臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

家族企業在商業活動中一直扮演相當重要的角色，而台灣企業亦普遍由家族所控制。由於過去研究較少從家族企業之觀點對其財務決策與組織績效進行全面性探討。因此，本研究以台灣上市櫃公司中有家族控制者為研究對象，分別從財務決策與組織績效，檢測其與家族持股之關聯；並進一步探討企業在家族控制下，其財務決策是否會影響組織績效。本研究期能有助於家族企業作出最佳的財務決策並達到組織績效最大化的效果。本文研究結果發現：(1)在財務決策方面，家族持股愈高的公司，現金股利發放率愈高，資金成本、股票股利支付率和研發費用率則愈低。(2)在組織績效方面，家族持股愈高的公司，組織績效愈高。(3)在家族持股與財務決策之交乘效果與組織績效方面，現金(股票)股利支付率與組織績效呈正(負)相關，而高家族持股企業此關聯性較低；研發費用率與組織績效呈正相關，但高家族持股企業未有明顯差異。因此，當家族企業能適當的運用股利和投資決策時，較能創造更好的經營績效。

In worldwide commercial activities, family firms always play an important role. A large portion of Taiwan’s firms are characterized by family ownership. Previous literature lacked a comprehensive survey of the relationship among family firms, financial decisions and organizational performance. This study tends to use Taiwan’s listing corporations controlled by families to investigate the family ownership from the perspectives of financial decisions and organizational performance. Besides, the study further examines whether financial decisions will affect organizational performance in family firms. I expect to help firms make the best financial decisions and maximize the firm performance. The results are following. First, on the financial decisions, the higher family ownership indicates the higher cash dividend payout ratio, the lower cost of capital, stock dividend payout ratio and R&D ratio. Second, on the organizational performance, the higher family ownership indicates the higher performance. Third, on the relationship between financial decision controlled by family firms and organizational performance, cash (stock) dividend payout ratio are positively (negatively) correlated with performance, and cash (stock) dividend payout ratio and family ownership interactively are negatively (positively) correlated with performance; R&D ratio are positively correlated with performance. However, R&D ratio and family ownership interactively correlates insignificantly with performance. Consequently, when family firms manipulate dividend and investment decisions appropriately, they could create higher organizational performance.

目 錄
謝 辭 I
中文摘要 II
英文摘要 III
目 錄 IV
圖目次 V
表目次 V
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構 4
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 代理問題 6
第二節 股權結構與融資決策 10
第三節 股權結構與股利決策 11
第四節 股權結構與投資決策 13
第五節 股權結構與組織績效 14
第三章 研究設計 18
第一節 研究假說 18
第二節 實證模型與變數定義 24
第三節 研究期間與資料來源 36
第四章 實證結果與分析 37
第一節 敘述性統計量 37
第二節 相關性分析 40
第三節 迴歸分析 43
第四節 敏感性分析 49
第五章 結論與建議 52
第一節 研究結論 52
第二節 研究限制 54
第三節 後續研究建議 54
參考文獻 56

圖目次
圖1- 1 研究流程圖 5
圖3- 1 觀念性架構圖 18

表目次
表3- 1 TOBIN’S Q各種計算方式與彙總 27
表3- 2 有關「家族企業」定義之文獻 29
表3- 3 本研究各變數定義與衡量彙總表 33
表4- 1 基本敘述統計量 38
表4- 2 產業別家族持股、財務決策與組織績效之平均值 39
表4- 3 年度別家族持股、財務決策與組織績效之平均值 40
表4- 4 家族持股與財務決策之PEARSON相關係數矩陣 41
表4- 5 家族持股與財務決策和組織績效之PEARSON相關係數矩陣 42
表4- 6 家族持股與融資決策和股利決策之關聯 44
表4- 7 家族持股與投資決策和組織績效之關聯 45
表4- 8 家族持股影響下財務決策與組織績效(Q)之關聯 47
表4- 9 家族企業財務決策與組織績效(Q)之關聯 48
表4- 10 家族持股影響下財務決策與組織績效(ROE)之關聯 50

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