臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究旨在探討CEO雙重性、CEO薪酬與企業績效三者間之關連性。研究對象為1999年至2005年在台灣證券交易所上市之公司。研究方法係先建構聯立方程模組，再以三階段最小平方法進行實證分析。實證結果發現：(1) CEO雙重性與CEO薪酬呈顯著之負向關係；(2) CEO雙重性與資產報酬率、益本比則均呈顯著之正向關係；(3) 本期CEO薪酬與本期企業績效間存在互為因果的正向關係；(4) 上期資產報酬率、益本比與本期CEO薪酬間，及上期CEO薪酬與本期資產報酬率、益本比間，均呈現顯著之負向關係；(5) 上期CEO薪酬與上期CEO雙重性的交互效果與本期資產報酬率呈顯著之負相關。因此，本研究認為，台灣上市公司董事會之雙重領導結構(CEO duality)雖符合忠僕理論，但在CEO薪酬的訂定上，似隱含企業激勵性酬勞機制偏重短期財務績效，導致CEO短視近利之反功能行為(dysfunctional behavior)，不利於未來財務績效之達成。

This study examines the relationships among CEO duality, CEO compensation, and firm performance. Panel data was collected from listed companies on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) during 1999-2005, and construct simultaneous equations model with three-stage least squares estimation.
Empirical results show that (1) CEO duality is significantly negative associated with CEO compensation; (2) the CEO duality is also significantly positive associated with ROA and EP; (3) CEO compensation is significantly positive associated with current performance and they are jointly determined; (4) a negative relationship exists between current performance (or CEO compensation) and subsequent CEO compensation (or performance); (5) the interaction effect of CEO compensation and CEO duality is significantly negative associated with subsequent ROA.
The findings indicate that the leadership structure of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange is consistent with stewardship theory. It implies that firms’ incentive compensation mechanism overemphasizes short-run financial performance on CEO compensation contract. That would lead to CEO’s dysfunctional behavior and be unfavorable to firm’s future performance.

謝 辭 I
中文摘要 II
英文摘要 III
圖目次 IV
表目次 V
目 錄 VI
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究流程 5
第二章 文獻探討 8
第一節 公司治理 8
第二節 代理理論與忠僕理論 10
第三節 CEO雙重性與企業績效 12
第四節 CEO薪酬與企業績效 15
第五節 CEO雙重性對CEO薪酬契約的影響 20
第三章 研究設計 25
第一節 理論架構與待證假說 25
第二節 資料來源及樣本選取 28
第三節 變數定義與衡量 29
第四節 實證模型及研究方法 32
第四章 實證結果 38
第一節 敘述性統計 38
第二節 相關係數與單根檢定 39
第三節 實證結果分析與解釋 44
第五章 結論與建議 54
第一節 研究結論 54
第二節 研究建議 56
第三節 研究限制 57
參考文獻 58
附錄ㄧ 普通最小平方法實證結果 65
附錄二 兩階段最小平方法實證結果 67
附錄三 企業相對績效實證結果－三階段最小平方法 69

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