之發展 24
第二節 變數與研究模型 26
第三節 樣本選取與資料來源 30
第四節 小結 32
第四章 實證結果分析 33
第一節 敘述性統計 33
第二節 相關性分析 35
第三節 迴歸結果分析 37
第四節 敏感性分析 40
第五章 結論與建議 47
第一節 研究結論 47
第二節 研究貢獻、研究限制與未來方向 49
參考文獻 50

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