跳到主要內容

臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

(216.73.216.42) 您好!臺灣時間:2025/10/02 01:35
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果 :::

詳目顯示

: 
twitterline
研究生:賈華瑪
研究生(外文):Fatoumatta Jaiteh
論文名稱:Top management team (TMT) compensation and innovation
論文名稱(外文):Top management team (TMT) compensation and innovation
指導教授:陳一如陳一如引用關係
指導教授(外文):I-Ju Chen
口試委員:陳彥行林智勇
口試委員(外文):Yang-Shing ChenChih-Yung Lin
口試日期:2016-06-16
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:元智大學
系所名稱:財務金融暨會計碩士班(財務金融學程)
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:一般商業學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2016
畢業學年度:104
語文別:英文
論文頁數:48
中文關鍵詞:TMT compensationInnovationFirm Characteristic
外文關鍵詞:TMT compensationInnovationFirm Characteristic
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:176
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:10
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
This study examined the relationship between TMT different compensation packages and innovation. We provide evidence that both TMT cash and options compensation has a positive impact on corporate new product introduce (innovation). On the other hand we show that TMT stock compensation have a negative impact on innovation. We also find that unvested option is more effective in promoting innovation that vested options. We do further robustness’ test to control for endogeneity problem, the 2SLS result show that our previous findings are not affected by endogeneity issues.
This study examined the relationship between TMT different compensation packages and innovation. We provide evidence that both TMT cash and options compensation has a positive impact on corporate new product introduce (innovation). On the other hand we show that TMT stock compensation have a negative impact on innovation. We also find that unvested option is more effective in promoting innovation that vested options. We do further robustness’ test to control for endogeneity problem, the 2SLS result show that our previous findings are not affected by endogeneity issues.
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………1
2. Literature Review…………………………………………………………………………3
2. Executive Compensation……………………………………...…………3
2. Innovation………………………………………………………………… 5
2. Executive Compensation and Innovation …………………………… 13
3. Motivation and Hypothesis…………………………………..……… 17
3. compensation and Innovation: Cash Compensation…………….… 17
3. compensation and Innovation: Stock Options ………………..…… 18
3.compensation and Innovation: Stock ………………………...……… 19
4.Data and Variable……………………………………...………………… 20
4. Data ….……………………………………………………………….……20
4. Variables ……………….............…………………………………….… 20
4.2.1 Dependent Variable ………………………..…………………….… 20
4.2.2 Independent Variable …………………………………………….… 21
4.2.3 Control Variable…………..……………………………………….… 21
5. Empirical Results………………………………………………………22
5.1 Univariable Analysis …………………………..……………………… 22
5.2 Multivariable Analysis …………………………………...…………… 24
5.2.1 Fixed effect Regression…………..………………………………… 24
5.2.2 Endogeneity Issues ………………………………………………… 26
5.2.3 Vested vs Unvested Options ……………………………………… 29
Conclusions …………………………………………………………………………………30 References .…………………………………………………………………31
Tables…………………………………………………………………………33


References
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, and Zenu Sharma (2011): INCENTIVES AND INNOVATION:
EVIDENCE FROM CEO COMPENSATON CONTRACT: available at SSRN.
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2005) Managerial incentives and risk-taking, Journal of Financial Economics Volume 79, Issue 2, February 2006, Pages 431–468.
David Hirshleifer, Po-Hsuan Hsu, Dongmei Li (2013): Innovative efficiency and stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 107 (3), 632-654.
Frydman and Saks (2010) Executive compensation: A NEW VIEW FROM A LONGTERM PERSPECTIVE, 1936-2005 Review of financial studies 23(5): 2099-2138
GUSTAVO MANSO: Motivating innovation: THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE • VOL. LXVI, NO. 5 • OCTOBER 2011
Heiner Evanschitzky, Martin Eisend, Roger J. Calantone, and Yuanyuan Jiang (2012): Success Factors of Product Innovation: An Updated Meta-Analysis. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 29:21-37.
Jensen and Murphy (1990) TOP-MANAGEMENT INCENTIVES, Journal of Political Economy Vol. 98, No. 2 (Apr., 1990), pp. 225-264
John E. Core, Robert W. Holthausen, David F. Larcker (1999): Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance Journal of Financial Economics
Volume 51, Issue 3, March 1999, Pages 371–406
JENNIFER N. CARPENTER: DOES OPTION COMPENSATION INCREASE MANAGERIAL RISK APPETITE. The journal of finance. Vol.lv, NO.5. OCT. 2000
Jeffrey L. Coles, Naveen D. Daniel, Lalitha Naveen: MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND RISK-TAKING JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMIES 79 (2006) 431 TO 468
Jun-Koo Kang, Wei-Lin Liu, Angie Low, and Le Zhang (2014): Friendly Boards and Innovation. FIRN Research paper.
Lauren Cohen, Karl Diether and Christopher Malloy (2013): Misvaluing Innovation. Review of Financial Studies, hhs183.
Nina Baranchuk, Robert Kieschnick, Rabih Moussawi: MOTIVATING INNOVATION IN NEWLY PUBLIC FIRMS: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 111 (2014) 579-588
Paul K. Chaney, Timothy M. Devinney and Russell S. Winer (1991): The Impact of New Product Introductions on the Market Value of Firms. Journal of Business, 573-610.
Po-Hsuan Hsu, Xuan Tian, and Yan Xu (2014): Financial development and innovation: Cross-country evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 112 (1), 116-135.
Shahbaz Sheikh, (2012), DO CEO COMPENSATION INCENTIVES AFFECT FIRM INNOVATION? Review of Accounting and Finance Vol. 11 No. 1, 2012 pp. 4-39
Xin Chang, Kangkang Fu, Angie Low, Wenrui Zhang (2013): Non-executive employee stock options and corporate innovation, Journal of Financial Economics
Volume 115, Issue 1, January 2015, Pages 168–188
Yangyang Chen, Edward J. Podolski and Madhu Veeraraghavan (2014): Does Managerial Skill Facilitate Corporate Innovative Success?. Available at SSRN 2461048

連結至畢業學校之論文網頁點我開啟連結
註: 此連結為研究生畢業學校所提供,不一定有電子全文可供下載,若連結有誤,請點選上方之〝勘誤回報〞功能,我們會盡快修正,謝謝!
QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top