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研究生:王書鶴
研究生(外文):Su-Her Wang
論文名稱:非審計公費對審計品質之影響-從盈餘管理的角度探討
論文名稱(外文):The Effect of Auditors'' Fees for Non-audit Services on Audit Quality ─ From the Perspective of Earnings Management
指導教授:李建然李建然引用關係
指導教授(外文):Jan-Zan Lee
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:中國文化大學
系所名稱:會計研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2003
畢業學年度:91
語文別:中文
論文頁數:83
中文關鍵詞:非審計公費審計品質盈餘管理
外文關鍵詞:Auditors'' Fees for Non-audit ServicesAudit QualityEarnings Management
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:30
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  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:5
會計師提供非審計服務是否影響審計品質,長久以來一直存在正反兩面的意見。過去由於國內公費資料取得困難,因此相關實證研究相對少於國外,而證期會之新規定使本研究得以自公開資訊觀測站蒐集民國91年上市上櫃公司之會計師公費揭露資訊。因此,本研究延伸Frankel et al. (2002)與李建然等(2002)之研究,以盈餘管理作為審計品質之代理變數,探討非審計服務是否影響審計品質。
實證結果發現,對向上與向下操縱盈餘的公司而言,公司購買非審計服務的多寡,並不影響會計師的審計決策。此外,本研究發現當公司向上操縱盈餘時,高額的審計公費,較容易使會計師允許客戶有較大的盈餘管理空間;至於當公司向下操縱盈餘時,審計公費金額高低並不影響會計師的審計決策。換言之,本研究並未發現國內會計師對審計客戶提供非審計服務,有影響審計品質之證據,本研究結果與Frankel et al. (2002)與李建然等(2002)之實證研究結果不同,本研究認為可能之原因有二。首先,由於國內公費揭露規定有設揭露門檻,並非全體公開發行公司均適用,造成有揭露會計師公費資料的樣本太少,可能影響實證結果。其次,本文認為在公費揭露規定實施第一年的情形下,會計師可能會擔心公司揭露高額非審計公費將造成各界懷疑會計師不具獨立性,因此對客戶之盈餘報導採取較保守的態度。
For a long time, there is always totally different opinions concerning whether audi-tors compromise their audit quality when they provide non-audit services to their audit clients. In the past, it was hard to get domestic data of auditor fees, so the volume of domestic related empirical research were less than foreign scholars’. The new regulation of Securities and Futures Commission makes auditor fees data collection from Market Observation Post System possible. Hence, this study continues Frankel et al. (2002) and Jan Zan Lee et al. (2002)’s research. We adopt earnings management as proxy variable of audit quality to investigate whether auditors compromise their audit quality when they provide non-audit services to their audit clients.
The results indicate that, for companies with positive or negative discretionary ac-cruals, auditor decision is not affected by provision of non-audit services. In addition, when companies manipulate earnings upward, we found that there was a significant positive association between provision of non-audit services and earnings management because of high audit fees. However, we didn’t find similar phenomenon when compa-nies manipulate earnings downward. In other words, we do not find auditors compro-mise their audit quality when they provide non-audit services to their audit clients. The result is different from Frankel et al. (2002) and Jan Zan Lee et al. (2002)’s findings. We think probably there are two reasons for this. First, we have little sample of auditor fees disclosure data because of limitation of the regulation. Second, this is the first year to enforce the regulation of auditor fees disclosure, so auditors may adopt more conserva-tive attitude toward clients’ earnings reporting for fearing that the disclosure of high non-audit fees will make the public doubt the auditors’ independence.
中文摘要 ..................... iii
英文摘要 ..................... iv
誌謝辭  ..................... v
內容目錄 ..................... vi
表目錄  ..................... viii
圖目錄  ..................... ix
第一章  緒論................... 1
  第一節  研究動機和目的............ 1
  第二節  研究架構與流程............ 5
  註 釋..................... 7
第二章  文獻探討................. 8
  第一節  非審計服務之定義與種類........ 8
  第二節  審計品質與會計師獨立性之間的關係... 12
  第三節  非審計服務對審計品質之影響...... 15
  註 釋..................... 25
第三章  研究方法................. 26
  第一節  研究假說............... 26
  第二節  研究設計與變數衡量.......... 30
  第三節  資料來源與樣本篩選.......... 40
  註 釋..................... 46
第四章  實證研究分析與結果............ 47
  第一節  樣本基本敘述統計........... 47
  第二節  單變量檢定之實證結果與分析...... 56
  第三節  多變量迴歸之實證結果與分析...... 58
第五章  結論與建議................ 70
  第一節  結論................. 70
  第二節  研究限制............... 72
  第三節  建議................. 73
參考文獻 ..................... 75
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