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研究生:林裕庭
研究生(外文):Lin Yu Ting
論文名稱:管理團隊品質是否影響公司投資的效率性
論文名稱(外文):Does Management Quality Affect Firms’Investment Efficiency?
指導教授:劉志諒劉志諒引用關係
指導教授(外文):C. L. Liu
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:長庚大學
系所名稱:企業管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2011
畢業學年度:99
論文頁數:80
中文關鍵詞:管理團隊品質投資決策投資無效率
外文關鍵詞:management qualityinvestment decisioninvestment inefficiency
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:234
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
公司投資效率性為近期研究中所關注的重要研究議題,然而過去
文獻大多探討財務報表與公司投資效率性間關係,迄今尚未有研究探
討公司管理團隊品質對公司投資決策影響。本研究檢測管理團隊品質
因素與公司投資無效率程度間之關聯性。研究樣本以台灣上市公司為
主,研究期間為2003年至2008年。
實證結果發現,管理團隊之規模、團隊成員之相關工作經驗及
CEO之支配力與投資無效率程度皆呈顯著負相關;此結果表示隨著管
理團隊規模的擴大,以增加不同背景成員,經由成員間不同觀點,以
修正投資決策錯誤的判斷,進而降低公司投資無效率。此外,管理者
擁有相關工作經驗,較能在變動與複雜環境中訂定有效投資決策,以
降低公司投資無效率。再者,權力較大之CEO可以改善並增加該團隊
之凝聚力,且隨者CEO本身持股比率上升,管理者和股東間之代理成
本降低,管理者較沒有動機從事擴張策略或特權消費等執行淨現值為
負之投資方案而導致過度投資行為,因而降低公司投資無效率。
Firm investment efficiency has been an important issue in recent years. Despite the numerous studies documenting the relationship between financial statements and investment efficiency, a relationship between management quality and investment decision has so far received little attention in the academic literature. This thesis empirically examines
the relationship between management quality and investment inefficiency. The data were hand-collected from the public listed companies in Taiwan for the periods from 2003 through 2008.
Empirical results find that the size of management team, managers’ pervious working experience and CEO dominance are significantly and negatively related to investment inefficiency. These results imply that the large size of management team consisting of managers from different
backgrounds with diverse viewpoints may help the firm to make the optimal investment decisions. Additionally, managers’ previous working experience may help the firms to make the right investment decision under volatile and complex environment. Third, a dominating CEO may improve and enhance the cohesion in the team. As the proportion of
CEO’s share ownership increase, the agency cost between managers and shareholders decrease. This prevents managers from empire building or perquisite consumption, which causes overinvestment. Overall, all the above factors of management quality can reduce investment inefficiency.
目錄
指導教授推薦書
口試委員會審定書
長庚大學論文授權書 iii
誌謝 iv
中文摘要 v
英文摘要 vi
目錄 vii
表目錄 x
圖目錄 xi
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究流程與架構 4
第二章 文獻回顧 5
第一節 投資效率性之相關文獻 5
一. 投資效率性之定義 5
二. 過度投資之相關研究 5
三. 投資不足之相關研究 6
四. 投資效率性之近期研究 7
第二節 管理品質相關文獻 9
一. 高階管理團隊 9
二. 管理品質構面 10
第三節 研究假說建立 16
第三章 研究設計與方法 19
第一節 變數衡量 19
一. 投資無效率性之衡量 19
二. 管理品質變數之衡量 22
第二節 實證模型 27
第三節樣本篩選與資料來源 30
一. 樣本選取與研究期間 30
二. 資料來源 31
三. 樣本產業分布情形 31
第四章 實證結果分析 33
第一節 敘述統計量分析 33
第二節 相關性分析 38
第三節 管理團隊品質對投資無效率的影響 41
一. 全產業之多元迴歸分析 41
二. 電子產業與非電子產業之多元迴歸分析 45
第四節 管理團隊品質對投資無效率之穩健性測試 52
第五章 結論與建議 57
第一節 研究結論 57
第二節 研究限制與後續建議 61
參考文獻 62

表目錄
表 3 樣本公司產業分布情形 32
表4-1-1 全產業之敘述統計表 35
表4-1-2 電子業之敘述統計表 36
表4-1-3 非電子業之敘述統計表 37
表4-2 相關係數矩陣 39
表4-3-1管理團隊品質對投資無效率的影響(全產業) 50
表4-3-2管理團隊品質對投資無效率的影響(電子與非電子產業) 51
表4-4-1管理團隊品質對投資無效率的影響—以Biddle et al. (2009)投
資模型之穩健性測試(全產業) 55
表4-4-2管理團隊品質對投資無效率的影響—以Biddle et al. (2009)投
資模型之穩健性測試(電子與非電子產業) 56
表5 檢定結果彙整 60

圖目錄
圖1 論文研究架構圖4


中文部分
[1]江正信(2000)。高階經營團隊與企業策略決策模式,組織學習傾向,
創新能力及經營績效之關係研究。未出版之碩士論文,國立成
功大學企業管理研究所。
[2]林秀鳳(2008)。管理品質要素及對企業績效之影響─管理團隊特性之
探討。未出版之博士論文,國立台北大學會計學系。
[3]許文吉(2006)。管理品質與自由現金流量之研究。未出版之碩士論文,
銘傳大學財務金融學系。


英文部分
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[9]Chemmanur, T., & Paeglis, I. (2005). Management quality, certification, and initial public offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 76(2), 331-368.
[10]Chemmanur, T., Paeglis, I., & Simonyan, K. (2009). Management Quality, Financial Policies, and Asymmetric Information. Journal of Finance and Quantitative analysis, 44(5), 1045-1079.
[11]Chung, K., & Pruitt, S. (1994). A simple approximation of Tobin's q. Financial Management, 23(3), 70-74.
[12]Cohen, B., & Dean, T. (2005). Information asymmetry and investor valuation of IPOs: Top management team legitimacy as a capital market signal. Strategic Management Journal, 26(7), 683-690.
[13]Eisenhardt, K., & Schoonhoven, C. (1990). Organizational growth: Linking founding team, strategy, environment, and growth among US semiconductor ventures, 1978-1988. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(3), 504-529.
[14]Finkelstein, S. (1992). Power in top management teams: Dimensions, measurement, and validation. Academy of Management Journal, 35(3), 505-538.
[15]Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. (1990). Top-management-team tenure and organizational outcomes: The moderating role of managerial discretion. Administrative Science Quarterly, 484-503.
[16]Haleblian, J., & Finkelstein, S. (1993). Top management team size, CEO dominance, and firm performance: The moderating roles of environmental turbulence and discretion. Academy of Management Journal, 36(4), 844-863.
[17]Hambrick, D., Cho, T., & Chen, M. (1996). The influence of top management team heterogeneity on firms' competitive moves. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(4).
[18]Hambrick, D., & D'Aveni, R. (1992). Top team deterioration as part of the downward spiral of large corporate bankruptcies. Management Science, 38(10), 1445-1466.
[19]Hambrick, D., & Mason, P. (1984). Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of management review, 9(2), 193-206.
[20]Harford, J. (1999). Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions. Journal of Finance, 54(6), 1969-1997.
[21]Hirshleifer, D., & Thakor, A. (1992). Managerial conservatism, project choice, and debt. Review of Financial Studies, 5(3), 437.
[22]Hitt, M., & Tyler, B. (1991). Strategic decision models: Integrating different perspectives. Strategic Management Journal, 12(5), 327-351.
[23]Holmstrom, B., & Costa, J. (1986). Managerial incentives and capital management. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(4), 835-860.
[24]Jensen, M. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American Economic Review, 76(2), 323-329.
[25]Jensen, M. (1993). The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems. Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880.
[26]Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
[27]Keck, S. (1997). Top management team structure: Differential effects by environmental context. Organization Science, 8(2), 143-156.
[28]Kimberly, J., & Evanisko, M. (1981). Organizational innovation: The influence of individual, organizational, and contextual factors on hospital adoption of technological and administrative innovations. Academy of Management Journal, 24(4), 689-713.
[29]McNichols, M., & Stubben, S. (2008). Does Earnings Management Affect Firms' Investment Decisions? Accounting Review, 83, 1571.
[30]Michel, J., & Hambrick, D. (1992). Diversification posture and top management team characteristics. Academy of Management Journal, 35(1), 9-37.
[31]Myers, S. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5(2), 147-175.
[32]Myers, S., & Majluf, N. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(2), 187-221.
[33]Narayanan, M. (1985). Managerial incentives for short-term results.Journal of Finance, 40(5), 1469-1484.
[34]Richardson, S. (2006). Over-investment of free cash flow. Review of Accounting Studies, 11(2), 159-189.
[35]Smith, K., Smith, K., Olian, J., Sims Jr, H., O'Bannon, D., & Scully, J. (1994). Top management team demography and process: The role of social integration and communication. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(3).
[36]Verdi, R. (2006). Financial reporting quality and investment efficiency. Working paper.
[37]Wiersema, M., & Bantel, K. (1992). Top management team demography and corporate strategic change. Academy of Management Journal, 35(1), 91-121.
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